Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test
Abstract We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of ri...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Bullock, David S. [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2007 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Economic Science Association 2007 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Experimental economics - Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers, 1998, 10(2007), 1 vom: 01. Feb., Seite 21-36 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:10 ; year:2007 ; number:1 ; day:01 ; month:02 ; pages:21-36 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1 |
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OLC2073983588 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers | ||
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10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1 doi (DE-627)OLC2073983588 (DE-He213)s10683-006-9133-1-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Bullock, David S. verfasserin aut Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Economic Science Association 2007 Abstract We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers Rent-dissipation Rent-seeking Transfers Experimental economics Rutström, E. Elisabet aut Enthalten in Experimental economics Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers, 1998 10(2007), 1 vom: 01. Feb., Seite 21-36 (DE-627)230492959 (DE-600)1386451-8 (DE-576)072172029 1386-4157 nnns volume:10 year:2007 number:1 day:01 month:02 pages:21-36 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 AR 10 2007 1 01 02 21-36 |
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10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1 doi (DE-627)OLC2073983588 (DE-He213)s10683-006-9133-1-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Bullock, David S. verfasserin aut Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Economic Science Association 2007 Abstract We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers Rent-dissipation Rent-seeking Transfers Experimental economics Rutström, E. Elisabet aut Enthalten in Experimental economics Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers, 1998 10(2007), 1 vom: 01. Feb., Seite 21-36 (DE-627)230492959 (DE-600)1386451-8 (DE-576)072172029 1386-4157 nnns volume:10 year:2007 number:1 day:01 month:02 pages:21-36 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 AR 10 2007 1 01 02 21-36 |
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10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1 doi (DE-627)OLC2073983588 (DE-He213)s10683-006-9133-1-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Bullock, David S. verfasserin aut Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Economic Science Association 2007 Abstract We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers Rent-dissipation Rent-seeking Transfers Experimental economics Rutström, E. Elisabet aut Enthalten in Experimental economics Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers, 1998 10(2007), 1 vom: 01. Feb., Seite 21-36 (DE-627)230492959 (DE-600)1386451-8 (DE-576)072172029 1386-4157 nnns volume:10 year:2007 number:1 day:01 month:02 pages:21-36 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 AR 10 2007 1 01 02 21-36 |
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10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1 doi (DE-627)OLC2073983588 (DE-He213)s10683-006-9133-1-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Bullock, David S. verfasserin aut Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Economic Science Association 2007 Abstract We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers Rent-dissipation Rent-seeking Transfers Experimental economics Rutström, E. Elisabet aut Enthalten in Experimental economics Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers, 1998 10(2007), 1 vom: 01. Feb., Seite 21-36 (DE-627)230492959 (DE-600)1386451-8 (DE-576)072172029 1386-4157 nnns volume:10 year:2007 number:1 day:01 month:02 pages:21-36 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 AR 10 2007 1 01 02 21-36 |
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10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1 doi (DE-627)OLC2073983588 (DE-He213)s10683-006-9133-1-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Bullock, David S. verfasserin aut Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Economic Science Association 2007 Abstract We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers Rent-dissipation Rent-seeking Transfers Experimental economics Rutström, E. Elisabet aut Enthalten in Experimental economics Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers, 1998 10(2007), 1 vom: 01. Feb., Seite 21-36 (DE-627)230492959 (DE-600)1386451-8 (DE-576)072172029 1386-4157 nnns volume:10 year:2007 number:1 day:01 month:02 pages:21-36 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 AR 10 2007 1 01 02 21-36 |
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Abstract We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers © Economic Science Association 2007 |
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Abstract We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers © Economic Science Association 2007 |
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Abstract We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers © Economic Science Association 2007 |
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10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1 |
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