The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation

Abstract Human cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, recip...
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Autor*in:	Burnham, Terence C. [verfasserIn] Johnson, Dominic D. P.

Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	Deutsch

Erschienen:	2005

Anmerkung:	© 2005 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Analyse & Kritik - Lucius & Lucius, 1979, 27(2005), 1 vom: 01. Mai, Seite 113-135
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:27 ; year:2005 ; number:1 ; day:01 ; month:05 ; pages:113-135

Links:	Volltext

DOI / URN:	10.1515/auk-2005-0107

Katalog-ID:	OLC213852549X

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520			\|a Abstract Human cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling. A number of recent authors label this behavior ‘strong reciprocity’, and argue that it is: (a) a newly documented aspect of human nature, (b) adaptive, and (c) evolved by group selection. We argue exactly the opposite; that the phenomenon is: (a) not new, (b) maladaptive, and (c) evolved by individual selection. In our perspective, the apparent puzzle disappears to reveal a biological and evolutionary logic to human cooperation. Group selection may play a role in theory, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain human cooperation. Our alternative solution is simpler, makes fewer assumptions, and is more parsimonious with the empirical data.
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spelling	10.1515/auk-2005-0107 doi (DE-627)OLC213852549X (DE-B1597)auk-2005-0107-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb ger 300 VZ 300 VZ LING DE-30 fid Burnham, Terence C. verfasserin aut The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation 2005 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © 2005 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart Abstract Human cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling. A number of recent authors label this behavior ‘strong reciprocity’, and argue that it is: (a) a newly documented aspect of human nature, (b) adaptive, and (c) evolved by group selection. We argue exactly the opposite; that the phenomenon is: (a) not new, (b) maladaptive, and (c) evolved by individual selection. In our perspective, the apparent puzzle disappears to reveal a biological and evolutionary logic to human cooperation. Group selection may play a role in theory, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain human cooperation. Our alternative solution is simpler, makes fewer assumptions, and is more parsimonious with the empirical data. Johnson, Dominic D. P. aut Enthalten in Analyse & Kritik Lucius & Lucius, 1979 27(2005), 1 vom: 01. Mai, Seite 113-135 (DE-627)130263893 (DE-600)558867-4 (DE-576)015829731 0171-5860 nnns volume:27 year:2005 number:1 day:01 month:05 pages:113-135 https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2005-0107 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-LING SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_72 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_131 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4315 GBV_ILN_4316 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4319 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 27 2005 1 01 05 113-135
allfields_unstemmed	10.1515/auk-2005-0107 doi (DE-627)OLC213852549X (DE-B1597)auk-2005-0107-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb ger 300 VZ 300 VZ LING DE-30 fid Burnham, Terence C. verfasserin aut The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation 2005 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © 2005 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart Abstract Human cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling. A number of recent authors label this behavior ‘strong reciprocity’, and argue that it is: (a) a newly documented aspect of human nature, (b) adaptive, and (c) evolved by group selection. We argue exactly the opposite; that the phenomenon is: (a) not new, (b) maladaptive, and (c) evolved by individual selection. In our perspective, the apparent puzzle disappears to reveal a biological and evolutionary logic to human cooperation. Group selection may play a role in theory, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain human cooperation. Our alternative solution is simpler, makes fewer assumptions, and is more parsimonious with the empirical data. Johnson, Dominic D. P. aut Enthalten in Analyse & Kritik Lucius & Lucius, 1979 27(2005), 1 vom: 01. Mai, Seite 113-135 (DE-627)130263893 (DE-600)558867-4 (DE-576)015829731 0171-5860 nnns volume:27 year:2005 number:1 day:01 month:05 pages:113-135 https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2005-0107 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-LING SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_72 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_131 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4315 GBV_ILN_4316 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4319 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 27 2005 1 01 05 113-135
allfieldsGer	10.1515/auk-2005-0107 doi (DE-627)OLC213852549X (DE-B1597)auk-2005-0107-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb ger 300 VZ 300 VZ LING DE-30 fid Burnham, Terence C. verfasserin aut The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation 2005 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © 2005 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart Abstract Human cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling. A number of recent authors label this behavior ‘strong reciprocity’, and argue that it is: (a) a newly documented aspect of human nature, (b) adaptive, and (c) evolved by group selection. We argue exactly the opposite; that the phenomenon is: (a) not new, (b) maladaptive, and (c) evolved by individual selection. In our perspective, the apparent puzzle disappears to reveal a biological and evolutionary logic to human cooperation. Group selection may play a role in theory, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain human cooperation. Our alternative solution is simpler, makes fewer assumptions, and is more parsimonious with the empirical data. Johnson, Dominic D. P. aut Enthalten in Analyse & Kritik Lucius & Lucius, 1979 27(2005), 1 vom: 01. Mai, Seite 113-135 (DE-627)130263893 (DE-600)558867-4 (DE-576)015829731 0171-5860 nnns volume:27 year:2005 number:1 day:01 month:05 pages:113-135 https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2005-0107 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-LING SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_72 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_131 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4315 GBV_ILN_4316 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4319 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 27 2005 1 01 05 113-135
allfieldsSound	10.1515/auk-2005-0107 doi (DE-627)OLC213852549X (DE-B1597)auk-2005-0107-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb ger 300 VZ 300 VZ LING DE-30 fid Burnham, Terence C. verfasserin aut The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation 2005 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © 2005 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart Abstract Human cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling. A number of recent authors label this behavior ‘strong reciprocity’, and argue that it is: (a) a newly documented aspect of human nature, (b) adaptive, and (c) evolved by group selection. We argue exactly the opposite; that the phenomenon is: (a) not new, (b) maladaptive, and (c) evolved by individual selection. In our perspective, the apparent puzzle disappears to reveal a biological and evolutionary logic to human cooperation. Group selection may play a role in theory, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain human cooperation. Our alternative solution is simpler, makes fewer assumptions, and is more parsimonious with the empirical data. Johnson, Dominic D. P. aut Enthalten in Analyse & Kritik Lucius & Lucius, 1979 27(2005), 1 vom: 01. Mai, Seite 113-135 (DE-627)130263893 (DE-600)558867-4 (DE-576)015829731 0171-5860 nnns volume:27 year:2005 number:1 day:01 month:05 pages:113-135 https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2005-0107 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC FID-LING SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_21 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_72 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_131 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2012 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_4027 GBV_ILN_4028 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4193 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4310 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4315 GBV_ILN_4316 GBV_ILN_4317 GBV_ILN_4318 GBV_ILN_4319 GBV_ILN_4326 AR 27 2005 1 01 05 113-135
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author	Burnham, Terence C.
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title	The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation
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title_full	The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation
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title_sort	the biological and evolutionary logic of human cooperation
title_auth	The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation
abstract	Abstract Human cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling. A number of recent authors label this behavior ‘strong reciprocity’, and argue that it is: (a) a newly documented aspect of human nature, (b) adaptive, and (c) evolved by group selection. We argue exactly the opposite; that the phenomenon is: (a) not new, (b) maladaptive, and (c) evolved by individual selection. In our perspective, the apparent puzzle disappears to reveal a biological and evolutionary logic to human cooperation. Group selection may play a role in theory, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain human cooperation. Our alternative solution is simpler, makes fewer assumptions, and is more parsimonious with the empirical data. © 2005 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart
abstractGer	Abstract Human cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling. A number of recent authors label this behavior ‘strong reciprocity’, and argue that it is: (a) a newly documented aspect of human nature, (b) adaptive, and (c) evolved by group selection. We argue exactly the opposite; that the phenomenon is: (a) not new, (b) maladaptive, and (c) evolved by individual selection. In our perspective, the apparent puzzle disappears to reveal a biological and evolutionary logic to human cooperation. Group selection may play a role in theory, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain human cooperation. Our alternative solution is simpler, makes fewer assumptions, and is more parsimonious with the empirical data. © 2005 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart
abstract_unstemmed	Abstract Human cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling. A number of recent authors label this behavior ‘strong reciprocity’, and argue that it is: (a) a newly documented aspect of human nature, (b) adaptive, and (c) evolved by group selection. We argue exactly the opposite; that the phenomenon is: (a) not new, (b) maladaptive, and (c) evolved by individual selection. In our perspective, the apparent puzzle disappears to reveal a biological and evolutionary logic to human cooperation. Group selection may play a role in theory, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain human cooperation. Our alternative solution is simpler, makes fewer assumptions, and is more parsimonious with the empirical data. © 2005 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart
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title_short	The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation
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