The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization”
Abstract Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range o...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Pyle, William [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2011 |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
|---|
| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 |
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Public choice - Springer US, 1968, 155(2011), 1-2 vom: 20. Juli, Seite 19-41 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:155 ; year:2011 ; number:1-2 ; day:20 ; month:07 ; pages:19-41 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
OLC2061967027 |
|---|
| LEADER | 01000caa a22002652 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | OLC2061967027 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20230504014850.0 | ||
| 007 | tu | ||
| 008 | 200820s2011 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)OLC2061967027 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-He213)s11127-011-9823-x-p | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 082 | 0 | 4 | |a 330 |q VZ |
| 100 | 1 | |a Pyle, William |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization” |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2011 | |
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Band |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 | ||
| 520 | |a Abstract Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests—have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys—one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises—we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson’s hypothesis. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Mancur Olson | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Business lobbies | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Lobbying | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Encompassing | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Russia | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Solanko, Laura |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Public choice |d Springer US, 1968 |g 155(2011), 1-2 vom: 20. Juli, Seite 19-41 |w (DE-627)129497630 |w (DE-600)207597-0 |w (DE-576)014896680 |x 0048-5829 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:155 |g year:2011 |g number:1-2 |g day:20 |g month:07 |g pages:19-41 |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a GBV_USEFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a SYSFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_OLC | ||
| 912 | |a SSG-OLC-POL | ||
| 912 | |a SSG-OLC-WIW | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_26 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_31 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_32 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_39 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_60 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_70 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2006 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2007 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2012 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4012 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4028 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4125 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4126 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4193 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4318 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4323 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4393 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4700 | ||
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| 952 | |d 155 |j 2011 |e 1-2 |b 20 |c 07 |h 19-41 | ||
| author_variant |
w p wp l s ls |
|---|---|
| matchkey_str |
article:00485829:2011----::hcmoiinnitrssfusabsnslbisetnosnhpteio |
| hierarchy_sort_str |
2011 |
| publishDate |
2011 |
| allfields |
10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x doi (DE-627)OLC2061967027 (DE-He213)s11127-011-9823-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Pyle, William verfasserin aut The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization” 2011 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 Abstract Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests—have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys—one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises—we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson’s hypothesis. Mancur Olson Business lobbies Lobbying Encompassing Russia Solanko, Laura aut Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 155(2011), 1-2 vom: 20. Juli, Seite 19-41 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:155 year:2011 number:1-2 day:20 month:07 pages:19-41 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 155 2011 1-2 20 07 19-41 |
| spelling |
10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x doi (DE-627)OLC2061967027 (DE-He213)s11127-011-9823-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Pyle, William verfasserin aut The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization” 2011 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 Abstract Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests—have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys—one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises—we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson’s hypothesis. Mancur Olson Business lobbies Lobbying Encompassing Russia Solanko, Laura aut Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 155(2011), 1-2 vom: 20. Juli, Seite 19-41 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:155 year:2011 number:1-2 day:20 month:07 pages:19-41 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 155 2011 1-2 20 07 19-41 |
| allfields_unstemmed |
10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x doi (DE-627)OLC2061967027 (DE-He213)s11127-011-9823-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Pyle, William verfasserin aut The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization” 2011 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 Abstract Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests—have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys—one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises—we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson’s hypothesis. Mancur Olson Business lobbies Lobbying Encompassing Russia Solanko, Laura aut Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 155(2011), 1-2 vom: 20. Juli, Seite 19-41 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:155 year:2011 number:1-2 day:20 month:07 pages:19-41 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 155 2011 1-2 20 07 19-41 |
| allfieldsGer |
10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x doi (DE-627)OLC2061967027 (DE-He213)s11127-011-9823-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Pyle, William verfasserin aut The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization” 2011 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 Abstract Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests—have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys—one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises—we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson’s hypothesis. Mancur Olson Business lobbies Lobbying Encompassing Russia Solanko, Laura aut Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 155(2011), 1-2 vom: 20. Juli, Seite 19-41 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:155 year:2011 number:1-2 day:20 month:07 pages:19-41 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 155 2011 1-2 20 07 19-41 |
| allfieldsSound |
10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x doi (DE-627)OLC2061967027 (DE-He213)s11127-011-9823-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Pyle, William verfasserin aut The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization” 2011 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 Abstract Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests—have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys—one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises—we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson’s hypothesis. Mancur Olson Business lobbies Lobbying Encompassing Russia Solanko, Laura aut Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 155(2011), 1-2 vom: 20. Juli, Seite 19-41 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:155 year:2011 number:1-2 day:20 month:07 pages:19-41 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 155 2011 1-2 20 07 19-41 |
| language |
English |
| source |
Enthalten in Public choice 155(2011), 1-2 vom: 20. Juli, Seite 19-41 volume:155 year:2011 number:1-2 day:20 month:07 pages:19-41 |
| sourceStr |
Enthalten in Public choice 155(2011), 1-2 vom: 20. Juli, Seite 19-41 volume:155 year:2011 number:1-2 day:20 month:07 pages:19-41 |
| format_phy_str_mv |
Article |
| institution |
findex.gbv.de |
| topic_facet |
Mancur Olson Business lobbies Lobbying Encompassing Russia |
| dewey-raw |
330 |
| isfreeaccess_bool |
false |
| container_title |
Public choice |
| authorswithroles_txt_mv |
Pyle, William @@aut@@ Solanko, Laura @@aut@@ |
| publishDateDaySort_date |
2011-07-20T00:00:00Z |
| hierarchy_top_id |
129497630 |
| dewey-sort |
3330 |
| id |
OLC2061967027 |
| language_de |
englisch |
| fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2061967027</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230504014850.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200820s2011 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2061967027</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s11127-011-9823-x-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Pyle, William</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization”</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests—have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys—one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises—we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson’s hypothesis.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Mancur Olson</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Business lobbies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Lobbying</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Encompassing</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Russia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Solanko, Laura</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Public choice</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer US, 1968</subfield><subfield code="g">155(2011), 1-2 vom: 20. Juli, Seite 19-41</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)129497630</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)207597-0</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)014896680</subfield><subfield code="x">0048-5829</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:155</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2011</subfield><subfield code="g">number:1-2</subfield><subfield code="g">day:20</subfield><subfield code="g">month:07</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:19-41</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x</subfield><subfield code="z">lizenzpflichtig</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-POL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-WIW</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_32</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4028</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4193</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4318</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4393</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">155</subfield><subfield code="j">2011</subfield><subfield code="e">1-2</subfield><subfield code="b">20</subfield><subfield code="c">07</subfield><subfield code="h">19-41</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| author |
Pyle, William |
| spellingShingle |
Pyle, William ddc 330 misc Mancur Olson misc Business lobbies misc Lobbying misc Encompassing misc Russia The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization” |
| authorStr |
Pyle, William |
| ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv |
@@773@@(DE-627)129497630 |
| format |
Article |
| dewey-ones |
330 - Economics |
| delete_txt_mv |
keep |
| author_role |
aut aut |
| collection |
OLC |
| remote_str |
false |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| issn |
0048-5829 |
| topic_title |
330 VZ The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization” Mancur Olson Business lobbies Lobbying Encompassing Russia |
| topic |
ddc 330 misc Mancur Olson misc Business lobbies misc Lobbying misc Encompassing misc Russia |
| topic_unstemmed |
ddc 330 misc Mancur Olson misc Business lobbies misc Lobbying misc Encompassing misc Russia |
| topic_browse |
ddc 330 misc Mancur Olson misc Business lobbies misc Lobbying misc Encompassing misc Russia |
| format_facet |
Aufsätze Gedruckte Aufsätze |
| format_main_str_mv |
Text Zeitschrift/Artikel |
| carriertype_str_mv |
nc |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
Public choice |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
129497630 |
| dewey-tens |
330 - Economics |
| hierarchy_top_title |
Public choice |
| isfreeaccess_txt |
false |
| familylinks_str_mv |
(DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 |
| title |
The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization” |
| ctrlnum |
(DE-627)OLC2061967027 (DE-He213)s11127-011-9823-x-p |
| title_full |
The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization” |
| author_sort |
Pyle, William |
| journal |
Public choice |
| journalStr |
Public choice |
| lang_code |
eng |
| isOA_bool |
false |
| dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
| recordtype |
marc |
| publishDateSort |
2011 |
| contenttype_str_mv |
txt |
| container_start_page |
19 |
| author_browse |
Pyle, William Solanko, Laura |
| container_volume |
155 |
| class |
330 VZ |
| format_se |
Aufsätze |
| author-letter |
Pyle, William |
| doi_str_mv |
10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x |
| dewey-full |
330 |
| title_sort |
the composition and interests of russia’s business lobbies: testing olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization” |
| title_auth |
The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization” |
| abstract |
Abstract Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests—have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys—one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises—we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson’s hypothesis. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests—have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys—one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises—we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson’s hypothesis. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests—have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys—one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises—we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson’s hypothesis. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 |
| collection_details |
GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 |
| container_issue |
1-2 |
| title_short |
The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization” |
| url |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x |
| remote_bool |
false |
| author2 |
Solanko, Laura |
| author2Str |
Solanko, Laura |
| ppnlink |
129497630 |
| mediatype_str_mv |
n |
| isOA_txt |
false |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| doi_str |
10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x |
| up_date |
2024-07-04T04:52:06.394Z |
| _version_ |
1803622784838926336 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2061967027</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230504014850.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200820s2011 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2061967027</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s11127-011-9823-x-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Pyle, William</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization”</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests—have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys—one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises—we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson’s hypothesis.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Mancur Olson</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Business lobbies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Lobbying</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Encompassing</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Russia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Solanko, Laura</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Public choice</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer US, 1968</subfield><subfield code="g">155(2011), 1-2 vom: 20. Juli, Seite 19-41</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)129497630</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)207597-0</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)014896680</subfield><subfield code="x">0048-5829</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:155</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2011</subfield><subfield code="g">number:1-2</subfield><subfield code="g">day:20</subfield><subfield code="g">month:07</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:19-41</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x</subfield><subfield code="z">lizenzpflichtig</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-POL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-WIW</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_32</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4028</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4193</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4318</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4393</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">155</subfield><subfield code="j">2011</subfield><subfield code="e">1-2</subfield><subfield code="b">20</subfield><subfield code="c">07</subfield><subfield code="h">19-41</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| score |
7.3982058 |