How to gerrymander: A formal analysis
Abstract The paper combines the optimal gerrymandering approach in political science with the “fair cake division” results in mathematics and economics to consider optimal partisan gerrymandering schemes on a given territory. We analyze existence and properties of an optimal districting map for a st...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Sherstyuk, Katerina [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
1998 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Public choice - Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1968, 95(1998), 1-2 vom: Apr., Seite 27-49 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:95 ; year:1998 ; number:1-2 ; month:04 ; pages:27-49 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1023/A:1004986314885 |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
OLC206194857X |
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10.1023/A:1004986314885 doi (DE-627)OLC206194857X (DE-He213)A:1004986314885-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Sherstyuk, Katerina verfasserin aut How to gerrymander: A formal analysis 1998 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998 Abstract The paper combines the optimal gerrymandering approach in political science with the “fair cake division” results in mathematics and economics to consider optimal partisan gerrymandering schemes on a given territory. We analyze existence and properties of an optimal districting map for a strategic party that has control over redistricting process, given arbitrary continuous distributions of voters and party supporters over the electoral territory. Interestingly, we find that imposition of certain equality-type constraints on districting might often help to prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness. Fair Division Lyapunov Theorem Electoral Support Support Index Geographic Constraint Enthalten in Public choice Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1968 95(1998), 1-2 vom: Apr., Seite 27-49 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:95 year:1998 number:1-2 month:04 pages:27-49 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004986314885 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 95 1998 1-2 04 27-49 |
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How to gerrymander: A formal analysis |
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how to gerrymander: a formal analysis |
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How to gerrymander: A formal analysis |
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Abstract The paper combines the optimal gerrymandering approach in political science with the “fair cake division” results in mathematics and economics to consider optimal partisan gerrymandering schemes on a given territory. We analyze existence and properties of an optimal districting map for a strategic party that has control over redistricting process, given arbitrary continuous distributions of voters and party supporters over the electoral territory. Interestingly, we find that imposition of certain equality-type constraints on districting might often help to prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness. © Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998 |
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Abstract The paper combines the optimal gerrymandering approach in political science with the “fair cake division” results in mathematics and economics to consider optimal partisan gerrymandering schemes on a given territory. We analyze existence and properties of an optimal districting map for a strategic party that has control over redistricting process, given arbitrary continuous distributions of voters and party supporters over the electoral territory. Interestingly, we find that imposition of certain equality-type constraints on districting might often help to prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness. © Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998 |
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Abstract The paper combines the optimal gerrymandering approach in political science with the “fair cake division” results in mathematics and economics to consider optimal partisan gerrymandering schemes on a given territory. We analyze existence and properties of an optimal districting map for a strategic party that has control over redistricting process, given arbitrary continuous distributions of voters and party supporters over the electoral territory. Interestingly, we find that imposition of certain equality-type constraints on districting might often help to prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness. © Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998 |
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