Multiproject team assignments
Abstract. We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equ...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Sherstyuk, Katerina [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
1999 |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Review of economic design - Springer-Verlag, 1997, 4(1999), 3 vom: Sept., Seite 231-254 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:4 ; year:1999 ; number:3 ; month:09 ; pages:231-254 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s100580050036 |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
OLC2069139468 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract. We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms are similar to the optimal auction (Myerson, 1981), the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project. | ||
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10.1007/s100580050036 doi (DE-627)OLC2069139468 (DE-He213)s100580050036-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 3,2 ssgn Sherstyuk, Katerina verfasserin aut Multiproject team assignments 1999 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999 Abstract. We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms are similar to the optimal auction (Myerson, 1981), the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project. Enthalten in Review of economic design Springer-Verlag, 1997 4(1999), 3 vom: Sept., Seite 231-254 (DE-627)238773264 (DE-600)1409550-6 (DE-576)067091741 1434-4742 nnns volume:4 year:1999 number:3 month:09 pages:231-254 https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050036 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4277 AR 4 1999 3 09 231-254 |
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10.1007/s100580050036 doi (DE-627)OLC2069139468 (DE-He213)s100580050036-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 3,2 ssgn Sherstyuk, Katerina verfasserin aut Multiproject team assignments 1999 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999 Abstract. We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms are similar to the optimal auction (Myerson, 1981), the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project. Enthalten in Review of economic design Springer-Verlag, 1997 4(1999), 3 vom: Sept., Seite 231-254 (DE-627)238773264 (DE-600)1409550-6 (DE-576)067091741 1434-4742 nnns volume:4 year:1999 number:3 month:09 pages:231-254 https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050036 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4277 AR 4 1999 3 09 231-254 |
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10.1007/s100580050036 doi (DE-627)OLC2069139468 (DE-He213)s100580050036-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 3,2 ssgn Sherstyuk, Katerina verfasserin aut Multiproject team assignments 1999 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999 Abstract. We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms are similar to the optimal auction (Myerson, 1981), the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project. Enthalten in Review of economic design Springer-Verlag, 1997 4(1999), 3 vom: Sept., Seite 231-254 (DE-627)238773264 (DE-600)1409550-6 (DE-576)067091741 1434-4742 nnns volume:4 year:1999 number:3 month:09 pages:231-254 https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050036 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4277 AR 4 1999 3 09 231-254 |
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Abstract. We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms are similar to the optimal auction (Myerson, 1981), the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999 |
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Abstract. We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms are similar to the optimal auction (Myerson, 1981), the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999 |
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Abstract. We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms are similar to the optimal auction (Myerson, 1981), the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999 |
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We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms are similar to the optimal auction (Myerson, 1981), the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Review of economic design</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer-Verlag, 1997</subfield><subfield code="g">4(1999), 3 vom: Sept., Seite 231-254</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)238773264</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1409550-6</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)067091741</subfield><subfield code="x">1434-4742</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:4</subfield><subfield code="g">year:1999</subfield><subfield code="g">number:3</subfield><subfield code="g">month:09</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:231-254</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050036</subfield><subfield code="z">lizenzpflichtig</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_OLC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-WIW</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2018</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4028</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4029</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4277</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">4</subfield><subfield code="j">1999</subfield><subfield code="e">3</subfield><subfield code="c">09</subfield><subfield code="h">231-254</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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