Payment schemes in infinite-horizon experimental games
Abstract We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, a...
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Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Sherstyuk, Katerina [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2012 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Economic Science Association 2012 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Experimental economics - Springer US, 1998, 16(2012), 1 vom: 19. Mai, Seite 125-153 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:16 ; year:2012 ; number:1 ; day:19 ; month:05 ; pages:125-153 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s10683-012-9323-y |
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OLC2073985386 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization and risk neutrality, both the cumulative and the last period payment schemes induce preferences that are equivalent to maximizing the discounted sum of utilities. The last period payment is also robust under different attitudes toward risk. In comparison, paying subjects for one of the periods chosen randomly creates a present-period bias. We further provide experimental evidence from infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games that supports the above theoretical predictions. | ||
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10.1007/s10683-012-9323-y doi (DE-627)OLC2073985386 (DE-He213)s10683-012-9323-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Sherstyuk, Katerina verfasserin aut Payment schemes in infinite-horizon experimental games 2012 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Economic Science Association 2012 Abstract We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization and risk neutrality, both the cumulative and the last period payment schemes induce preferences that are equivalent to maximizing the discounted sum of utilities. The last period payment is also robust under different attitudes toward risk. In comparison, paying subjects for one of the periods chosen randomly creates a present-period bias. We further provide experimental evidence from infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games that supports the above theoretical predictions. Economic experiments Infinite-horizon games Random termination Tarui, Nori aut Saijo, Tatsuyoshi aut Enthalten in Experimental economics Springer US, 1998 16(2012), 1 vom: 19. Mai, Seite 125-153 (DE-627)230492959 (DE-600)1386451-8 (DE-576)072172029 1386-4157 nnns volume:16 year:2012 number:1 day:19 month:05 pages:125-153 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-012-9323-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4393 AR 16 2012 1 19 05 125-153 |
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10.1007/s10683-012-9323-y doi (DE-627)OLC2073985386 (DE-He213)s10683-012-9323-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Sherstyuk, Katerina verfasserin aut Payment schemes in infinite-horizon experimental games 2012 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Economic Science Association 2012 Abstract We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization and risk neutrality, both the cumulative and the last period payment schemes induce preferences that are equivalent to maximizing the discounted sum of utilities. The last period payment is also robust under different attitudes toward risk. In comparison, paying subjects for one of the periods chosen randomly creates a present-period bias. We further provide experimental evidence from infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games that supports the above theoretical predictions. Economic experiments Infinite-horizon games Random termination Tarui, Nori aut Saijo, Tatsuyoshi aut Enthalten in Experimental economics Springer US, 1998 16(2012), 1 vom: 19. Mai, Seite 125-153 (DE-627)230492959 (DE-600)1386451-8 (DE-576)072172029 1386-4157 nnns volume:16 year:2012 number:1 day:19 month:05 pages:125-153 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-012-9323-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4393 AR 16 2012 1 19 05 125-153 |
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10.1007/s10683-012-9323-y doi (DE-627)OLC2073985386 (DE-He213)s10683-012-9323-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Sherstyuk, Katerina verfasserin aut Payment schemes in infinite-horizon experimental games 2012 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Economic Science Association 2012 Abstract We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization and risk neutrality, both the cumulative and the last period payment schemes induce preferences that are equivalent to maximizing the discounted sum of utilities. The last period payment is also robust under different attitudes toward risk. In comparison, paying subjects for one of the periods chosen randomly creates a present-period bias. We further provide experimental evidence from infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games that supports the above theoretical predictions. Economic experiments Infinite-horizon games Random termination Tarui, Nori aut Saijo, Tatsuyoshi aut Enthalten in Experimental economics Springer US, 1998 16(2012), 1 vom: 19. Mai, Seite 125-153 (DE-627)230492959 (DE-600)1386451-8 (DE-576)072172029 1386-4157 nnns volume:16 year:2012 number:1 day:19 month:05 pages:125-153 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-012-9323-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4393 AR 16 2012 1 19 05 125-153 |
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10.1007/s10683-012-9323-y doi (DE-627)OLC2073985386 (DE-He213)s10683-012-9323-y-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Sherstyuk, Katerina verfasserin aut Payment schemes in infinite-horizon experimental games 2012 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Economic Science Association 2012 Abstract We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization and risk neutrality, both the cumulative and the last period payment schemes induce preferences that are equivalent to maximizing the discounted sum of utilities. The last period payment is also robust under different attitudes toward risk. In comparison, paying subjects for one of the periods chosen randomly creates a present-period bias. We further provide experimental evidence from infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games that supports the above theoretical predictions. Economic experiments Infinite-horizon games Random termination Tarui, Nori aut Saijo, Tatsuyoshi aut Enthalten in Experimental economics Springer US, 1998 16(2012), 1 vom: 19. Mai, Seite 125-153 (DE-627)230492959 (DE-600)1386451-8 (DE-576)072172029 1386-4157 nnns volume:16 year:2012 number:1 day:19 month:05 pages:125-153 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-012-9323-y lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4393 AR 16 2012 1 19 05 125-153 |
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Abstract We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization and risk neutrality, both the cumulative and the last period payment schemes induce preferences that are equivalent to maximizing the discounted sum of utilities. The last period payment is also robust under different attitudes toward risk. In comparison, paying subjects for one of the periods chosen randomly creates a present-period bias. We further provide experimental evidence from infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games that supports the above theoretical predictions. © Economic Science Association 2012 |
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Abstract We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization and risk neutrality, both the cumulative and the last period payment schemes induce preferences that are equivalent to maximizing the discounted sum of utilities. The last period payment is also robust under different attitudes toward risk. In comparison, paying subjects for one of the periods chosen randomly creates a present-period bias. We further provide experimental evidence from infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games that supports the above theoretical predictions. © Economic Science Association 2012 |
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Abstract We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization and risk neutrality, both the cumulative and the last period payment schemes induce preferences that are equivalent to maximizing the discounted sum of utilities. The last period payment is also robust under different attitudes toward risk. In comparison, paying subjects for one of the periods chosen randomly creates a present-period bias. We further provide experimental evidence from infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games that supports the above theoretical predictions. © Economic Science Association 2012 |
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We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization and risk neutrality, both the cumulative and the last period payment schemes induce preferences that are equivalent to maximizing the discounted sum of utilities. The last period payment is also robust under different attitudes toward risk. In comparison, paying subjects for one of the periods chosen randomly creates a present-period bias. We further provide experimental evidence from infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games that supports the above theoretical predictions.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Economic experiments</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Infinite-horizon games</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Random termination</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Tarui, Nori</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Saijo, Tatsuyoshi</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Experimental economics</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer US, 1998</subfield><subfield code="g">16(2012), 1 vom: 19. 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