Explanation, justification, and egalitarianism
Abstract This paper argues that the philosophy of explanation can help inform core debates in value theory. Specifically, it argues that there is a consistent parallelism between the properties of explanation and the properties of justification such that one can reasonably infer that any property of...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Spafford, Jesse [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2021 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© The Author(s) 2021 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Synthese - Springer Netherlands, 1936, 199(2021), 3-4 vom: 13. Juli, Seite 9699-9724 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:199 ; year:2021 ; number:3-4 ; day:13 ; month:07 ; pages:9699-9724 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11229-021-03222-4 |
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OLC2077632380 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract This paper argues that the philosophy of explanation can help inform core debates in value theory. Specifically, it argues that there is a consistent parallelism between the properties of explanation and the properties of justification such that one can reasonably infer that any property of explanation has a counterpart property of justification. Thus, by appealing to facts about the nature of explanation, one can derive various conclusions about the justifications offered by normative theorists. The paper illustrates this point by considering a debate within political philosophy over whether inequality requires justification in a way that equality does not. Egalitarians typically presume an affirmative answer to this question. However, libertarian critics note that this justificatory asymmetry cannot be simply assumed without argument. This paper argues that, by appealing to the explanation-justification parallelism, one can resolve this debate in favor of the egalitarians, as there are two properties of explanation, the justificatory analogs of which vindicate the egalitarian presumption. | ||
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10.1007/s11229-021-03222-4 doi (DE-627)OLC2077632380 (DE-He213)s11229-021-03222-4-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 400 150 300 VZ 5,2 7,11 11 5,1 ssgn LING DE-30 fid Spafford, Jesse verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-7443-9882 aut Explanation, justification, and egalitarianism 2021 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s) 2021 Abstract This paper argues that the philosophy of explanation can help inform core debates in value theory. Specifically, it argues that there is a consistent parallelism between the properties of explanation and the properties of justification such that one can reasonably infer that any property of explanation has a counterpart property of justification. Thus, by appealing to facts about the nature of explanation, one can derive various conclusions about the justifications offered by normative theorists. The paper illustrates this point by considering a debate within political philosophy over whether inequality requires justification in a way that equality does not. Egalitarians typically presume an affirmative answer to this question. However, libertarian critics note that this justificatory asymmetry cannot be simply assumed without argument. This paper argues that, by appealing to the explanation-justification parallelism, one can resolve this debate in favor of the egalitarians, as there are two properties of explanation, the justificatory analogs of which vindicate the egalitarian presumption. Egalitarianism Justification Explanation Metaphilosophy Luck egalitarianism Enthalten in Synthese Springer Netherlands, 1936 199(2021), 3-4 vom: 13. Juli, Seite 9699-9724 (DE-627)129479187 (DE-600)204075-X (DE-576)014860856 0039-7857 nnns volume:199 year:2021 number:3-4 day:13 month:07 pages:9699-9724 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03222-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHY SSG-OLC-CHE SSG-OLC-PHI SSG-OLC-PHA SSG-OLC-DE-84 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 AR 199 2021 3-4 13 07 9699-9724 |
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10.1007/s11229-021-03222-4 doi (DE-627)OLC2077632380 (DE-He213)s11229-021-03222-4-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 400 150 300 VZ 5,2 7,11 11 5,1 ssgn LING DE-30 fid Spafford, Jesse verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-7443-9882 aut Explanation, justification, and egalitarianism 2021 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s) 2021 Abstract This paper argues that the philosophy of explanation can help inform core debates in value theory. Specifically, it argues that there is a consistent parallelism between the properties of explanation and the properties of justification such that one can reasonably infer that any property of explanation has a counterpart property of justification. Thus, by appealing to facts about the nature of explanation, one can derive various conclusions about the justifications offered by normative theorists. The paper illustrates this point by considering a debate within political philosophy over whether inequality requires justification in a way that equality does not. Egalitarians typically presume an affirmative answer to this question. However, libertarian critics note that this justificatory asymmetry cannot be simply assumed without argument. This paper argues that, by appealing to the explanation-justification parallelism, one can resolve this debate in favor of the egalitarians, as there are two properties of explanation, the justificatory analogs of which vindicate the egalitarian presumption. Egalitarianism Justification Explanation Metaphilosophy Luck egalitarianism Enthalten in Synthese Springer Netherlands, 1936 199(2021), 3-4 vom: 13. Juli, Seite 9699-9724 (DE-627)129479187 (DE-600)204075-X (DE-576)014860856 0039-7857 nnns volume:199 year:2021 number:3-4 day:13 month:07 pages:9699-9724 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03222-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHY SSG-OLC-CHE SSG-OLC-PHI SSG-OLC-PHA SSG-OLC-DE-84 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 AR 199 2021 3-4 13 07 9699-9724 |
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10.1007/s11229-021-03222-4 doi (DE-627)OLC2077632380 (DE-He213)s11229-021-03222-4-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 400 150 300 VZ 5,2 7,11 11 5,1 ssgn LING DE-30 fid Spafford, Jesse verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-7443-9882 aut Explanation, justification, and egalitarianism 2021 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s) 2021 Abstract This paper argues that the philosophy of explanation can help inform core debates in value theory. Specifically, it argues that there is a consistent parallelism between the properties of explanation and the properties of justification such that one can reasonably infer that any property of explanation has a counterpart property of justification. Thus, by appealing to facts about the nature of explanation, one can derive various conclusions about the justifications offered by normative theorists. The paper illustrates this point by considering a debate within political philosophy over whether inequality requires justification in a way that equality does not. Egalitarians typically presume an affirmative answer to this question. However, libertarian critics note that this justificatory asymmetry cannot be simply assumed without argument. This paper argues that, by appealing to the explanation-justification parallelism, one can resolve this debate in favor of the egalitarians, as there are two properties of explanation, the justificatory analogs of which vindicate the egalitarian presumption. Egalitarianism Justification Explanation Metaphilosophy Luck egalitarianism Enthalten in Synthese Springer Netherlands, 1936 199(2021), 3-4 vom: 13. Juli, Seite 9699-9724 (DE-627)129479187 (DE-600)204075-X (DE-576)014860856 0039-7857 nnns volume:199 year:2021 number:3-4 day:13 month:07 pages:9699-9724 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03222-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHY SSG-OLC-CHE SSG-OLC-PHI SSG-OLC-PHA SSG-OLC-DE-84 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 AR 199 2021 3-4 13 07 9699-9724 |
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10.1007/s11229-021-03222-4 doi (DE-627)OLC2077632380 (DE-He213)s11229-021-03222-4-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 400 150 300 VZ 5,2 7,11 11 5,1 ssgn LING DE-30 fid Spafford, Jesse verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-7443-9882 aut Explanation, justification, and egalitarianism 2021 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s) 2021 Abstract This paper argues that the philosophy of explanation can help inform core debates in value theory. Specifically, it argues that there is a consistent parallelism between the properties of explanation and the properties of justification such that one can reasonably infer that any property of explanation has a counterpart property of justification. Thus, by appealing to facts about the nature of explanation, one can derive various conclusions about the justifications offered by normative theorists. The paper illustrates this point by considering a debate within political philosophy over whether inequality requires justification in a way that equality does not. Egalitarians typically presume an affirmative answer to this question. However, libertarian critics note that this justificatory asymmetry cannot be simply assumed without argument. This paper argues that, by appealing to the explanation-justification parallelism, one can resolve this debate in favor of the egalitarians, as there are two properties of explanation, the justificatory analogs of which vindicate the egalitarian presumption. Egalitarianism Justification Explanation Metaphilosophy Luck egalitarianism Enthalten in Synthese Springer Netherlands, 1936 199(2021), 3-4 vom: 13. Juli, Seite 9699-9724 (DE-627)129479187 (DE-600)204075-X (DE-576)014860856 0039-7857 nnns volume:199 year:2021 number:3-4 day:13 month:07 pages:9699-9724 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03222-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHY SSG-OLC-CHE SSG-OLC-PHI SSG-OLC-PHA SSG-OLC-DE-84 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 AR 199 2021 3-4 13 07 9699-9724 |
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10.1007/s11229-021-03222-4 doi (DE-627)OLC2077632380 (DE-He213)s11229-021-03222-4-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 400 150 300 VZ 5,2 7,11 11 5,1 ssgn LING DE-30 fid Spafford, Jesse verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-7443-9882 aut Explanation, justification, and egalitarianism 2021 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s) 2021 Abstract This paper argues that the philosophy of explanation can help inform core debates in value theory. Specifically, it argues that there is a consistent parallelism between the properties of explanation and the properties of justification such that one can reasonably infer that any property of explanation has a counterpart property of justification. Thus, by appealing to facts about the nature of explanation, one can derive various conclusions about the justifications offered by normative theorists. The paper illustrates this point by considering a debate within political philosophy over whether inequality requires justification in a way that equality does not. Egalitarians typically presume an affirmative answer to this question. However, libertarian critics note that this justificatory asymmetry cannot be simply assumed without argument. This paper argues that, by appealing to the explanation-justification parallelism, one can resolve this debate in favor of the egalitarians, as there are two properties of explanation, the justificatory analogs of which vindicate the egalitarian presumption. Egalitarianism Justification Explanation Metaphilosophy Luck egalitarianism Enthalten in Synthese Springer Netherlands, 1936 199(2021), 3-4 vom: 13. Juli, Seite 9699-9724 (DE-627)129479187 (DE-600)204075-X (DE-576)014860856 0039-7857 nnns volume:199 year:2021 number:3-4 day:13 month:07 pages:9699-9724 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03222-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-LING SSG-OLC-PHY SSG-OLC-CHE SSG-OLC-PHI SSG-OLC-PHA SSG-OLC-DE-84 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_4012 AR 199 2021 3-4 13 07 9699-9724 |
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Explanation, justification, and egalitarianism |
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Abstract This paper argues that the philosophy of explanation can help inform core debates in value theory. Specifically, it argues that there is a consistent parallelism between the properties of explanation and the properties of justification such that one can reasonably infer that any property of explanation has a counterpart property of justification. Thus, by appealing to facts about the nature of explanation, one can derive various conclusions about the justifications offered by normative theorists. The paper illustrates this point by considering a debate within political philosophy over whether inequality requires justification in a way that equality does not. Egalitarians typically presume an affirmative answer to this question. However, libertarian critics note that this justificatory asymmetry cannot be simply assumed without argument. This paper argues that, by appealing to the explanation-justification parallelism, one can resolve this debate in favor of the egalitarians, as there are two properties of explanation, the justificatory analogs of which vindicate the egalitarian presumption. © The Author(s) 2021 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract This paper argues that the philosophy of explanation can help inform core debates in value theory. Specifically, it argues that there is a consistent parallelism between the properties of explanation and the properties of justification such that one can reasonably infer that any property of explanation has a counterpart property of justification. Thus, by appealing to facts about the nature of explanation, one can derive various conclusions about the justifications offered by normative theorists. The paper illustrates this point by considering a debate within political philosophy over whether inequality requires justification in a way that equality does not. Egalitarians typically presume an affirmative answer to this question. However, libertarian critics note that this justificatory asymmetry cannot be simply assumed without argument. This paper argues that, by appealing to the explanation-justification parallelism, one can resolve this debate in favor of the egalitarians, as there are two properties of explanation, the justificatory analogs of which vindicate the egalitarian presumption. © The Author(s) 2021 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract This paper argues that the philosophy of explanation can help inform core debates in value theory. Specifically, it argues that there is a consistent parallelism between the properties of explanation and the properties of justification such that one can reasonably infer that any property of explanation has a counterpart property of justification. Thus, by appealing to facts about the nature of explanation, one can derive various conclusions about the justifications offered by normative theorists. The paper illustrates this point by considering a debate within political philosophy over whether inequality requires justification in a way that equality does not. Egalitarians typically presume an affirmative answer to this question. However, libertarian critics note that this justificatory asymmetry cannot be simply assumed without argument. This paper argues that, by appealing to the explanation-justification parallelism, one can resolve this debate in favor of the egalitarians, as there are two properties of explanation, the justificatory analogs of which vindicate the egalitarian presumption. © The Author(s) 2021 |
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3-4 |
| title_short |
Explanation, justification, and egalitarianism |
| url |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03222-4 |
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false |
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129479187 |
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| doi_str |
10.1007/s11229-021-03222-4 |
| up_date |
2024-07-03T16:32:33.151Z |
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7.4002647 |