On the Virginia school of antitrust: Competition policy, law & economics and public choice
Abstract Competition policy (antitrust policy in the United States) engages the subfields of microeconomics (price theory), industrial organization, law and economics, and public choice. The last was a latecomer to the list because of the persistence of naïve “public interest” explanations for compe...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Shughart, William F. [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2022 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2022 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Public choice - Springer US, 1968, 191(2022), 1-2 vom: Apr., Seite 1-19 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:191 ; year:2022 ; number:1-2 ; month:04 ; pages:1-19 |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11127-022-00967-5 |
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OLC2078530662 |
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10.1007/s11127-022-00967-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2078530662 (DE-He213)s11127-022-00967-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Shughart, William F. verfasserin aut On the Virginia school of antitrust: Competition policy, law & economics and public choice 2022 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2022 Abstract Competition policy (antitrust policy in the United States) engages the subfields of microeconomics (price theory), industrial organization, law and economics, and public choice. The last was a latecomer to the list because of the persistence of naïve “public interest” explanations for competition policy’s origins, purposes, and effects. Even after a half-century of policy analyses in general and of public regulation of prices and conditions of entry into myriad industries around the world—showing that such interventions almost always benefit politically powerful special interests rather than society at large—most scholars still carelessly and mistakenly assume that private plaintiffs, attorneys called to the antitrust bar, the public law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, judges and other parties involved in antitrust proceedings have no motivations beyond preserving competitive marketplaces. My aim here is to bring antitrust policy more firmly within the ambit of public choice reasoning, which helps explain why antitrust intervention often either is ineffective or perverse. Competition law enforcement is a first cousin of economic regulation and, hence, should be evaluated as such. Competition policy Antitrust policy Chicago school Virginia school Robert Tollison Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 191(2022), 1-2 vom: Apr., Seite 1-19 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:191 year:2022 number:1-2 month:04 pages:1-19 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-022-00967-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_4028 AR 191 2022 1-2 04 1-19 |
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10.1007/s11127-022-00967-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2078530662 (DE-He213)s11127-022-00967-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Shughart, William F. verfasserin aut On the Virginia school of antitrust: Competition policy, law & economics and public choice 2022 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2022 Abstract Competition policy (antitrust policy in the United States) engages the subfields of microeconomics (price theory), industrial organization, law and economics, and public choice. The last was a latecomer to the list because of the persistence of naïve “public interest” explanations for competition policy’s origins, purposes, and effects. Even after a half-century of policy analyses in general and of public regulation of prices and conditions of entry into myriad industries around the world—showing that such interventions almost always benefit politically powerful special interests rather than society at large—most scholars still carelessly and mistakenly assume that private plaintiffs, attorneys called to the antitrust bar, the public law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, judges and other parties involved in antitrust proceedings have no motivations beyond preserving competitive marketplaces. My aim here is to bring antitrust policy more firmly within the ambit of public choice reasoning, which helps explain why antitrust intervention often either is ineffective or perverse. Competition law enforcement is a first cousin of economic regulation and, hence, should be evaluated as such. Competition policy Antitrust policy Chicago school Virginia school Robert Tollison Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 191(2022), 1-2 vom: Apr., Seite 1-19 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:191 year:2022 number:1-2 month:04 pages:1-19 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-022-00967-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_4028 AR 191 2022 1-2 04 1-19 |
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10.1007/s11127-022-00967-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2078530662 (DE-He213)s11127-022-00967-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Shughart, William F. verfasserin aut On the Virginia school of antitrust: Competition policy, law & economics and public choice 2022 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2022 Abstract Competition policy (antitrust policy in the United States) engages the subfields of microeconomics (price theory), industrial organization, law and economics, and public choice. The last was a latecomer to the list because of the persistence of naïve “public interest” explanations for competition policy’s origins, purposes, and effects. Even after a half-century of policy analyses in general and of public regulation of prices and conditions of entry into myriad industries around the world—showing that such interventions almost always benefit politically powerful special interests rather than society at large—most scholars still carelessly and mistakenly assume that private plaintiffs, attorneys called to the antitrust bar, the public law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, judges and other parties involved in antitrust proceedings have no motivations beyond preserving competitive marketplaces. My aim here is to bring antitrust policy more firmly within the ambit of public choice reasoning, which helps explain why antitrust intervention often either is ineffective or perverse. Competition law enforcement is a first cousin of economic regulation and, hence, should be evaluated as such. Competition policy Antitrust policy Chicago school Virginia school Robert Tollison Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 191(2022), 1-2 vom: Apr., Seite 1-19 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:191 year:2022 number:1-2 month:04 pages:1-19 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-022-00967-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_4028 AR 191 2022 1-2 04 1-19 |
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10.1007/s11127-022-00967-5 doi (DE-627)OLC2078530662 (DE-He213)s11127-022-00967-5-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ Shughart, William F. verfasserin aut On the Virginia school of antitrust: Competition policy, law & economics and public choice 2022 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2022 Abstract Competition policy (antitrust policy in the United States) engages the subfields of microeconomics (price theory), industrial organization, law and economics, and public choice. The last was a latecomer to the list because of the persistence of naïve “public interest” explanations for competition policy’s origins, purposes, and effects. Even after a half-century of policy analyses in general and of public regulation of prices and conditions of entry into myriad industries around the world—showing that such interventions almost always benefit politically powerful special interests rather than society at large—most scholars still carelessly and mistakenly assume that private plaintiffs, attorneys called to the antitrust bar, the public law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, judges and other parties involved in antitrust proceedings have no motivations beyond preserving competitive marketplaces. My aim here is to bring antitrust policy more firmly within the ambit of public choice reasoning, which helps explain why antitrust intervention often either is ineffective or perverse. Competition law enforcement is a first cousin of economic regulation and, hence, should be evaluated as such. Competition policy Antitrust policy Chicago school Virginia school Robert Tollison Enthalten in Public choice Springer US, 1968 191(2022), 1-2 vom: Apr., Seite 1-19 (DE-627)129497630 (DE-600)207597-0 (DE-576)014896680 0048-5829 nnns volume:191 year:2022 number:1-2 month:04 pages:1-19 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-022-00967-5 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-POL SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_4028 AR 191 2022 1-2 04 1-19 |
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Abstract Competition policy (antitrust policy in the United States) engages the subfields of microeconomics (price theory), industrial organization, law and economics, and public choice. The last was a latecomer to the list because of the persistence of naïve “public interest” explanations for competition policy’s origins, purposes, and effects. Even after a half-century of policy analyses in general and of public regulation of prices and conditions of entry into myriad industries around the world—showing that such interventions almost always benefit politically powerful special interests rather than society at large—most scholars still carelessly and mistakenly assume that private plaintiffs, attorneys called to the antitrust bar, the public law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, judges and other parties involved in antitrust proceedings have no motivations beyond preserving competitive marketplaces. My aim here is to bring antitrust policy more firmly within the ambit of public choice reasoning, which helps explain why antitrust intervention often either is ineffective or perverse. Competition law enforcement is a first cousin of economic regulation and, hence, should be evaluated as such. © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2022 |
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Abstract Competition policy (antitrust policy in the United States) engages the subfields of microeconomics (price theory), industrial organization, law and economics, and public choice. The last was a latecomer to the list because of the persistence of naïve “public interest” explanations for competition policy’s origins, purposes, and effects. Even after a half-century of policy analyses in general and of public regulation of prices and conditions of entry into myriad industries around the world—showing that such interventions almost always benefit politically powerful special interests rather than society at large—most scholars still carelessly and mistakenly assume that private plaintiffs, attorneys called to the antitrust bar, the public law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, judges and other parties involved in antitrust proceedings have no motivations beyond preserving competitive marketplaces. My aim here is to bring antitrust policy more firmly within the ambit of public choice reasoning, which helps explain why antitrust intervention often either is ineffective or perverse. Competition law enforcement is a first cousin of economic regulation and, hence, should be evaluated as such. © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2022 |
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Abstract Competition policy (antitrust policy in the United States) engages the subfields of microeconomics (price theory), industrial organization, law and economics, and public choice. The last was a latecomer to the list because of the persistence of naïve “public interest” explanations for competition policy’s origins, purposes, and effects. Even after a half-century of policy analyses in general and of public regulation of prices and conditions of entry into myriad industries around the world—showing that such interventions almost always benefit politically powerful special interests rather than society at large—most scholars still carelessly and mistakenly assume that private plaintiffs, attorneys called to the antitrust bar, the public law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, judges and other parties involved in antitrust proceedings have no motivations beyond preserving competitive marketplaces. My aim here is to bring antitrust policy more firmly within the ambit of public choice reasoning, which helps explain why antitrust intervention often either is ineffective or perverse. Competition law enforcement is a first cousin of economic regulation and, hence, should be evaluated as such. © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2022 |
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1803592679697678336 |
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