Haecceitism for Modal Realists
Abstract In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is i...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Cowling, Sam [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2012 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Erkenntnis - Springer Netherlands, 1930, 77(2012), 3 vom: 06. Sept., Seite 399-417 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:77 ; year:2012 ; number:3 ; day:06 ; month:09 ; pages:399-417 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s10670-012-9394-3 |
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| Katalog-ID: |
OLC2072720176 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal defended by David Lewis resolves this incompatibility by rejecting modal correspondence, I defend modal correspondence and develop an alternative strategy for reconciling these theses. Specifically, I examine Lewis’s arguments against non-qualitative counterpart theory and undermine them by developing a novel version of non-qualitative counterpart theory that appeals to a metaphysics of bare particulars. I then indicate how this version of non-qualitative counterpart theory accommodates both haecceitism and modal correspondence. | ||
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10.1007/s10670-012-9394-3 doi (DE-627)OLC2072720176 (DE-He213)s10670-012-9394-3-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid Cowling, Sam verfasserin aut Haecceitism for Modal Realists 2012 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 Abstract In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal defended by David Lewis resolves this incompatibility by rejecting modal correspondence, I defend modal correspondence and develop an alternative strategy for reconciling these theses. Specifically, I examine Lewis’s arguments against non-qualitative counterpart theory and undermine them by developing a novel version of non-qualitative counterpart theory that appeals to a metaphysics of bare particulars. I then indicate how this version of non-qualitative counterpart theory accommodates both haecceitism and modal correspondence. Logical Space Modal Realism Substratum Theory Ordinary Object Contingent Identity Enthalten in Erkenntnis Springer Netherlands, 1930 77(2012), 3 vom: 06. Sept., Seite 399-417 (DE-627)129476242 (DE-600)203461-X (DE-576)01485578X 0165-0106 nnns volume:77 year:2012 number:3 day:06 month:09 pages:399-417 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9394-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_72 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 77 2012 3 06 09 399-417 |
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10.1007/s10670-012-9394-3 doi (DE-627)OLC2072720176 (DE-He213)s10670-012-9394-3-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid Cowling, Sam verfasserin aut Haecceitism for Modal Realists 2012 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 Abstract In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal defended by David Lewis resolves this incompatibility by rejecting modal correspondence, I defend modal correspondence and develop an alternative strategy for reconciling these theses. Specifically, I examine Lewis’s arguments against non-qualitative counterpart theory and undermine them by developing a novel version of non-qualitative counterpart theory that appeals to a metaphysics of bare particulars. I then indicate how this version of non-qualitative counterpart theory accommodates both haecceitism and modal correspondence. Logical Space Modal Realism Substratum Theory Ordinary Object Contingent Identity Enthalten in Erkenntnis Springer Netherlands, 1930 77(2012), 3 vom: 06. Sept., Seite 399-417 (DE-627)129476242 (DE-600)203461-X (DE-576)01485578X 0165-0106 nnns volume:77 year:2012 number:3 day:06 month:09 pages:399-417 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9394-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_72 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 77 2012 3 06 09 399-417 |
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10.1007/s10670-012-9394-3 doi (DE-627)OLC2072720176 (DE-He213)s10670-012-9394-3-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid Cowling, Sam verfasserin aut Haecceitism for Modal Realists 2012 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 Abstract In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal defended by David Lewis resolves this incompatibility by rejecting modal correspondence, I defend modal correspondence and develop an alternative strategy for reconciling these theses. Specifically, I examine Lewis’s arguments against non-qualitative counterpart theory and undermine them by developing a novel version of non-qualitative counterpart theory that appeals to a metaphysics of bare particulars. I then indicate how this version of non-qualitative counterpart theory accommodates both haecceitism and modal correspondence. Logical Space Modal Realism Substratum Theory Ordinary Object Contingent Identity Enthalten in Erkenntnis Springer Netherlands, 1930 77(2012), 3 vom: 06. Sept., Seite 399-417 (DE-627)129476242 (DE-600)203461-X (DE-576)01485578X 0165-0106 nnns volume:77 year:2012 number:3 day:06 month:09 pages:399-417 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9394-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_72 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 77 2012 3 06 09 399-417 |
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10.1007/s10670-012-9394-3 doi (DE-627)OLC2072720176 (DE-He213)s10670-012-9394-3-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid Cowling, Sam verfasserin aut Haecceitism for Modal Realists 2012 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 Abstract In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal defended by David Lewis resolves this incompatibility by rejecting modal correspondence, I defend modal correspondence and develop an alternative strategy for reconciling these theses. Specifically, I examine Lewis’s arguments against non-qualitative counterpart theory and undermine them by developing a novel version of non-qualitative counterpart theory that appeals to a metaphysics of bare particulars. I then indicate how this version of non-qualitative counterpart theory accommodates both haecceitism and modal correspondence. Logical Space Modal Realism Substratum Theory Ordinary Object Contingent Identity Enthalten in Erkenntnis Springer Netherlands, 1930 77(2012), 3 vom: 06. Sept., Seite 399-417 (DE-627)129476242 (DE-600)203461-X (DE-576)01485578X 0165-0106 nnns volume:77 year:2012 number:3 day:06 month:09 pages:399-417 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9394-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_72 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 77 2012 3 06 09 399-417 |
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10.1007/s10670-012-9394-3 doi (DE-627)OLC2072720176 (DE-He213)s10670-012-9394-3-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 100 VZ 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid LING DE-30 fid Cowling, Sam verfasserin aut Haecceitism for Modal Realists 2012 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 Abstract In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal defended by David Lewis resolves this incompatibility by rejecting modal correspondence, I defend modal correspondence and develop an alternative strategy for reconciling these theses. Specifically, I examine Lewis’s arguments against non-qualitative counterpart theory and undermine them by developing a novel version of non-qualitative counterpart theory that appeals to a metaphysics of bare particulars. I then indicate how this version of non-qualitative counterpart theory accommodates both haecceitism and modal correspondence. Logical Space Modal Realism Substratum Theory Ordinary Object Contingent Identity Enthalten in Erkenntnis Springer Netherlands, 1930 77(2012), 3 vom: 06. Sept., Seite 399-417 (DE-627)129476242 (DE-600)203461-X (DE-576)01485578X 0165-0106 nnns volume:77 year:2012 number:3 day:06 month:09 pages:399-417 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9394-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_72 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4082 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 77 2012 3 06 09 399-417 |
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Abstract In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal defended by David Lewis resolves this incompatibility by rejecting modal correspondence, I defend modal correspondence and develop an alternative strategy for reconciling these theses. Specifically, I examine Lewis’s arguments against non-qualitative counterpart theory and undermine them by developing a novel version of non-qualitative counterpart theory that appeals to a metaphysics of bare particulars. I then indicate how this version of non-qualitative counterpart theory accommodates both haecceitism and modal correspondence. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 |
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Abstract In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal defended by David Lewis resolves this incompatibility by rejecting modal correspondence, I defend modal correspondence and develop an alternative strategy for reconciling these theses. Specifically, I examine Lewis’s arguments against non-qualitative counterpart theory and undermine them by developing a novel version of non-qualitative counterpart theory that appeals to a metaphysics of bare particulars. I then indicate how this version of non-qualitative counterpart theory accommodates both haecceitism and modal correspondence. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 |
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Abstract In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal defended by David Lewis resolves this incompatibility by rejecting modal correspondence, I defend modal correspondence and develop an alternative strategy for reconciling these theses. Specifically, I examine Lewis’s arguments against non-qualitative counterpart theory and undermine them by developing a novel version of non-qualitative counterpart theory that appeals to a metaphysics of bare particulars. I then indicate how this version of non-qualitative counterpart theory accommodates both haecceitism and modal correspondence. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 |
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