Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence
Abstract Laboratory experiments are used to evaluate the extent to which players in games can coordinate investments that diminish the probability of losses due to security breaches or terrorist attacks. In this environment, economically sensible investments may be foregone if their potential benefi...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Hess, Rachel O. [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2007 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Economic Science Association 2007 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Experimental economics - Springer US, 1998, 10(2007), 3 vom: 09. Aug., Seite 235-250 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:10 ; year:2007 ; number:3 ; day:09 ; month:08 ; pages:235-250 |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s10683-007-9176-y |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Laboratory experiments are used to evaluate the extent to which players in games can coordinate investments that diminish the probability of losses due to security breaches or terrorist attacks. In this environment, economically sensible investments may be foregone if their potential benefits are negated by failures to invest in security at other sites. The result is a coordination game with a desirable high-payoff, high-security equilibrium and an undesirable low-security equilibrium that may result if players do not expect others to invest in security. One unique feature of this coordination situation is that investment in security by one player generates a positive externality such that all other players’ expected payoffs are increased, regardless of those other players’ investment decisions. Coordination failures are pervasive in a baseline experiment with simultaneous decisions, but coordination is improved if players are allowed to move in an endogenously determined sequence. In addition, coordinated security investments are observed more often when the largest single security threat to individuals is preventable by their own decisions to invest in security. The security coordination game is a “potential game,” and the success of coordination on the more secure equilibrium is related to the notion of potential function maximization and basin of attraction. | ||
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| 700 | 1 | |a Smith, Angela M. |4 aut | |
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10.1007/s10683-007-9176-y doi (DE-627)OLC2073983820 (DE-He213)s10683-007-9176-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Hess, Rachel O. verfasserin aut Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Economic Science Association 2007 Abstract Laboratory experiments are used to evaluate the extent to which players in games can coordinate investments that diminish the probability of losses due to security breaches or terrorist attacks. In this environment, economically sensible investments may be foregone if their potential benefits are negated by failures to invest in security at other sites. The result is a coordination game with a desirable high-payoff, high-security equilibrium and an undesirable low-security equilibrium that may result if players do not expect others to invest in security. One unique feature of this coordination situation is that investment in security by one player generates a positive externality such that all other players’ expected payoffs are increased, regardless of those other players’ investment decisions. Coordination failures are pervasive in a baseline experiment with simultaneous decisions, but coordination is improved if players are allowed to move in an endogenously determined sequence. In addition, coordinated security investments are observed more often when the largest single security threat to individuals is preventable by their own decisions to invest in security. The security coordination game is a “potential game,” and the success of coordination on the more secure equilibrium is related to the notion of potential function maximization and basin of attraction. Coordination games Laboratory experiments Potential games Security Holt, Charles A. aut Smith, Angela M. aut Enthalten in Experimental economics Springer US, 1998 10(2007), 3 vom: 09. Aug., Seite 235-250 (DE-627)230492959 (DE-600)1386451-8 (DE-576)072172029 1386-4157 nnns volume:10 year:2007 number:3 day:09 month:08 pages:235-250 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9176-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 AR 10 2007 3 09 08 235-250 |
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10.1007/s10683-007-9176-y doi (DE-627)OLC2073983820 (DE-He213)s10683-007-9176-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Hess, Rachel O. verfasserin aut Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Economic Science Association 2007 Abstract Laboratory experiments are used to evaluate the extent to which players in games can coordinate investments that diminish the probability of losses due to security breaches or terrorist attacks. In this environment, economically sensible investments may be foregone if their potential benefits are negated by failures to invest in security at other sites. The result is a coordination game with a desirable high-payoff, high-security equilibrium and an undesirable low-security equilibrium that may result if players do not expect others to invest in security. One unique feature of this coordination situation is that investment in security by one player generates a positive externality such that all other players’ expected payoffs are increased, regardless of those other players’ investment decisions. Coordination failures are pervasive in a baseline experiment with simultaneous decisions, but coordination is improved if players are allowed to move in an endogenously determined sequence. In addition, coordinated security investments are observed more often when the largest single security threat to individuals is preventable by their own decisions to invest in security. The security coordination game is a “potential game,” and the success of coordination on the more secure equilibrium is related to the notion of potential function maximization and basin of attraction. Coordination games Laboratory experiments Potential games Security Holt, Charles A. aut Smith, Angela M. aut Enthalten in Experimental economics Springer US, 1998 10(2007), 3 vom: 09. Aug., Seite 235-250 (DE-627)230492959 (DE-600)1386451-8 (DE-576)072172029 1386-4157 nnns volume:10 year:2007 number:3 day:09 month:08 pages:235-250 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9176-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 AR 10 2007 3 09 08 235-250 |
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10.1007/s10683-007-9176-y doi (DE-627)OLC2073983820 (DE-He213)s10683-007-9176-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Hess, Rachel O. verfasserin aut Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Economic Science Association 2007 Abstract Laboratory experiments are used to evaluate the extent to which players in games can coordinate investments that diminish the probability of losses due to security breaches or terrorist attacks. In this environment, economically sensible investments may be foregone if their potential benefits are negated by failures to invest in security at other sites. The result is a coordination game with a desirable high-payoff, high-security equilibrium and an undesirable low-security equilibrium that may result if players do not expect others to invest in security. One unique feature of this coordination situation is that investment in security by one player generates a positive externality such that all other players’ expected payoffs are increased, regardless of those other players’ investment decisions. Coordination failures are pervasive in a baseline experiment with simultaneous decisions, but coordination is improved if players are allowed to move in an endogenously determined sequence. In addition, coordinated security investments are observed more often when the largest single security threat to individuals is preventable by their own decisions to invest in security. The security coordination game is a “potential game,” and the success of coordination on the more secure equilibrium is related to the notion of potential function maximization and basin of attraction. Coordination games Laboratory experiments Potential games Security Holt, Charles A. aut Smith, Angela M. aut Enthalten in Experimental economics Springer US, 1998 10(2007), 3 vom: 09. Aug., Seite 235-250 (DE-627)230492959 (DE-600)1386451-8 (DE-576)072172029 1386-4157 nnns volume:10 year:2007 number:3 day:09 month:08 pages:235-250 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9176-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 AR 10 2007 3 09 08 235-250 |
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10.1007/s10683-007-9176-y doi (DE-627)OLC2073983820 (DE-He213)s10683-007-9176-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Hess, Rachel O. verfasserin aut Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Economic Science Association 2007 Abstract Laboratory experiments are used to evaluate the extent to which players in games can coordinate investments that diminish the probability of losses due to security breaches or terrorist attacks. In this environment, economically sensible investments may be foregone if their potential benefits are negated by failures to invest in security at other sites. The result is a coordination game with a desirable high-payoff, high-security equilibrium and an undesirable low-security equilibrium that may result if players do not expect others to invest in security. One unique feature of this coordination situation is that investment in security by one player generates a positive externality such that all other players’ expected payoffs are increased, regardless of those other players’ investment decisions. Coordination failures are pervasive in a baseline experiment with simultaneous decisions, but coordination is improved if players are allowed to move in an endogenously determined sequence. In addition, coordinated security investments are observed more often when the largest single security threat to individuals is preventable by their own decisions to invest in security. The security coordination game is a “potential game,” and the success of coordination on the more secure equilibrium is related to the notion of potential function maximization and basin of attraction. Coordination games Laboratory experiments Potential games Security Holt, Charles A. aut Smith, Angela M. aut Enthalten in Experimental economics Springer US, 1998 10(2007), 3 vom: 09. Aug., Seite 235-250 (DE-627)230492959 (DE-600)1386451-8 (DE-576)072172029 1386-4157 nnns volume:10 year:2007 number:3 day:09 month:08 pages:235-250 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9176-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 AR 10 2007 3 09 08 235-250 |
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10.1007/s10683-007-9176-y doi (DE-627)OLC2073983820 (DE-He213)s10683-007-9176-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Hess, Rachel O. verfasserin aut Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence 2007 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Economic Science Association 2007 Abstract Laboratory experiments are used to evaluate the extent to which players in games can coordinate investments that diminish the probability of losses due to security breaches or terrorist attacks. In this environment, economically sensible investments may be foregone if their potential benefits are negated by failures to invest in security at other sites. The result is a coordination game with a desirable high-payoff, high-security equilibrium and an undesirable low-security equilibrium that may result if players do not expect others to invest in security. One unique feature of this coordination situation is that investment in security by one player generates a positive externality such that all other players’ expected payoffs are increased, regardless of those other players’ investment decisions. Coordination failures are pervasive in a baseline experiment with simultaneous decisions, but coordination is improved if players are allowed to move in an endogenously determined sequence. In addition, coordinated security investments are observed more often when the largest single security threat to individuals is preventable by their own decisions to invest in security. The security coordination game is a “potential game,” and the success of coordination on the more secure equilibrium is related to the notion of potential function maximization and basin of attraction. Coordination games Laboratory experiments Potential games Security Holt, Charles A. aut Smith, Angela M. aut Enthalten in Experimental economics Springer US, 1998 10(2007), 3 vom: 09. Aug., Seite 235-250 (DE-627)230492959 (DE-600)1386451-8 (DE-576)072172029 1386-4157 nnns volume:10 year:2007 number:3 day:09 month:08 pages:235-250 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9176-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4322 AR 10 2007 3 09 08 235-250 |
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Abstract Laboratory experiments are used to evaluate the extent to which players in games can coordinate investments that diminish the probability of losses due to security breaches or terrorist attacks. In this environment, economically sensible investments may be foregone if their potential benefits are negated by failures to invest in security at other sites. The result is a coordination game with a desirable high-payoff, high-security equilibrium and an undesirable low-security equilibrium that may result if players do not expect others to invest in security. One unique feature of this coordination situation is that investment in security by one player generates a positive externality such that all other players’ expected payoffs are increased, regardless of those other players’ investment decisions. Coordination failures are pervasive in a baseline experiment with simultaneous decisions, but coordination is improved if players are allowed to move in an endogenously determined sequence. In addition, coordinated security investments are observed more often when the largest single security threat to individuals is preventable by their own decisions to invest in security. The security coordination game is a “potential game,” and the success of coordination on the more secure equilibrium is related to the notion of potential function maximization and basin of attraction. © Economic Science Association 2007 |
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Abstract Laboratory experiments are used to evaluate the extent to which players in games can coordinate investments that diminish the probability of losses due to security breaches or terrorist attacks. In this environment, economically sensible investments may be foregone if their potential benefits are negated by failures to invest in security at other sites. The result is a coordination game with a desirable high-payoff, high-security equilibrium and an undesirable low-security equilibrium that may result if players do not expect others to invest in security. One unique feature of this coordination situation is that investment in security by one player generates a positive externality such that all other players’ expected payoffs are increased, regardless of those other players’ investment decisions. Coordination failures are pervasive in a baseline experiment with simultaneous decisions, but coordination is improved if players are allowed to move in an endogenously determined sequence. In addition, coordinated security investments are observed more often when the largest single security threat to individuals is preventable by their own decisions to invest in security. The security coordination game is a “potential game,” and the success of coordination on the more secure equilibrium is related to the notion of potential function maximization and basin of attraction. © Economic Science Association 2007 |
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Abstract Laboratory experiments are used to evaluate the extent to which players in games can coordinate investments that diminish the probability of losses due to security breaches or terrorist attacks. In this environment, economically sensible investments may be foregone if their potential benefits are negated by failures to invest in security at other sites. The result is a coordination game with a desirable high-payoff, high-security equilibrium and an undesirable low-security equilibrium that may result if players do not expect others to invest in security. One unique feature of this coordination situation is that investment in security by one player generates a positive externality such that all other players’ expected payoffs are increased, regardless of those other players’ investment decisions. Coordination failures are pervasive in a baseline experiment with simultaneous decisions, but coordination is improved if players are allowed to move in an endogenously determined sequence. In addition, coordinated security investments are observed more often when the largest single security threat to individuals is preventable by their own decisions to invest in security. The security coordination game is a “potential game,” and the success of coordination on the more secure equilibrium is related to the notion of potential function maximization and basin of attraction. © Economic Science Association 2007 |
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| title_short |
Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence |
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Holt, Charles A. Smith, Angela M. |
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