Confirmation bias without rhyme or reason
Abstract Having a confirmation bias sometimes leads us to hold inaccurate beliefs. So, the puzzle goes: why do we have it? According to the influential argumentative theory of reasoning, confirmation bias emerges because the primary function of reason is not to form accurate beliefs, but to convince...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Michel, Matthias [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2020 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© The Author(s) 2020 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Synthese - Springer Netherlands, 1936, 199(2020), 1-2 vom: 22. Okt., Seite 2757-2772 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:199 ; year:2020 ; number:1-2 ; day:22 ; month:10 ; pages:2757-2772 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11229-020-02910-x |
|---|
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OLC2077475242 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Having a confirmation bias sometimes leads us to hold inaccurate beliefs. So, the puzzle goes: why do we have it? According to the influential argumentative theory of reasoning, confirmation bias emerges because the primary function of reason is not to form accurate beliefs, but to convince others that we’re right. A crucial prediction of the theory, then, is that confirmation bias should be found only in the reasoning domain. In this article, we argue that there is evidence that confirmation bias does exist outside the reasoning domain. This undermines the main evidential basis for the argumentative theory of reasoning. In presenting the relevant evidence, we explore why having such confirmation bias may not be maladaptive. | ||
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Abstract Having a confirmation bias sometimes leads us to hold inaccurate beliefs. So, the puzzle goes: why do we have it? According to the influential argumentative theory of reasoning, confirmation bias emerges because the primary function of reason is not to form accurate beliefs, but to convince others that we’re right. A crucial prediction of the theory, then, is that confirmation bias should be found only in the reasoning domain. In this article, we argue that there is evidence that confirmation bias does exist outside the reasoning domain. This undermines the main evidential basis for the argumentative theory of reasoning. In presenting the relevant evidence, we explore why having such confirmation bias may not be maladaptive. © The Author(s) 2020 |
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Abstract Having a confirmation bias sometimes leads us to hold inaccurate beliefs. So, the puzzle goes: why do we have it? According to the influential argumentative theory of reasoning, confirmation bias emerges because the primary function of reason is not to form accurate beliefs, but to convince others that we’re right. A crucial prediction of the theory, then, is that confirmation bias should be found only in the reasoning domain. In this article, we argue that there is evidence that confirmation bias does exist outside the reasoning domain. This undermines the main evidential basis for the argumentative theory of reasoning. In presenting the relevant evidence, we explore why having such confirmation bias may not be maladaptive. © The Author(s) 2020 |
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Abstract Having a confirmation bias sometimes leads us to hold inaccurate beliefs. So, the puzzle goes: why do we have it? According to the influential argumentative theory of reasoning, confirmation bias emerges because the primary function of reason is not to form accurate beliefs, but to convince others that we’re right. A crucial prediction of the theory, then, is that confirmation bias should be found only in the reasoning domain. In this article, we argue that there is evidence that confirmation bias does exist outside the reasoning domain. This undermines the main evidential basis for the argumentative theory of reasoning. In presenting the relevant evidence, we explore why having such confirmation bias may not be maladaptive. © The Author(s) 2020 |
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Confirmation bias without rhyme or reason |
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Peters, Megan A. K. |
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