All too skeptical theism
Abstract Skeptical theism contends that, due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot expect to be able to determine whether there are reasons which justify God’s permission of apparently unjustified evils. Because this is so, the existence of these evils does not constituted evidence against God’s e...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Hasker, William [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2010 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion - Springer Netherlands, 1970, 68(2010), 1-3 vom: 07. Aug., Seite 15-29 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:68 ; year:2010 ; number:1-3 ; day:07 ; month:08 ; pages:15-29 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11153-010-9252-7 |
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OLC2070961397 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Skeptical theism contends that, due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot expect to be able to determine whether there are reasons which justify God’s permission of apparently unjustified evils. Because this is so, the existence of these evils does not constituted evidence against God’s existence. A common criticism is that the skeptical theist is implicitly committed to other, less palatable forms of skepticism, especially moral skepticism. I examine a recent defense against this charge mounted by Michael Bergmann. I point out that the Bergmannian skeptical theist is unable to determine concerning any event or feature of the world whether that feature or event is good or evil all-things-considered. Because of this the skeptical theist must abandon any attempt to act in such a way that the world becomes better rather than worse as a result. These, I claim, are seriously skeptical conclusions, and should cause us to be skeptical about skeptical theism itself. | ||
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10.1007/s11153-010-9252-7 doi (DE-627)OLC2070961397 (DE-He213)s11153-010-9252-7-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 290 VZ 0 ssgn Hasker, William verfasserin aut All too skeptical theism 2010 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 Abstract Skeptical theism contends that, due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot expect to be able to determine whether there are reasons which justify God’s permission of apparently unjustified evils. Because this is so, the existence of these evils does not constituted evidence against God’s existence. A common criticism is that the skeptical theist is implicitly committed to other, less palatable forms of skepticism, especially moral skepticism. I examine a recent defense against this charge mounted by Michael Bergmann. I point out that the Bergmannian skeptical theist is unable to determine concerning any event or feature of the world whether that feature or event is good or evil all-things-considered. Because of this the skeptical theist must abandon any attempt to act in such a way that the world becomes better rather than worse as a result. These, I claim, are seriously skeptical conclusions, and should cause us to be skeptical about skeptical theism itself. Skeptical theism Evidential argument from evil Inductive skepticism Moral skepticism Unjustified evil Enthalten in International journal for philosophy of religion Springer Netherlands, 1970 68(2010), 1-3 vom: 07. Aug., Seite 15-29 (DE-627)129546089 (DE-600)218276-2 (DE-576)014996405 0020-7047 nnns volume:68 year:2010 number:1-3 day:07 month:08 pages:15-29 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-010-9252-7 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-VOR SSG-OLC-PHI SSG-OLC-MFO GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 AR 68 2010 1-3 07 08 15-29 |
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all too skeptical theism |
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Abstract Skeptical theism contends that, due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot expect to be able to determine whether there are reasons which justify God’s permission of apparently unjustified evils. Because this is so, the existence of these evils does not constituted evidence against God’s existence. A common criticism is that the skeptical theist is implicitly committed to other, less palatable forms of skepticism, especially moral skepticism. I examine a recent defense against this charge mounted by Michael Bergmann. I point out that the Bergmannian skeptical theist is unable to determine concerning any event or feature of the world whether that feature or event is good or evil all-things-considered. Because of this the skeptical theist must abandon any attempt to act in such a way that the world becomes better rather than worse as a result. These, I claim, are seriously skeptical conclusions, and should cause us to be skeptical about skeptical theism itself. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract Skeptical theism contends that, due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot expect to be able to determine whether there are reasons which justify God’s permission of apparently unjustified evils. Because this is so, the existence of these evils does not constituted evidence against God’s existence. A common criticism is that the skeptical theist is implicitly committed to other, less palatable forms of skepticism, especially moral skepticism. I examine a recent defense against this charge mounted by Michael Bergmann. I point out that the Bergmannian skeptical theist is unable to determine concerning any event or feature of the world whether that feature or event is good or evil all-things-considered. Because of this the skeptical theist must abandon any attempt to act in such a way that the world becomes better rather than worse as a result. These, I claim, are seriously skeptical conclusions, and should cause us to be skeptical about skeptical theism itself. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract Skeptical theism contends that, due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot expect to be able to determine whether there are reasons which justify God’s permission of apparently unjustified evils. Because this is so, the existence of these evils does not constituted evidence against God’s existence. A common criticism is that the skeptical theist is implicitly committed to other, less palatable forms of skepticism, especially moral skepticism. I examine a recent defense against this charge mounted by Michael Bergmann. I point out that the Bergmannian skeptical theist is unable to determine concerning any event or feature of the world whether that feature or event is good or evil all-things-considered. Because of this the skeptical theist must abandon any attempt to act in such a way that the world becomes better rather than worse as a result. These, I claim, are seriously skeptical conclusions, and should cause us to be skeptical about skeptical theism itself. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 |
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