Worldly imprecision
Abstract Physical theories often characterize their observables with real number precision. Many non-fundamental theories do so needlessly: they are more precise than they need to be to capture the physical matters of fact about their observables. A natural expectation is that a truly fundamental th...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Miller, Michael E. [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2020 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Philosophical studies - Springer Netherlands, 1950, 178(2020), 9 vom: 25. Nov., Seite 2895-2911 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:178 ; year:2020 ; number:9 ; day:25 ; month:11 ; pages:2895-2911 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11098-020-01591-z |
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OLC2077026685 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Physical theories often characterize their observables with real number precision. Many non-fundamental theories do so needlessly: they are more precise than they need to be to capture the physical matters of fact about their observables. A natural expectation is that a truly fundamental theory will require its full precision in order to exhaustively capture all of the fundamental physical matters of fact. I argue against this expectation and I show that we do not have good reason to expect that the standard of precision set by successful theories, or even by a truly fundamental theory, will match the granularity of the physical facts. | ||
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Abstract Physical theories often characterize their observables with real number precision. Many non-fundamental theories do so needlessly: they are more precise than they need to be to capture the physical matters of fact about their observables. A natural expectation is that a truly fundamental theory will require its full precision in order to exhaustively capture all of the fundamental physical matters of fact. I argue against this expectation and I show that we do not have good reason to expect that the standard of precision set by successful theories, or even by a truly fundamental theory, will match the granularity of the physical facts. © Springer Nature B.V. 2020 |
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Abstract Physical theories often characterize their observables with real number precision. Many non-fundamental theories do so needlessly: they are more precise than they need to be to capture the physical matters of fact about their observables. A natural expectation is that a truly fundamental theory will require its full precision in order to exhaustively capture all of the fundamental physical matters of fact. I argue against this expectation and I show that we do not have good reason to expect that the standard of precision set by successful theories, or even by a truly fundamental theory, will match the granularity of the physical facts. © Springer Nature B.V. 2020 |
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Abstract Physical theories often characterize their observables with real number precision. Many non-fundamental theories do so needlessly: they are more precise than they need to be to capture the physical matters of fact about their observables. A natural expectation is that a truly fundamental theory will require its full precision in order to exhaustively capture all of the fundamental physical matters of fact. I argue against this expectation and I show that we do not have good reason to expect that the standard of precision set by successful theories, or even by a truly fundamental theory, will match the granularity of the physical facts. © Springer Nature B.V. 2020 |
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