Internalized social norms in conflicts: an evolutionary approach
Abstract An individual with an internalized norm prefers to comply with the norm as long as the opponents also comply. This paper studies the evolution of such norms in a conflict. Individuals play with the same opponent for a number of rounds, during which they adapt their behavior according to a m...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Mohlin, Erik [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2010 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Systematik: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer-Verlag 2010 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Economics of governance - Springer-Verlag, 2000, 11(2010), 2 vom: 27. Feb., Seite 169-181 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:11 ; year:2010 ; number:2 ; day:27 ; month:02 ; pages:169-181 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s10101-010-0076-9 |
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OLC2069165744 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract An individual with an internalized norm prefers to comply with the norm as long as the opponents also comply. This paper studies the evolution of such norms in a conflict. Individuals play with the same opponent for a number of rounds, during which they adapt their behavior according to a myopic best response dynamic. The payoffs earned during this equilibration period enter into the cultural evolutionary process that determines which norms that survive. It is found that if agents play against the same opponent for sufficiently many times, then only norms that reduce conflict relative to the Nash equilibrium survive. If instead agents meet the same opponent only once, then only agents that play the Nash equilibrium survive. By way of example it is also shown that in the intermediate case the outcome of evolution can be either that conflict reducing norms or Nash behavior dominates. These results indicate that the common practice of disregarding equilibration in models of preference evolution is not without a cost. | ||
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Internalized social norms in conflicts: an evolutionary approach |
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Abstract An individual with an internalized norm prefers to comply with the norm as long as the opponents also comply. This paper studies the evolution of such norms in a conflict. Individuals play with the same opponent for a number of rounds, during which they adapt their behavior according to a myopic best response dynamic. The payoffs earned during this equilibration period enter into the cultural evolutionary process that determines which norms that survive. It is found that if agents play against the same opponent for sufficiently many times, then only norms that reduce conflict relative to the Nash equilibrium survive. If instead agents meet the same opponent only once, then only agents that play the Nash equilibrium survive. By way of example it is also shown that in the intermediate case the outcome of evolution can be either that conflict reducing norms or Nash behavior dominates. These results indicate that the common practice of disregarding equilibration in models of preference evolution is not without a cost. © Springer-Verlag 2010 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract An individual with an internalized norm prefers to comply with the norm as long as the opponents also comply. This paper studies the evolution of such norms in a conflict. Individuals play with the same opponent for a number of rounds, during which they adapt their behavior according to a myopic best response dynamic. The payoffs earned during this equilibration period enter into the cultural evolutionary process that determines which norms that survive. It is found that if agents play against the same opponent for sufficiently many times, then only norms that reduce conflict relative to the Nash equilibrium survive. If instead agents meet the same opponent only once, then only agents that play the Nash equilibrium survive. By way of example it is also shown that in the intermediate case the outcome of evolution can be either that conflict reducing norms or Nash behavior dominates. These results indicate that the common practice of disregarding equilibration in models of preference evolution is not without a cost. © Springer-Verlag 2010 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract An individual with an internalized norm prefers to comply with the norm as long as the opponents also comply. This paper studies the evolution of such norms in a conflict. Individuals play with the same opponent for a number of rounds, during which they adapt their behavior according to a myopic best response dynamic. The payoffs earned during this equilibration period enter into the cultural evolutionary process that determines which norms that survive. It is found that if agents play against the same opponent for sufficiently many times, then only norms that reduce conflict relative to the Nash equilibrium survive. If instead agents meet the same opponent only once, then only agents that play the Nash equilibrium survive. By way of example it is also shown that in the intermediate case the outcome of evolution can be either that conflict reducing norms or Nash behavior dominates. These results indicate that the common practice of disregarding equilibration in models of preference evolution is not without a cost. © Springer-Verlag 2010 |
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| title_short |
Internalized social norms in conflicts: an evolutionary approach |
| url |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-010-0076-9 |
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| doi_str |
10.1007/s10101-010-0076-9 |
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2024-07-03T21:15:54.544Z |
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