Subsidy Incidence in the Presence of Bertrand Suppliers of Complementary Inputs: A U.S. Agricultural Example
Abstract Past farm subsidy research has identified the occurance of subsidy incidence to only a single input factor market (land). We expand subsidy incidence literature to a partial equilibrium two-stage dynamic game between a price-taking buyer and two Bertrand complementary input suppliers. The b...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Kelly, Abby [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2019 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Journal of industry, competition and trade - Springer US, 2001, 20(2019), 3 vom: 11. Dez., Seite 479-501 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:20 ; year:2019 ; number:3 ; day:11 ; month:12 ; pages:479-501 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s10842-019-00321-4 |
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OLC2118744986 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Past farm subsidy research has identified the occurance of subsidy incidence to only a single input factor market (land). We expand subsidy incidence literature to a partial equilibrium two-stage dynamic game between a price-taking buyer and two Bertrand complementary input suppliers. The buyer (farmer) is the target of the government subsidy. We find that a coupled subsidy results in higher input prices for both the affiliated coupled factor (land) and its nonaffiliated complementary factor (e.g. seed). Sector welfare and welfare distribution are highly influenced by input demand complementarity. Surplus for the receiver of the coupled subsidy increases as inputs become closer complements,while aggregate surplus distribution increasingly favors the input suppliers. However, increases in sector growth from coupled subsidies (mulitplier effect) increases as inputs become closer complements. Therefore, policy aimed at mitigating subsidy incidence may reduce sector growth. | ||
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10.1007/s10842-019-00321-4 doi (DE-627)OLC2118744986 (DE-He213)s10842-019-00321-4-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 690 VZ Kelly, Abby verfasserin aut Subsidy Incidence in the Presence of Bertrand Suppliers of Complementary Inputs: A U.S. Agricultural Example 2019 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019 Abstract Past farm subsidy research has identified the occurance of subsidy incidence to only a single input factor market (land). We expand subsidy incidence literature to a partial equilibrium two-stage dynamic game between a price-taking buyer and two Bertrand complementary input suppliers. The buyer (farmer) is the target of the government subsidy. We find that a coupled subsidy results in higher input prices for both the affiliated coupled factor (land) and its nonaffiliated complementary factor (e.g. seed). Sector welfare and welfare distribution are highly influenced by input demand complementarity. Surplus for the receiver of the coupled subsidy increases as inputs become closer complements,while aggregate surplus distribution increasingly favors the input suppliers. However, increases in sector growth from coupled subsidies (mulitplier effect) increases as inputs become closer complements. Therefore, policy aimed at mitigating subsidy incidence may reduce sector growth. Subsidies Bertrand competition Differentiated products Farm policy Coatney, Kalyn T. aut Li, Xiaofei aut Coble, Keith H. aut Enthalten in Journal of industry, competition and trade Springer US, 2001 20(2019), 3 vom: 11. Dez., Seite 479-501 (DE-627)340721324 (DE-600)2067120-9 (DE-576)102476020 1566-1679 nnns volume:20 year:2019 number:3 day:11 month:12 pages:479-501 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-019-00321-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 AR 20 2019 3 11 12 479-501 |
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10.1007/s10842-019-00321-4 doi (DE-627)OLC2118744986 (DE-He213)s10842-019-00321-4-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 690 VZ Kelly, Abby verfasserin aut Subsidy Incidence in the Presence of Bertrand Suppliers of Complementary Inputs: A U.S. Agricultural Example 2019 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019 Abstract Past farm subsidy research has identified the occurance of subsidy incidence to only a single input factor market (land). We expand subsidy incidence literature to a partial equilibrium two-stage dynamic game between a price-taking buyer and two Bertrand complementary input suppliers. The buyer (farmer) is the target of the government subsidy. We find that a coupled subsidy results in higher input prices for both the affiliated coupled factor (land) and its nonaffiliated complementary factor (e.g. seed). Sector welfare and welfare distribution are highly influenced by input demand complementarity. Surplus for the receiver of the coupled subsidy increases as inputs become closer complements,while aggregate surplus distribution increasingly favors the input suppliers. However, increases in sector growth from coupled subsidies (mulitplier effect) increases as inputs become closer complements. Therefore, policy aimed at mitigating subsidy incidence may reduce sector growth. Subsidies Bertrand competition Differentiated products Farm policy Coatney, Kalyn T. aut Li, Xiaofei aut Coble, Keith H. aut Enthalten in Journal of industry, competition and trade Springer US, 2001 20(2019), 3 vom: 11. Dez., Seite 479-501 (DE-627)340721324 (DE-600)2067120-9 (DE-576)102476020 1566-1679 nnns volume:20 year:2019 number:3 day:11 month:12 pages:479-501 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-019-00321-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 AR 20 2019 3 11 12 479-501 |
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10.1007/s10842-019-00321-4 doi (DE-627)OLC2118744986 (DE-He213)s10842-019-00321-4-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 690 VZ Kelly, Abby verfasserin aut Subsidy Incidence in the Presence of Bertrand Suppliers of Complementary Inputs: A U.S. Agricultural Example 2019 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019 Abstract Past farm subsidy research has identified the occurance of subsidy incidence to only a single input factor market (land). We expand subsidy incidence literature to a partial equilibrium two-stage dynamic game between a price-taking buyer and two Bertrand complementary input suppliers. The buyer (farmer) is the target of the government subsidy. We find that a coupled subsidy results in higher input prices for both the affiliated coupled factor (land) and its nonaffiliated complementary factor (e.g. seed). Sector welfare and welfare distribution are highly influenced by input demand complementarity. Surplus for the receiver of the coupled subsidy increases as inputs become closer complements,while aggregate surplus distribution increasingly favors the input suppliers. However, increases in sector growth from coupled subsidies (mulitplier effect) increases as inputs become closer complements. Therefore, policy aimed at mitigating subsidy incidence may reduce sector growth. Subsidies Bertrand competition Differentiated products Farm policy Coatney, Kalyn T. aut Li, Xiaofei aut Coble, Keith H. aut Enthalten in Journal of industry, competition and trade Springer US, 2001 20(2019), 3 vom: 11. Dez., Seite 479-501 (DE-627)340721324 (DE-600)2067120-9 (DE-576)102476020 1566-1679 nnns volume:20 year:2019 number:3 day:11 month:12 pages:479-501 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-019-00321-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 AR 20 2019 3 11 12 479-501 |
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10.1007/s10842-019-00321-4 doi (DE-627)OLC2118744986 (DE-He213)s10842-019-00321-4-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 690 VZ Kelly, Abby verfasserin aut Subsidy Incidence in the Presence of Bertrand Suppliers of Complementary Inputs: A U.S. Agricultural Example 2019 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019 Abstract Past farm subsidy research has identified the occurance of subsidy incidence to only a single input factor market (land). We expand subsidy incidence literature to a partial equilibrium two-stage dynamic game between a price-taking buyer and two Bertrand complementary input suppliers. The buyer (farmer) is the target of the government subsidy. We find that a coupled subsidy results in higher input prices for both the affiliated coupled factor (land) and its nonaffiliated complementary factor (e.g. seed). Sector welfare and welfare distribution are highly influenced by input demand complementarity. Surplus for the receiver of the coupled subsidy increases as inputs become closer complements,while aggregate surplus distribution increasingly favors the input suppliers. However, increases in sector growth from coupled subsidies (mulitplier effect) increases as inputs become closer complements. Therefore, policy aimed at mitigating subsidy incidence may reduce sector growth. Subsidies Bertrand competition Differentiated products Farm policy Coatney, Kalyn T. aut Li, Xiaofei aut Coble, Keith H. aut Enthalten in Journal of industry, competition and trade Springer US, 2001 20(2019), 3 vom: 11. Dez., Seite 479-501 (DE-627)340721324 (DE-600)2067120-9 (DE-576)102476020 1566-1679 nnns volume:20 year:2019 number:3 day:11 month:12 pages:479-501 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-019-00321-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_26 AR 20 2019 3 11 12 479-501 |
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Abstract Past farm subsidy research has identified the occurance of subsidy incidence to only a single input factor market (land). We expand subsidy incidence literature to a partial equilibrium two-stage dynamic game between a price-taking buyer and two Bertrand complementary input suppliers. The buyer (farmer) is the target of the government subsidy. We find that a coupled subsidy results in higher input prices for both the affiliated coupled factor (land) and its nonaffiliated complementary factor (e.g. seed). Sector welfare and welfare distribution are highly influenced by input demand complementarity. Surplus for the receiver of the coupled subsidy increases as inputs become closer complements,while aggregate surplus distribution increasingly favors the input suppliers. However, increases in sector growth from coupled subsidies (mulitplier effect) increases as inputs become closer complements. Therefore, policy aimed at mitigating subsidy incidence may reduce sector growth. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019 |
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Abstract Past farm subsidy research has identified the occurance of subsidy incidence to only a single input factor market (land). We expand subsidy incidence literature to a partial equilibrium two-stage dynamic game between a price-taking buyer and two Bertrand complementary input suppliers. The buyer (farmer) is the target of the government subsidy. We find that a coupled subsidy results in higher input prices for both the affiliated coupled factor (land) and its nonaffiliated complementary factor (e.g. seed). Sector welfare and welfare distribution are highly influenced by input demand complementarity. Surplus for the receiver of the coupled subsidy increases as inputs become closer complements,while aggregate surplus distribution increasingly favors the input suppliers. However, increases in sector growth from coupled subsidies (mulitplier effect) increases as inputs become closer complements. Therefore, policy aimed at mitigating subsidy incidence may reduce sector growth. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019 |
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Abstract Past farm subsidy research has identified the occurance of subsidy incidence to only a single input factor market (land). We expand subsidy incidence literature to a partial equilibrium two-stage dynamic game between a price-taking buyer and two Bertrand complementary input suppliers. The buyer (farmer) is the target of the government subsidy. We find that a coupled subsidy results in higher input prices for both the affiliated coupled factor (land) and its nonaffiliated complementary factor (e.g. seed). Sector welfare and welfare distribution are highly influenced by input demand complementarity. Surplus for the receiver of the coupled subsidy increases as inputs become closer complements,while aggregate surplus distribution increasingly favors the input suppliers. However, increases in sector growth from coupled subsidies (mulitplier effect) increases as inputs become closer complements. Therefore, policy aimed at mitigating subsidy incidence may reduce sector growth. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019 |
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Coatney, Kalyn T. Li, Xiaofei Coble, Keith H. |
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Coatney, Kalyn T. Li, Xiaofei Coble, Keith H. |
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340721324 |
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| doi_str |
10.1007/s10842-019-00321-4 |
| up_date |
2024-07-03T21:13:48.372Z |
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1803593951087689728 |
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