A tractable multiple agents protocol and algorithm for resource allocation under price rigidities
Abstract In many resource allocation problems, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We investigate the computational issues of dynamic mechanisms for selling multiple indivi...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Huang, Wei [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2015 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Applied intelligence - Springer US, 1991, 43(2015), 3 vom: 05. Mai, Seite 564-577 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:43 ; year:2015 ; number:3 ; day:05 ; month:05 ; pages:564-577 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s10489-015-0663-0 |
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OLC2066100595 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract In many resource allocation problems, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We investigate the computational issues of dynamic mechanisms for selling multiple indivisible objects under price rigidities. We propose a multiple agents protocol and algorithm with polynomial time complexity that can achieve the over-demanded sets of items, and then introduce a dynamic mechanism with rationing to discover constrainedWalrasian equilibria under price rigidities in polynomial time. We also address the computation of buyers’ expected profits and items’ expected prices, and discuss strategical issues in the sense of expected profits. | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Price rigidity | |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Dynamic mechanism | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Constrained Walrasian equilibrium | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Liu, Hongbo |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Dai, Guangyao |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Abraham, Ajith |4 aut | |
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10.1007/s10489-015-0663-0 doi (DE-627)OLC2066100595 (DE-He213)s10489-015-0663-0-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 VZ Huang, Wei verfasserin aut A tractable multiple agents protocol and algorithm for resource allocation under price rigidities 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015 Abstract In many resource allocation problems, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We investigate the computational issues of dynamic mechanisms for selling multiple indivisible objects under price rigidities. We propose a multiple agents protocol and algorithm with polynomial time complexity that can achieve the over-demanded sets of items, and then introduce a dynamic mechanism with rationing to discover constrainedWalrasian equilibria under price rigidities in polynomial time. We also address the computation of buyers’ expected profits and items’ expected prices, and discuss strategical issues in the sense of expected profits. Resource allocation Price rigidity Multiple agents system Dynamic mechanism Constrained Walrasian equilibrium Liu, Hongbo aut Dai, Guangyao aut Abraham, Ajith aut Enthalten in Applied intelligence Springer US, 1991 43(2015), 3 vom: 05. Mai, Seite 564-577 (DE-627)130990515 (DE-600)1080229-0 (DE-576)029154286 0924-669X nnns volume:43 year:2015 number:3 day:05 month:05 pages:564-577 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10489-015-0663-0 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_70 AR 43 2015 3 05 05 564-577 |
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10.1007/s10489-015-0663-0 doi (DE-627)OLC2066100595 (DE-He213)s10489-015-0663-0-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 VZ Huang, Wei verfasserin aut A tractable multiple agents protocol and algorithm for resource allocation under price rigidities 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015 Abstract In many resource allocation problems, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We investigate the computational issues of dynamic mechanisms for selling multiple indivisible objects under price rigidities. We propose a multiple agents protocol and algorithm with polynomial time complexity that can achieve the over-demanded sets of items, and then introduce a dynamic mechanism with rationing to discover constrainedWalrasian equilibria under price rigidities in polynomial time. We also address the computation of buyers’ expected profits and items’ expected prices, and discuss strategical issues in the sense of expected profits. Resource allocation Price rigidity Multiple agents system Dynamic mechanism Constrained Walrasian equilibrium Liu, Hongbo aut Dai, Guangyao aut Abraham, Ajith aut Enthalten in Applied intelligence Springer US, 1991 43(2015), 3 vom: 05. Mai, Seite 564-577 (DE-627)130990515 (DE-600)1080229-0 (DE-576)029154286 0924-669X nnns volume:43 year:2015 number:3 day:05 month:05 pages:564-577 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10489-015-0663-0 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_70 AR 43 2015 3 05 05 564-577 |
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10.1007/s10489-015-0663-0 doi (DE-627)OLC2066100595 (DE-He213)s10489-015-0663-0-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 VZ Huang, Wei verfasserin aut A tractable multiple agents protocol and algorithm for resource allocation under price rigidities 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015 Abstract In many resource allocation problems, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We investigate the computational issues of dynamic mechanisms for selling multiple indivisible objects under price rigidities. We propose a multiple agents protocol and algorithm with polynomial time complexity that can achieve the over-demanded sets of items, and then introduce a dynamic mechanism with rationing to discover constrainedWalrasian equilibria under price rigidities in polynomial time. We also address the computation of buyers’ expected profits and items’ expected prices, and discuss strategical issues in the sense of expected profits. Resource allocation Price rigidity Multiple agents system Dynamic mechanism Constrained Walrasian equilibrium Liu, Hongbo aut Dai, Guangyao aut Abraham, Ajith aut Enthalten in Applied intelligence Springer US, 1991 43(2015), 3 vom: 05. Mai, Seite 564-577 (DE-627)130990515 (DE-600)1080229-0 (DE-576)029154286 0924-669X nnns volume:43 year:2015 number:3 day:05 month:05 pages:564-577 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10489-015-0663-0 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_70 AR 43 2015 3 05 05 564-577 |
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Abstract In many resource allocation problems, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We investigate the computational issues of dynamic mechanisms for selling multiple indivisible objects under price rigidities. We propose a multiple agents protocol and algorithm with polynomial time complexity that can achieve the over-demanded sets of items, and then introduce a dynamic mechanism with rationing to discover constrainedWalrasian equilibria under price rigidities in polynomial time. We also address the computation of buyers’ expected profits and items’ expected prices, and discuss strategical issues in the sense of expected profits. © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015 |
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Abstract In many resource allocation problems, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We investigate the computational issues of dynamic mechanisms for selling multiple indivisible objects under price rigidities. We propose a multiple agents protocol and algorithm with polynomial time complexity that can achieve the over-demanded sets of items, and then introduce a dynamic mechanism with rationing to discover constrainedWalrasian equilibria under price rigidities in polynomial time. We also address the computation of buyers’ expected profits and items’ expected prices, and discuss strategical issues in the sense of expected profits. © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015 |
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Abstract In many resource allocation problems, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We investigate the computational issues of dynamic mechanisms for selling multiple indivisible objects under price rigidities. We propose a multiple agents protocol and algorithm with polynomial time complexity that can achieve the over-demanded sets of items, and then introduce a dynamic mechanism with rationing to discover constrainedWalrasian equilibria under price rigidities in polynomial time. We also address the computation of buyers’ expected profits and items’ expected prices, and discuss strategical issues in the sense of expected profits. © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015 |
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2066100595</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230502204938.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200820s2015 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s10489-015-0663-0</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2066100595</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s10489-015-0663-0-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">004</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Huang, Wei</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">A tractable multiple agents protocol and algorithm for resource allocation under price rigidities</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract In many resource allocation problems, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. 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