On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device
Abstract In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haysta...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Stark, Oded [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2008 |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
|---|
| Anmerkung: |
© Springer-Verlag 2008 |
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Journal of evolutionary economics - Springer-Verlag, 1991, 19(2008), 1 vom: 20. Juni, Seite 95-109 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:19 ; year:2008 ; number:1 ; day:20 ; month:06 ; pages:95-109 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
OLC2062635621 |
|---|
| LEADER | 01000caa a22002652 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | OLC2062635621 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20230323144509.0 | ||
| 007 | tu | ||
| 008 | 200820s2008 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)OLC2062635621 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-He213)s00191-008-0112-x-p | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 082 | 0 | 4 | |a 330 |q VZ |
| 082 | 0 | 4 | |a 300 |a 330 |q VZ |
| 100 | 1 | |a Stark, Oded |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2008 | |
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Band |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a © Springer-Verlag 2008 | ||
| 520 | |a Abstract In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Haystacks-type model | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Prisoner’s dilemma game | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Inclination to migrate | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Cost of migration | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Evolution of cooperation | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Taste for migration | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Behrens, Doris A. |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Wang, Yong |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Journal of evolutionary economics |d Springer-Verlag, 1991 |g 19(2008), 1 vom: 20. Juni, Seite 95-109 |w (DE-627)130926132 |w (DE-600)1055126-8 |w (DE-576)025087231 |x 0936-9937 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:19 |g year:2008 |g number:1 |g day:20 |g month:06 |g pages:95-109 |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x |z lizenzpflichtig |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a GBV_USEFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a SYSFLAG_A | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_OLC | ||
| 912 | |a SSG-OLC-WIW | ||
| 912 | |a SSG-OLC-IBL | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_11 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_26 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_31 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_39 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_40 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_60 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_70 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_267 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2002 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2006 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2007 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2018 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4012 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4116 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4125 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4193 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4277 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4311 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4314 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4317 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4318 | ||
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| 952 | |d 19 |j 2008 |e 1 |b 20 |c 06 |h 95-109 | ||
| author_variant |
o s os d a b da dab y w yw |
|---|---|
| matchkey_str |
article:09369937:2008----::nheouinregomgainsnsot |
| hierarchy_sort_str |
2008 |
| publishDate |
2008 |
| allfields |
10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x doi (DE-627)OLC2062635621 (DE-He213)s00191-008-0112-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 300 330 VZ Stark, Oded verfasserin aut On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device 2008 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag 2008 Abstract In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation. Haystacks-type model Prisoner’s dilemma game Inclination to migrate Cost of migration Evolution of cooperation Taste for migration Behrens, Doris A. aut Wang, Yong aut Enthalten in Journal of evolutionary economics Springer-Verlag, 1991 19(2008), 1 vom: 20. Juni, Seite 95-109 (DE-627)130926132 (DE-600)1055126-8 (DE-576)025087231 0936-9937 nnns volume:19 year:2008 number:1 day:20 month:06 pages:95-109 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 AR 19 2008 1 20 06 95-109 |
| spelling |
10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x doi (DE-627)OLC2062635621 (DE-He213)s00191-008-0112-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 300 330 VZ Stark, Oded verfasserin aut On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device 2008 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag 2008 Abstract In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation. Haystacks-type model Prisoner’s dilemma game Inclination to migrate Cost of migration Evolution of cooperation Taste for migration Behrens, Doris A. aut Wang, Yong aut Enthalten in Journal of evolutionary economics Springer-Verlag, 1991 19(2008), 1 vom: 20. Juni, Seite 95-109 (DE-627)130926132 (DE-600)1055126-8 (DE-576)025087231 0936-9937 nnns volume:19 year:2008 number:1 day:20 month:06 pages:95-109 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 AR 19 2008 1 20 06 95-109 |
| allfields_unstemmed |
10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x doi (DE-627)OLC2062635621 (DE-He213)s00191-008-0112-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 300 330 VZ Stark, Oded verfasserin aut On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device 2008 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag 2008 Abstract In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation. Haystacks-type model Prisoner’s dilemma game Inclination to migrate Cost of migration Evolution of cooperation Taste for migration Behrens, Doris A. aut Wang, Yong aut Enthalten in Journal of evolutionary economics Springer-Verlag, 1991 19(2008), 1 vom: 20. Juni, Seite 95-109 (DE-627)130926132 (DE-600)1055126-8 (DE-576)025087231 0936-9937 nnns volume:19 year:2008 number:1 day:20 month:06 pages:95-109 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 AR 19 2008 1 20 06 95-109 |
| allfieldsGer |
10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x doi (DE-627)OLC2062635621 (DE-He213)s00191-008-0112-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 300 330 VZ Stark, Oded verfasserin aut On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device 2008 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag 2008 Abstract In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation. Haystacks-type model Prisoner’s dilemma game Inclination to migrate Cost of migration Evolution of cooperation Taste for migration Behrens, Doris A. aut Wang, Yong aut Enthalten in Journal of evolutionary economics Springer-Verlag, 1991 19(2008), 1 vom: 20. Juni, Seite 95-109 (DE-627)130926132 (DE-600)1055126-8 (DE-576)025087231 0936-9937 nnns volume:19 year:2008 number:1 day:20 month:06 pages:95-109 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 AR 19 2008 1 20 06 95-109 |
| allfieldsSound |
10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x doi (DE-627)OLC2062635621 (DE-He213)s00191-008-0112-x-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 300 330 VZ Stark, Oded verfasserin aut On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device 2008 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag 2008 Abstract In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation. Haystacks-type model Prisoner’s dilemma game Inclination to migrate Cost of migration Evolution of cooperation Taste for migration Behrens, Doris A. aut Wang, Yong aut Enthalten in Journal of evolutionary economics Springer-Verlag, 1991 19(2008), 1 vom: 20. Juni, Seite 95-109 (DE-627)130926132 (DE-600)1055126-8 (DE-576)025087231 0936-9937 nnns volume:19 year:2008 number:1 day:20 month:06 pages:95-109 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 AR 19 2008 1 20 06 95-109 |
| language |
English |
| source |
Enthalten in Journal of evolutionary economics 19(2008), 1 vom: 20. Juni, Seite 95-109 volume:19 year:2008 number:1 day:20 month:06 pages:95-109 |
| sourceStr |
Enthalten in Journal of evolutionary economics 19(2008), 1 vom: 20. Juni, Seite 95-109 volume:19 year:2008 number:1 day:20 month:06 pages:95-109 |
| format_phy_str_mv |
Article |
| institution |
findex.gbv.de |
| topic_facet |
Haystacks-type model Prisoner’s dilemma game Inclination to migrate Cost of migration Evolution of cooperation Taste for migration |
| dewey-raw |
330 |
| isfreeaccess_bool |
false |
| container_title |
Journal of evolutionary economics |
| authorswithroles_txt_mv |
Stark, Oded @@aut@@ Behrens, Doris A. @@aut@@ Wang, Yong @@aut@@ |
| publishDateDaySort_date |
2008-06-20T00:00:00Z |
| hierarchy_top_id |
130926132 |
| dewey-sort |
3330 |
| id |
OLC2062635621 |
| language_de |
englisch |
| fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2062635621</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230323144509.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200820s2008 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2062635621</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s00191-008-0112-x-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">300</subfield><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Stark, Oded</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2008</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer-Verlag 2008</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Haystacks-type model</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Prisoner’s dilemma game</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Inclination to migrate</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Cost of migration</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Evolution of cooperation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Taste for migration</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Behrens, Doris A.</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Wang, Yong</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Journal of evolutionary economics</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer-Verlag, 1991</subfield><subfield code="g">19(2008), 1 vom: 20. Juni, Seite 95-109</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)130926132</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1055126-8</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)025087231</subfield><subfield code="x">0936-9937</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:19</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2008</subfield><subfield code="g">number:1</subfield><subfield code="g">day:20</subfield><subfield code="g">month:06</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:95-109</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x</subfield><subfield code="z">lizenzpflichtig</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-WIW</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-IBL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_267</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2018</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4116</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4193</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4277</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4311</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4314</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4317</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4318</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">19</subfield><subfield code="j">2008</subfield><subfield code="e">1</subfield><subfield code="b">20</subfield><subfield code="c">06</subfield><subfield code="h">95-109</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| author |
Stark, Oded |
| spellingShingle |
Stark, Oded ddc 330 ddc 300 misc Haystacks-type model misc Prisoner’s dilemma game misc Inclination to migrate misc Cost of migration misc Evolution of cooperation misc Taste for migration On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device |
| authorStr |
Stark, Oded |
| ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv |
@@773@@(DE-627)130926132 |
| format |
Article |
| dewey-ones |
330 - Economics 300 - Social sciences |
| delete_txt_mv |
keep |
| author_role |
aut aut aut |
| collection |
OLC |
| remote_str |
false |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| issn |
0936-9937 |
| topic_title |
330 VZ 300 330 VZ On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device Haystacks-type model Prisoner’s dilemma game Inclination to migrate Cost of migration Evolution of cooperation Taste for migration |
| topic |
ddc 330 ddc 300 misc Haystacks-type model misc Prisoner’s dilemma game misc Inclination to migrate misc Cost of migration misc Evolution of cooperation misc Taste for migration |
| topic_unstemmed |
ddc 330 ddc 300 misc Haystacks-type model misc Prisoner’s dilemma game misc Inclination to migrate misc Cost of migration misc Evolution of cooperation misc Taste for migration |
| topic_browse |
ddc 330 ddc 300 misc Haystacks-type model misc Prisoner’s dilemma game misc Inclination to migrate misc Cost of migration misc Evolution of cooperation misc Taste for migration |
| format_facet |
Aufsätze Gedruckte Aufsätze |
| format_main_str_mv |
Text Zeitschrift/Artikel |
| carriertype_str_mv |
nc |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
Journal of evolutionary economics |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
130926132 |
| dewey-tens |
330 - Economics 300 - Social sciences, sociology & anthropology |
| hierarchy_top_title |
Journal of evolutionary economics |
| isfreeaccess_txt |
false |
| familylinks_str_mv |
(DE-627)130926132 (DE-600)1055126-8 (DE-576)025087231 |
| title |
On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device |
| ctrlnum |
(DE-627)OLC2062635621 (DE-He213)s00191-008-0112-x-p |
| title_full |
On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device |
| author_sort |
Stark, Oded |
| journal |
Journal of evolutionary economics |
| journalStr |
Journal of evolutionary economics |
| lang_code |
eng |
| isOA_bool |
false |
| dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
| recordtype |
marc |
| publishDateSort |
2008 |
| contenttype_str_mv |
txt |
| container_start_page |
95 |
| author_browse |
Stark, Oded Behrens, Doris A. Wang, Yong |
| container_volume |
19 |
| class |
330 VZ 300 330 VZ |
| format_se |
Aufsätze |
| author-letter |
Stark, Oded |
| doi_str_mv |
10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x |
| dewey-full |
330 300 |
| title_sort |
on the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device |
| title_auth |
On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device |
| abstract |
Abstract In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation. © Springer-Verlag 2008 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation. © Springer-Verlag 2008 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation. © Springer-Verlag 2008 |
| collection_details |
GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-IBL GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 |
| container_issue |
1 |
| title_short |
On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device |
| url |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x |
| remote_bool |
false |
| author2 |
Behrens, Doris A. Wang, Yong |
| author2Str |
Behrens, Doris A. Wang, Yong |
| ppnlink |
130926132 |
| mediatype_str_mv |
n |
| isOA_txt |
false |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| doi_str |
10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x |
| up_date |
2024-07-03T15:52:20.855Z |
| _version_ |
1803573726656069632 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2062635621</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230323144509.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200820s2008 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2062635621</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s00191-008-0112-x-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">300</subfield><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Stark, Oded</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">On the evolutionary edge of migration as an assortative mating device</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2008</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer-Verlag 2008</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Haystacks-type model</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Prisoner’s dilemma game</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Inclination to migrate</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Cost of migration</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Evolution of cooperation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Taste for migration</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Behrens, Doris A.</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Wang, Yong</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Journal of evolutionary economics</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer-Verlag, 1991</subfield><subfield code="g">19(2008), 1 vom: 20. Juni, Seite 95-109</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)130926132</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1055126-8</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)025087231</subfield><subfield code="x">0936-9937</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:19</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2008</subfield><subfield code="g">number:1</subfield><subfield code="g">day:20</subfield><subfield code="g">month:06</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:95-109</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-008-0112-x</subfield><subfield code="z">lizenzpflichtig</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-WIW</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-IBL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_267</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2018</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4116</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4193</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4277</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4311</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4314</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4317</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4318</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">19</subfield><subfield code="j">2008</subfield><subfield code="e">1</subfield><subfield code="b">20</subfield><subfield code="c">06</subfield><subfield code="h">95-109</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| score |
7.3995953 |