A public good version of the collective household model: an empirical approach with an application to British household data
Abstract In this paper we consider an empirical collective household model of time allocation for two-earner households. The novelty of this paper is that we estimate a version of the collective household model, where the internally produced goods and externally purchased goods are assumed to be pub...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
van Klaveren, Chris [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2008 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Review of Economics of the Household - Springer US, 2003, 6(2008), 2 vom: 19. Jan., Seite 169-191 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:6 ; year:2008 ; number:2 ; day:19 ; month:01 ; pages:169-191 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11150-007-9028-8 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract In this paper we consider an empirical collective household model of time allocation for two-earner households. The novelty of this paper is that we estimate a version of the collective household model, where the internally produced goods and externally purchased goods are assumed to be public. The empirical results suggest that (1) Preferences of men and women differ; (2) Although there are significant individual variations, on average the utility functions of men and women are equally weighted in the household utility function; (3) Differences in the ratio of the partners’ hourly wages are explanatory for how individual utilities are weighted in the household utility function. (4) The female’s preference for household production is influenced by family size, but this does not hold for the male; (5) Both the male and the female have a backward-bending labor supply curve; (6) Labor-supply curves are forward-bending with respect to the partner’s wage rate; (7) Our model rejects the unitary Slutsky symmetry condition. | ||
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| 700 | 1 | |a Maassen van den Brink, Henriette |4 aut | |
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10.1007/s11150-007-9028-8 doi (DE-627)OLC207515290X (DE-He213)s11150-007-9028-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ van Klaveren, Chris verfasserin aut A public good version of the collective household model: an empirical approach with an application to British household data 2008 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008 Abstract In this paper we consider an empirical collective household model of time allocation for two-earner households. The novelty of this paper is that we estimate a version of the collective household model, where the internally produced goods and externally purchased goods are assumed to be public. The empirical results suggest that (1) Preferences of men and women differ; (2) Although there are significant individual variations, on average the utility functions of men and women are equally weighted in the household utility function; (3) Differences in the ratio of the partners’ hourly wages are explanatory for how individual utilities are weighted in the household utility function. (4) The female’s preference for household production is influenced by family size, but this does not hold for the male; (5) Both the male and the female have a backward-bending labor supply curve; (6) Labor-supply curves are forward-bending with respect to the partner’s wage rate; (7) Our model rejects the unitary Slutsky symmetry condition. Collective household models Household behavior Labor supply Intra-household Time allocation van Praag, Bernard aut Maassen van den Brink, Henriette aut Enthalten in Review of Economics of the Household Springer US, 2003 6(2008), 2 vom: 19. Jan., Seite 169-191 (DE-627)363769102 (DE-600)2108192-X (DE-576)266542344 1569-5239 nnns volume:6 year:2008 number:2 day:19 month:01 pages:169-191 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-007-9028-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 AR 6 2008 2 19 01 169-191 |
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10.1007/s11150-007-9028-8 doi (DE-627)OLC207515290X (DE-He213)s11150-007-9028-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ van Klaveren, Chris verfasserin aut A public good version of the collective household model: an empirical approach with an application to British household data 2008 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008 Abstract In this paper we consider an empirical collective household model of time allocation for two-earner households. The novelty of this paper is that we estimate a version of the collective household model, where the internally produced goods and externally purchased goods are assumed to be public. The empirical results suggest that (1) Preferences of men and women differ; (2) Although there are significant individual variations, on average the utility functions of men and women are equally weighted in the household utility function; (3) Differences in the ratio of the partners’ hourly wages are explanatory for how individual utilities are weighted in the household utility function. (4) The female’s preference for household production is influenced by family size, but this does not hold for the male; (5) Both the male and the female have a backward-bending labor supply curve; (6) Labor-supply curves are forward-bending with respect to the partner’s wage rate; (7) Our model rejects the unitary Slutsky symmetry condition. Collective household models Household behavior Labor supply Intra-household Time allocation van Praag, Bernard aut Maassen van den Brink, Henriette aut Enthalten in Review of Economics of the Household Springer US, 2003 6(2008), 2 vom: 19. Jan., Seite 169-191 (DE-627)363769102 (DE-600)2108192-X (DE-576)266542344 1569-5239 nnns volume:6 year:2008 number:2 day:19 month:01 pages:169-191 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-007-9028-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 AR 6 2008 2 19 01 169-191 |
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10.1007/s11150-007-9028-8 doi (DE-627)OLC207515290X (DE-He213)s11150-007-9028-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ van Klaveren, Chris verfasserin aut A public good version of the collective household model: an empirical approach with an application to British household data 2008 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008 Abstract In this paper we consider an empirical collective household model of time allocation for two-earner households. The novelty of this paper is that we estimate a version of the collective household model, where the internally produced goods and externally purchased goods are assumed to be public. The empirical results suggest that (1) Preferences of men and women differ; (2) Although there are significant individual variations, on average the utility functions of men and women are equally weighted in the household utility function; (3) Differences in the ratio of the partners’ hourly wages are explanatory for how individual utilities are weighted in the household utility function. (4) The female’s preference for household production is influenced by family size, but this does not hold for the male; (5) Both the male and the female have a backward-bending labor supply curve; (6) Labor-supply curves are forward-bending with respect to the partner’s wage rate; (7) Our model rejects the unitary Slutsky symmetry condition. Collective household models Household behavior Labor supply Intra-household Time allocation van Praag, Bernard aut Maassen van den Brink, Henriette aut Enthalten in Review of Economics of the Household Springer US, 2003 6(2008), 2 vom: 19. Jan., Seite 169-191 (DE-627)363769102 (DE-600)2108192-X (DE-576)266542344 1569-5239 nnns volume:6 year:2008 number:2 day:19 month:01 pages:169-191 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-007-9028-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 AR 6 2008 2 19 01 169-191 |
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10.1007/s11150-007-9028-8 doi (DE-627)OLC207515290X (DE-He213)s11150-007-9028-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ van Klaveren, Chris verfasserin aut A public good version of the collective household model: an empirical approach with an application to British household data 2008 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008 Abstract In this paper we consider an empirical collective household model of time allocation for two-earner households. The novelty of this paper is that we estimate a version of the collective household model, where the internally produced goods and externally purchased goods are assumed to be public. The empirical results suggest that (1) Preferences of men and women differ; (2) Although there are significant individual variations, on average the utility functions of men and women are equally weighted in the household utility function; (3) Differences in the ratio of the partners’ hourly wages are explanatory for how individual utilities are weighted in the household utility function. (4) The female’s preference for household production is influenced by family size, but this does not hold for the male; (5) Both the male and the female have a backward-bending labor supply curve; (6) Labor-supply curves are forward-bending with respect to the partner’s wage rate; (7) Our model rejects the unitary Slutsky symmetry condition. Collective household models Household behavior Labor supply Intra-household Time allocation van Praag, Bernard aut Maassen van den Brink, Henriette aut Enthalten in Review of Economics of the Household Springer US, 2003 6(2008), 2 vom: 19. Jan., Seite 169-191 (DE-627)363769102 (DE-600)2108192-X (DE-576)266542344 1569-5239 nnns volume:6 year:2008 number:2 day:19 month:01 pages:169-191 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-007-9028-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 AR 6 2008 2 19 01 169-191 |
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Abstract In this paper we consider an empirical collective household model of time allocation for two-earner households. The novelty of this paper is that we estimate a version of the collective household model, where the internally produced goods and externally purchased goods are assumed to be public. The empirical results suggest that (1) Preferences of men and women differ; (2) Although there are significant individual variations, on average the utility functions of men and women are equally weighted in the household utility function; (3) Differences in the ratio of the partners’ hourly wages are explanatory for how individual utilities are weighted in the household utility function. (4) The female’s preference for household production is influenced by family size, but this does not hold for the male; (5) Both the male and the female have a backward-bending labor supply curve; (6) Labor-supply curves are forward-bending with respect to the partner’s wage rate; (7) Our model rejects the unitary Slutsky symmetry condition. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008 |
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Abstract In this paper we consider an empirical collective household model of time allocation for two-earner households. The novelty of this paper is that we estimate a version of the collective household model, where the internally produced goods and externally purchased goods are assumed to be public. The empirical results suggest that (1) Preferences of men and women differ; (2) Although there are significant individual variations, on average the utility functions of men and women are equally weighted in the household utility function; (3) Differences in the ratio of the partners’ hourly wages are explanatory for how individual utilities are weighted in the household utility function. (4) The female’s preference for household production is influenced by family size, but this does not hold for the male; (5) Both the male and the female have a backward-bending labor supply curve; (6) Labor-supply curves are forward-bending with respect to the partner’s wage rate; (7) Our model rejects the unitary Slutsky symmetry condition. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract In this paper we consider an empirical collective household model of time allocation for two-earner households. The novelty of this paper is that we estimate a version of the collective household model, where the internally produced goods and externally purchased goods are assumed to be public. The empirical results suggest that (1) Preferences of men and women differ; (2) Although there are significant individual variations, on average the utility functions of men and women are equally weighted in the household utility function; (3) Differences in the ratio of the partners’ hourly wages are explanatory for how individual utilities are weighted in the household utility function. (4) The female’s preference for household production is influenced by family size, but this does not hold for the male; (5) Both the male and the female have a backward-bending labor supply curve; (6) Labor-supply curves are forward-bending with respect to the partner’s wage rate; (7) Our model rejects the unitary Slutsky symmetry condition. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008 |
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van Praag, Bernard Maassen van den Brink, Henriette |
| author2Str |
van Praag, Bernard Maassen van den Brink, Henriette |
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363769102 |
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n |
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false |
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| doi_str |
10.1007/s11150-007-9028-8 |
| up_date |
2024-07-04T00:31:58.717Z |
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1803606419012845568 |
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