Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking
Abstract This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their produc...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2007 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Public choice - Springer US, 1968, 133(2007), 1-2 vom: 14. Juni, Seite 199-229 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:133 ; year:2007 ; number:1-2 ; day:14 ; month:06 ; pages:199-229 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11127-007-9186-5 |
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| Katalog-ID: |
OLC2061960154 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors’ exit option, distinguishing between “redistributive rent-seeking” and “productive rent-seeking” situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the “lost treasure” effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors’ exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases. | ||
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| 700 | 1 | |a Parisi, Francesco |4 aut | |
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10.1007/s11127-007-9186-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2061960154 (DE-He213)s11127-007-9186-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe verfasserin aut Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007 Abstract This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors’ exit option, distinguishing between “redistributive rent-seeking” and “productive rent-seeking” situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the “lost treasure” effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors’ exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases. Rent-seeking Rent dissipation Tullock’s paradox Langlais, Eric aut Lovat, Bruno aut Parisi, Francesco aut Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 133(2007), 1-2 vom: 14. Juni, Seite 199-229 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:133 year:2007 number:1-2 day:14 month:06 pages:199-229 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9186-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 133 2007 1-2 14 06 199-229 |
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10.1007/s11127-007-9186-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2061960154 (DE-He213)s11127-007-9186-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe verfasserin aut Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007 Abstract This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors’ exit option, distinguishing between “redistributive rent-seeking” and “productive rent-seeking” situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the “lost treasure” effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors’ exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases. Rent-seeking Rent dissipation Tullock’s paradox Langlais, Eric aut Lovat, Bruno aut Parisi, Francesco aut Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 133(2007), 1-2 vom: 14. Juni, Seite 199-229 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:133 year:2007 number:1-2 day:14 month:06 pages:199-229 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9186-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 133 2007 1-2 14 06 199-229 |
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10.1007/s11127-007-9186-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2061960154 (DE-He213)s11127-007-9186-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe verfasserin aut Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007 Abstract This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors’ exit option, distinguishing between “redistributive rent-seeking” and “productive rent-seeking” situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the “lost treasure” effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors’ exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases. Rent-seeking Rent dissipation Tullock’s paradox Langlais, Eric aut Lovat, Bruno aut Parisi, Francesco aut Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 133(2007), 1-2 vom: 14. Juni, Seite 199-229 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:133 year:2007 number:1-2 day:14 month:06 pages:199-229 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9186-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 133 2007 1-2 14 06 199-229 |
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10.1007/s11127-007-9186-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2061960154 (DE-He213)s11127-007-9186-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe verfasserin aut Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007 Abstract This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors’ exit option, distinguishing between “redistributive rent-seeking” and “productive rent-seeking” situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the “lost treasure” effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors’ exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases. Rent-seeking Rent dissipation Tullock’s paradox Langlais, Eric aut Lovat, Bruno aut Parisi, Francesco aut Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 133(2007), 1-2 vom: 14. Juni, Seite 199-229 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:133 year:2007 number:1-2 day:14 month:06 pages:199-229 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9186-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 133 2007 1-2 14 06 199-229 |
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10.1007/s11127-007-9186-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2061960154 (DE-He213)s11127-007-9186-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe verfasserin aut Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007 Abstract This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors’ exit option, distinguishing between “redistributive rent-seeking” and “productive rent-seeking” situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the “lost treasure” effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors’ exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases. Rent-seeking Rent dissipation Tullock’s paradox Langlais, Eric aut Lovat, Bruno aut Parisi, Francesco aut Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 133(2007), 1-2 vom: 14. Juni, Seite 199-229 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:133 year:2007 number:1-2 day:14 month:06 pages:199-229 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9186-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 133 2007 1-2 14 06 199-229 |
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Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking |
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Abstract This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors’ exit option, distinguishing between “redistributive rent-seeking” and “productive rent-seeking” situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the “lost treasure” effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors’ exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases. © Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007 |
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Abstract This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors’ exit option, distinguishing between “redistributive rent-seeking” and “productive rent-seeking” situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the “lost treasure” effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors’ exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases. © Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007 |
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Abstract This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation increases with the number of potential participants and with their productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further consider the impact of competitors’ exit option, distinguishing between “redistributive rent-seeking” and “productive rent-seeking” situations. In redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of participation creates a social loss (the “lost treasure” effect), since valuable rents are left unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors’ exit. Hence, unlike redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the number of players increases. © Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007 |
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