Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights
Abstract We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites’ asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites’ concern about the security of thei...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Polishchuk, Leonid [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2014 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Public choice - Springer US, 1968, 162(2014), 1-2 vom: 16. Nov., Seite 159-182 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:162 ; year:2014 ; number:1-2 ; day:16 ; month:11 ; pages:159-182 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11127-014-0210-2 |
|---|
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OLC2061969577 |
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10.1007/s11127-014-0210-2 doi (DE-627)OLC2061969577 (DE-He213)s11127-014-0210-2-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Polishchuk, Leonid verfasserin aut Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights 2014 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 Abstract We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites’ asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites’ concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent. Endogenous property rights Credible commitment “Stationary bandit” Syunyaev, Georgiy aut Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 162(2014), 1-2 vom: 16. Nov., Seite 159-182 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:162 year:2014 number:1-2 day:16 month:11 pages:159-182 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0210-2 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 162 2014 1-2 16 11 159-182 |
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10.1007/s11127-014-0210-2 doi (DE-627)OLC2061969577 (DE-He213)s11127-014-0210-2-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Polishchuk, Leonid verfasserin aut Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights 2014 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 Abstract We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites’ asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites’ concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent. Endogenous property rights Credible commitment “Stationary bandit” Syunyaev, Georgiy aut Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 162(2014), 1-2 vom: 16. Nov., Seite 159-182 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:162 year:2014 number:1-2 day:16 month:11 pages:159-182 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0210-2 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 162 2014 1-2 16 11 159-182 |
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Abstract We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites’ asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites’ concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent. © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 |
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Abstract We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites’ asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites’ concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent. © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 |
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