On the epistemic significance of practical reasons to inquire
Abstract In this paper I explore the epistemic significance of practical reasons to inquire. I have in mind the range of practical reasons one might have to do such things as collect (additional) evidence, consult with various sources, employ certain methods or techniques, double-check one’s answer...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Goldberg, Sanford C. [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2020 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Anmerkung: |
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Synthese - Springer Netherlands, 1936, 199(2020), 1-2 vom: 30. Sept., Seite 1641-1658 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:199 ; year:2020 ; number:1-2 ; day:30 ; month:09 ; pages:1641-1658 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11229-020-02833-7 |
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Katalog-ID: |
OLC2077474718 |
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10.1007/s11229-020-02833-7 doi (DE-627)OLC2077474718 (DE-He213)s11229-020-02833-7-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 400 150 300 VZ 5,2 7,11 11 5,1 ssgn LING DE-30 fid Goldberg, Sanford C. verfasserin aut On the epistemic significance of practical reasons to inquire 2020 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Nature B.V. 2020 Abstract In this paper I explore the epistemic significance of practical reasons to inquire. I have in mind the range of practical reasons one might have to do such things as collect (additional) evidence, consult with various sources, employ certain methods or techniques, double-check one’s answer to a question, etc. After expanding the diet of examples in which subjects have such reasons, I appeal to features of these sorts of reason in order to question the motivation for pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. Once we reject pragmatic encroachment, it can seem that we are forced to treat practical reasons to inquire as having no distinctly epistemic significance. This is not so; I conclude by sketching an alternative account of what the epistemic significance of such reasons might be. Pragmatic encroachment Practical reasons Inquiry Defeater Normative defeat Enthalten in Synthese Springer Netherlands, 1936 199(2020), 1-2 vom: 30. Sept., Seite 1641-1658 (DE-627)129479187 (DE-600)204075-X (DE-576)014860856 0039-7857 nnns volume:199 year:2020 number:1-2 day:30 month:09 pages:1641-1658 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02833-7 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHY SSG-OLC-CHE SSG-OLC-PHI SSG-OLC-PHA SSG-OLC-DE-84 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 AR 199 2020 1-2 30 09 1641-1658 |
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Abstract In this paper I explore the epistemic significance of practical reasons to inquire. I have in mind the range of practical reasons one might have to do such things as collect (additional) evidence, consult with various sources, employ certain methods or techniques, double-check one’s answer to a question, etc. After expanding the diet of examples in which subjects have such reasons, I appeal to features of these sorts of reason in order to question the motivation for pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. Once we reject pragmatic encroachment, it can seem that we are forced to treat practical reasons to inquire as having no distinctly epistemic significance. This is not so; I conclude by sketching an alternative account of what the epistemic significance of such reasons might be. © Springer Nature B.V. 2020 |
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Abstract In this paper I explore the epistemic significance of practical reasons to inquire. I have in mind the range of practical reasons one might have to do such things as collect (additional) evidence, consult with various sources, employ certain methods or techniques, double-check one’s answer to a question, etc. After expanding the diet of examples in which subjects have such reasons, I appeal to features of these sorts of reason in order to question the motivation for pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. Once we reject pragmatic encroachment, it can seem that we are forced to treat practical reasons to inquire as having no distinctly epistemic significance. This is not so; I conclude by sketching an alternative account of what the epistemic significance of such reasons might be. © Springer Nature B.V. 2020 |
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Abstract In this paper I explore the epistemic significance of practical reasons to inquire. I have in mind the range of practical reasons one might have to do such things as collect (additional) evidence, consult with various sources, employ certain methods or techniques, double-check one’s answer to a question, etc. After expanding the diet of examples in which subjects have such reasons, I appeal to features of these sorts of reason in order to question the motivation for pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. Once we reject pragmatic encroachment, it can seem that we are forced to treat practical reasons to inquire as having no distinctly epistemic significance. This is not so; I conclude by sketching an alternative account of what the epistemic significance of such reasons might be. © Springer Nature B.V. 2020 |
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1803573312747470851 |
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