The Reason-Giving Force of Requests
Abstract How do we change the normative landscape by making requests? It will be argued that by making requests we create reasons for action if and only if certain conditions are met. We are able to create reasons if and only if doing so is valuable for the requester, and if they respect the request...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Schaber, Peter [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2021 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© The Author(s) 2021 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice - Springer Netherlands, 1998, 24(2021), 2 vom: 24. März, Seite 431-442 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:24 ; year:2021 ; number:2 ; day:24 ; month:03 ; pages:431-442 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s10677-021-10174-8 |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
OLC2125933314 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract How do we change the normative landscape by making requests? It will be argued that by making requests we create reasons for action if and only if certain conditions are met. We are able to create reasons if and only if doing so is valuable for the requester, and if they respect the requestee. Respectful requests have a normative force – it will be argued – because it is of instrumental value to us that we all have the normative power of creating reasons by making requests. The normative power has the potential for creating and shaping valuable interactions and relationships for the requester and the requestee. This potential could not be realized if we did not have the normative power of making requests. It will also be shown why this account of the normative force of requests should be preferred to the two alternative accounts of the reason-giving force of requests that have been put forward by James H.P. Lewis and David Enoch. | ||
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10.1007/s10677-021-10174-8 doi (DE-627)OLC2125933314 (DE-He213)s10677-021-10174-8-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 VZ 1 5,1 ssgn PHILOS DE-12 fid Schaber, Peter verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-9613-629X aut The Reason-Giving Force of Requests 2021 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s) 2021 Abstract How do we change the normative landscape by making requests? It will be argued that by making requests we create reasons for action if and only if certain conditions are met. We are able to create reasons if and only if doing so is valuable for the requester, and if they respect the requestee. Respectful requests have a normative force – it will be argued – because it is of instrumental value to us that we all have the normative power of creating reasons by making requests. The normative power has the potential for creating and shaping valuable interactions and relationships for the requester and the requestee. This potential could not be realized if we did not have the normative power of making requests. It will also be shown why this account of the normative force of requests should be preferred to the two alternative accounts of the reason-giving force of requests that have been put forward by James H.P. Lewis and David Enoch. Requests Creating reasons Triggering reasons Non-obligatory reasons Obligatory reasons Enthalten in Ethical theory and moral practice Springer Netherlands, 1998 24(2021), 2 vom: 24. März, Seite 431-442 (DE-627)234523336 (DE-600)1395203-1 (DE-576)066011205 1386-2820 nnns volume:24 year:2021 number:2 day:24 month:03 pages:431-442 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10174-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-PHILOS SSG-OLC-PHI GBV_ILN_607 GBV_ILN_2002 GBV_ILN_2007 AR 24 2021 2 24 03 431-442 |
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Abstract How do we change the normative landscape by making requests? It will be argued that by making requests we create reasons for action if and only if certain conditions are met. We are able to create reasons if and only if doing so is valuable for the requester, and if they respect the requestee. Respectful requests have a normative force – it will be argued – because it is of instrumental value to us that we all have the normative power of creating reasons by making requests. The normative power has the potential for creating and shaping valuable interactions and relationships for the requester and the requestee. This potential could not be realized if we did not have the normative power of making requests. It will also be shown why this account of the normative force of requests should be preferred to the two alternative accounts of the reason-giving force of requests that have been put forward by James H.P. Lewis and David Enoch. © The Author(s) 2021 |
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Abstract How do we change the normative landscape by making requests? It will be argued that by making requests we create reasons for action if and only if certain conditions are met. We are able to create reasons if and only if doing so is valuable for the requester, and if they respect the requestee. Respectful requests have a normative force – it will be argued – because it is of instrumental value to us that we all have the normative power of creating reasons by making requests. The normative power has the potential for creating and shaping valuable interactions and relationships for the requester and the requestee. This potential could not be realized if we did not have the normative power of making requests. It will also be shown why this account of the normative force of requests should be preferred to the two alternative accounts of the reason-giving force of requests that have been put forward by James H.P. Lewis and David Enoch. © The Author(s) 2021 |
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Abstract How do we change the normative landscape by making requests? It will be argued that by making requests we create reasons for action if and only if certain conditions are met. We are able to create reasons if and only if doing so is valuable for the requester, and if they respect the requestee. Respectful requests have a normative force – it will be argued – because it is of instrumental value to us that we all have the normative power of creating reasons by making requests. The normative power has the potential for creating and shaping valuable interactions and relationships for the requester and the requestee. This potential could not be realized if we did not have the normative power of making requests. It will also be shown why this account of the normative force of requests should be preferred to the two alternative accounts of the reason-giving force of requests that have been put forward by James H.P. Lewis and David Enoch. © The Author(s) 2021 |
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The Reason-Giving Force of Requests |
| url |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10174-8 |
| remote_bool |
false |
| ppnlink |
234523336 |
| mediatype_str_mv |
n |
| isOA_txt |
false |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| doi_str |
10.1007/s10677-021-10174-8 |
| up_date |
2024-07-04T05:21:54.173Z |
| _version_ |
1803624659457933312 |
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