Federal Reserve transparency: The more things change, the more they stay the same?
Abstract The calculus of electoral politics and the central bank’s bureaucratic objectives can explain the recent trend toward greater Federal Reserve transparency and can shed light on the likelihood that this trend will continue. If incumbent politicians see no electoral advantage in pressuring th...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
McGregor, Rob Roy [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2007 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Public choice - Springer US, 1968, 133(2007), 3-4 vom: 12. Sept., Seite 269-273 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:133 ; year:2007 ; number:3-4 ; day:12 ; month:09 ; pages:269-273 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11127-007-9226-1 |
|---|
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OLC2061960464 |
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10.1007/s11127-007-9226-1 doi (DE-627)OLC2061960464 (DE-He213)s11127-007-9226-1-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ McGregor, Rob Roy verfasserin aut Federal Reserve transparency: The more things change, the more they stay the same? 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007 Abstract The calculus of electoral politics and the central bank’s bureaucratic objectives can explain the recent trend toward greater Federal Reserve transparency and can shed light on the likelihood that this trend will continue. If incumbent politicians see no electoral advantage in pressuring the Fed to become still more transparent, and if the Fed sees no benefit to greater transparancy, then further changes in current practice are unlikely. Private sector agents will continue to face a significant degree of uncertainty about the Fed’s policy objectives and about the information that policymakers consider in the monetary policy decision process. Federal Open Market Committee FOMC Federal Reserve Federal Reserve transparency Federal Reserve bureaucratic objectives Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 133(2007), 3-4 vom: 12. Sept., Seite 269-273 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:133 year:2007 number:3-4 day:12 month:09 pages:269-273 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9226-1 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 133 2007 3-4 12 09 269-273 |
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federal reserve transparency: the more things change, the more they stay the same? |
| title_auth |
Federal Reserve transparency: The more things change, the more they stay the same? |
| abstract |
Abstract The calculus of electoral politics and the central bank’s bureaucratic objectives can explain the recent trend toward greater Federal Reserve transparency and can shed light on the likelihood that this trend will continue. If incumbent politicians see no electoral advantage in pressuring the Fed to become still more transparent, and if the Fed sees no benefit to greater transparancy, then further changes in current practice are unlikely. Private sector agents will continue to face a significant degree of uncertainty about the Fed’s policy objectives and about the information that policymakers consider in the monetary policy decision process. © Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract The calculus of electoral politics and the central bank’s bureaucratic objectives can explain the recent trend toward greater Federal Reserve transparency and can shed light on the likelihood that this trend will continue. If incumbent politicians see no electoral advantage in pressuring the Fed to become still more transparent, and if the Fed sees no benefit to greater transparancy, then further changes in current practice are unlikely. Private sector agents will continue to face a significant degree of uncertainty about the Fed’s policy objectives and about the information that policymakers consider in the monetary policy decision process. © Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract The calculus of electoral politics and the central bank’s bureaucratic objectives can explain the recent trend toward greater Federal Reserve transparency and can shed light on the likelihood that this trend will continue. If incumbent politicians see no electoral advantage in pressuring the Fed to become still more transparent, and if the Fed sees no benefit to greater transparancy, then further changes in current practice are unlikely. Private sector agents will continue to face a significant degree of uncertainty about the Fed’s policy objectives and about the information that policymakers consider in the monetary policy decision process. © Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007 |
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Federal Reserve transparency: The more things change, the more they stay the same? |
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