Experiments with probabilistic quantum auctions
Abstract We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in determining which bidder wins, or having no winner, rather...
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Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Chen, Kay-Yut [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2008 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Quantum information processing - Springer US, 2002, 7(2008), 4 vom: Aug., Seite 139-152 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:7 ; year:2008 ; number:4 ; month:08 ; pages:139-152 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11128-008-0079-4 |
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| Katalog-ID: |
OLC2075138133 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in determining which bidder wins, or having no winner, rather than always having the highest bidder win. Comparing two quantum protocols in the context of first-price sealed bid auctions, we find the one predicted to be superior by game theory also performs better experimentally. We also compare with a conventional first-price auction, which gives higher performance. Thus to provide benefits, the quantum protocol requires more complex economic scenarios such as maintaining privacy of bids over a series of related auctions or involving allocative externalities. | ||
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10.1007/s11128-008-0079-4 doi (DE-627)OLC2075138133 (DE-He213)s11128-008-0079-4-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 VZ 33.23$jQuantenphysik bkl 54.10$jTheoretische Informatik bkl Chen, Kay-Yut verfasserin aut Experiments with probabilistic quantum auctions 2008 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008 Abstract We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in determining which bidder wins, or having no winner, rather than always having the highest bidder win. Comparing two quantum protocols in the context of first-price sealed bid auctions, we find the one predicted to be superior by game theory also performs better experimentally. We also compare with a conventional first-price auction, which gives higher performance. Thus to provide benefits, the quantum protocol requires more complex economic scenarios such as maintaining privacy of bids over a series of related auctions or involving allocative externalities. Quantum games Quantum economics Auctions Experimental economics Hogg, Tad aut Enthalten in Quantum information processing Springer US, 2002 7(2008), 4 vom: Aug., Seite 139-152 (DE-627)489255752 (DE-600)2191523-4 (DE-576)9489255750 1570-0755 nnns volume:7 year:2008 number:4 month:08 pages:139-152 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11128-008-0079-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT GBV_ILN_70 33.23$jQuantenphysik VZ 106407910 (DE-625)106407910 54.10$jTheoretische Informatik VZ 106418815 (DE-625)106418815 AR 7 2008 4 08 139-152 |
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Abstract We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in determining which bidder wins, or having no winner, rather than always having the highest bidder win. Comparing two quantum protocols in the context of first-price sealed bid auctions, we find the one predicted to be superior by game theory also performs better experimentally. We also compare with a conventional first-price auction, which gives higher performance. Thus to provide benefits, the quantum protocol requires more complex economic scenarios such as maintaining privacy of bids over a series of related auctions or involving allocative externalities. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008 |
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Abstract We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in determining which bidder wins, or having no winner, rather than always having the highest bidder win. Comparing two quantum protocols in the context of first-price sealed bid auctions, we find the one predicted to be superior by game theory also performs better experimentally. We also compare with a conventional first-price auction, which gives higher performance. Thus to provide benefits, the quantum protocol requires more complex economic scenarios such as maintaining privacy of bids over a series of related auctions or involving allocative externalities. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008 |
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Abstract We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in determining which bidder wins, or having no winner, rather than always having the highest bidder win. Comparing two quantum protocols in the context of first-price sealed bid auctions, we find the one predicted to be superior by game theory also performs better experimentally. We also compare with a conventional first-price auction, which gives higher performance. Thus to provide benefits, the quantum protocol requires more complex economic scenarios such as maintaining privacy of bids over a series of related auctions or involving allocative externalities. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008 |
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">OLC2075138133</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230504014958.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">tu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">200820s2008 xx ||||| 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s11128-008-0079-4</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)OLC2075138133</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-He213)s11128-008-0079-4-p</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">004</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">33.23$jQuantenphysik</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">54.10$jTheoretische Informatik</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Chen, Kay-Yut</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Experiments with probabilistic quantum auctions</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2008</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen</subfield><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Band</subfield><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in determining which bidder wins, or having no winner, rather than always having the highest bidder win. Comparing two quantum protocols in the context of first-price sealed bid auctions, we find the one predicted to be superior by game theory also performs better experimentally. We also compare with a conventional first-price auction, which gives higher performance. 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