Modelling non-competitive behavior in commodity markets: A game theoretic approach
Abstract In this paper, we provide a coalitional alternative to the perfectly competitive and purely non-cooperative assumptions commonly employed in the modelling of commodity markets. These assumptions of perfect competition or pure non-cooperation are usually imposed exogenously without providing...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Rajan, R. [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
1990 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Physica-Verlag 1990 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Empirical economics - Physica-Verlag, 1976, 15(1990), 4 vom: Dez., Seite 347-366 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:15 ; year:1990 ; number:4 ; month:12 ; pages:347-366 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/BF02307287 |
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OLC2063174660 |
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10.1007/BF02307287 doi (DE-627)OLC2063174660 (DE-He213)BF02307287-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 VZ 000 330 VZ Rajan, R. verfasserin aut Modelling non-competitive behavior in commodity markets: A game theoretic approach 1990 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Physica-Verlag 1990 Abstract In this paper, we provide a coalitional alternative to the perfectly competitive and purely non-cooperative assumptions commonly employed in the modelling of commodity markets. These assumptions of perfect competition or pure non-cooperation are usually imposed exogenously without providing an economic basis for assuming why firms that could stand to gain by cooperating would not in fact do so. Three behavioral rules embodied in three different cooperative games are discussed in this paper and a methodology for predicting the coalition structures that would result from each of these is offered. By applying these games to the US copper industry of the 1970's, we show that the theory of games can be profitably employed in conjunction with the traditional “institutional approach” of industrial organization to yield useful economic predictions. Copper Economic Theory Theoretic Approach Industrial Organization Cooperative Game Enthalten in Empirical economics Physica-Verlag, 1976 15(1990), 4 vom: Dez., Seite 347-366 (DE-627)130166235 (DE-600)519394-1 (DE-576)015709310 0377-7332 nnns volume:15 year:1990 number:4 month:12 pages:347-366 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02307287 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4393 AR 15 1990 4 12 347-366 |
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10.1007/BF02307287 doi (DE-627)OLC2063174660 (DE-He213)BF02307287-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 VZ 000 330 VZ Rajan, R. verfasserin aut Modelling non-competitive behavior in commodity markets: A game theoretic approach 1990 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Physica-Verlag 1990 Abstract In this paper, we provide a coalitional alternative to the perfectly competitive and purely non-cooperative assumptions commonly employed in the modelling of commodity markets. These assumptions of perfect competition or pure non-cooperation are usually imposed exogenously without providing an economic basis for assuming why firms that could stand to gain by cooperating would not in fact do so. Three behavioral rules embodied in three different cooperative games are discussed in this paper and a methodology for predicting the coalition structures that would result from each of these is offered. By applying these games to the US copper industry of the 1970's, we show that the theory of games can be profitably employed in conjunction with the traditional “institutional approach” of industrial organization to yield useful economic predictions. Copper Economic Theory Theoretic Approach Industrial Organization Cooperative Game Enthalten in Empirical economics Physica-Verlag, 1976 15(1990), 4 vom: Dez., Seite 347-366 (DE-627)130166235 (DE-600)519394-1 (DE-576)015709310 0377-7332 nnns volume:15 year:1990 number:4 month:12 pages:347-366 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02307287 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4393 AR 15 1990 4 12 347-366 |
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10.1007/BF02307287 doi (DE-627)OLC2063174660 (DE-He213)BF02307287-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 VZ 000 330 VZ Rajan, R. verfasserin aut Modelling non-competitive behavior in commodity markets: A game theoretic approach 1990 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Physica-Verlag 1990 Abstract In this paper, we provide a coalitional alternative to the perfectly competitive and purely non-cooperative assumptions commonly employed in the modelling of commodity markets. These assumptions of perfect competition or pure non-cooperation are usually imposed exogenously without providing an economic basis for assuming why firms that could stand to gain by cooperating would not in fact do so. Three behavioral rules embodied in three different cooperative games are discussed in this paper and a methodology for predicting the coalition structures that would result from each of these is offered. By applying these games to the US copper industry of the 1970's, we show that the theory of games can be profitably employed in conjunction with the traditional “institutional approach” of industrial organization to yield useful economic predictions. Copper Economic Theory Theoretic Approach Industrial Organization Cooperative Game Enthalten in Empirical economics Physica-Verlag, 1976 15(1990), 4 vom: Dez., Seite 347-366 (DE-627)130166235 (DE-600)519394-1 (DE-576)015709310 0377-7332 nnns volume:15 year:1990 number:4 month:12 pages:347-366 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02307287 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4393 AR 15 1990 4 12 347-366 |
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Rajan, R. |
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Rajan, R. |
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10.1007/BF02307287 |
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modelling non-competitive behavior in commodity markets: a game theoretic approach |
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Modelling non-competitive behavior in commodity markets: A game theoretic approach |
| abstract |
Abstract In this paper, we provide a coalitional alternative to the perfectly competitive and purely non-cooperative assumptions commonly employed in the modelling of commodity markets. These assumptions of perfect competition or pure non-cooperation are usually imposed exogenously without providing an economic basis for assuming why firms that could stand to gain by cooperating would not in fact do so. Three behavioral rules embodied in three different cooperative games are discussed in this paper and a methodology for predicting the coalition structures that would result from each of these is offered. By applying these games to the US copper industry of the 1970's, we show that the theory of games can be profitably employed in conjunction with the traditional “institutional approach” of industrial organization to yield useful economic predictions. © Physica-Verlag 1990 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract In this paper, we provide a coalitional alternative to the perfectly competitive and purely non-cooperative assumptions commonly employed in the modelling of commodity markets. These assumptions of perfect competition or pure non-cooperation are usually imposed exogenously without providing an economic basis for assuming why firms that could stand to gain by cooperating would not in fact do so. Three behavioral rules embodied in three different cooperative games are discussed in this paper and a methodology for predicting the coalition structures that would result from each of these is offered. By applying these games to the US copper industry of the 1970's, we show that the theory of games can be profitably employed in conjunction with the traditional “institutional approach” of industrial organization to yield useful economic predictions. © Physica-Verlag 1990 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract In this paper, we provide a coalitional alternative to the perfectly competitive and purely non-cooperative assumptions commonly employed in the modelling of commodity markets. These assumptions of perfect competition or pure non-cooperation are usually imposed exogenously without providing an economic basis for assuming why firms that could stand to gain by cooperating would not in fact do so. Three behavioral rules embodied in three different cooperative games are discussed in this paper and a methodology for predicting the coalition structures that would result from each of these is offered. By applying these games to the US copper industry of the 1970's, we show that the theory of games can be profitably employed in conjunction with the traditional “institutional approach” of industrial organization to yield useful economic predictions. © Physica-Verlag 1990 |
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Modelling non-competitive behavior in commodity markets: A game theoretic approach |
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