The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
Abstract Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Polanski, Arnold [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2022 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© The Author(s) 2022 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: International journal of game theory - Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1971, 52(2022), 2 vom: 29. Nov., Seite 463-483 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:52 ; year:2022 ; number:2 ; day:29 ; month:11 ; pages:463-483 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s00182-022-00826-z |
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OLC214369038X |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize a focal Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. In particular, we find that senders’ lying propensities are strategic complements so that increasing one sender’s bias decreases both senders’ truthfulness. We also analyse the role of polarization across senders. | ||
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10.1007/s00182-022-00826-z doi (DE-627)OLC214369038X (DE-He213)s00182-022-00826-z-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 VZ 510 VZ Polanski, Arnold verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-9146-6364 aut The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders 2022 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s) 2022 Abstract Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize a focal Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. In particular, we find that senders’ lying propensities are strategic complements so that increasing one sender’s bias decreases both senders’ truthfulness. We also analyse the role of polarization across senders. Information Externalities Communication Polarization Le Quement, Mark aut Enthalten in International journal of game theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1971 52(2022), 2 vom: 29. Nov., Seite 463-483 (DE-627)129290653 (DE-600)120387-3 (DE-576)01447199X 0020-7276 nnns volume:52 year:2022 number:2 day:29 month:11 pages:463-483 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00826-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2244 GBV_ILN_4277 AR 52 2022 2 29 11 463-483 |
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10.1007/s00182-022-00826-z doi (DE-627)OLC214369038X (DE-He213)s00182-022-00826-z-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 VZ 510 VZ Polanski, Arnold verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-9146-6364 aut The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders 2022 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s) 2022 Abstract Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize a focal Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. In particular, we find that senders’ lying propensities are strategic complements so that increasing one sender’s bias decreases both senders’ truthfulness. We also analyse the role of polarization across senders. Information Externalities Communication Polarization Le Quement, Mark aut Enthalten in International journal of game theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1971 52(2022), 2 vom: 29. Nov., Seite 463-483 (DE-627)129290653 (DE-600)120387-3 (DE-576)01447199X 0020-7276 nnns volume:52 year:2022 number:2 day:29 month:11 pages:463-483 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00826-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2244 GBV_ILN_4277 AR 52 2022 2 29 11 463-483 |
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10.1007/s00182-022-00826-z doi (DE-627)OLC214369038X (DE-He213)s00182-022-00826-z-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 VZ 510 VZ Polanski, Arnold verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-9146-6364 aut The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders 2022 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s) 2022 Abstract Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize a focal Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. In particular, we find that senders’ lying propensities are strategic complements so that increasing one sender’s bias decreases both senders’ truthfulness. We also analyse the role of polarization across senders. Information Externalities Communication Polarization Le Quement, Mark aut Enthalten in International journal of game theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1971 52(2022), 2 vom: 29. Nov., Seite 463-483 (DE-627)129290653 (DE-600)120387-3 (DE-576)01447199X 0020-7276 nnns volume:52 year:2022 number:2 day:29 month:11 pages:463-483 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00826-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2244 GBV_ILN_4277 AR 52 2022 2 29 11 463-483 |
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10.1007/s00182-022-00826-z doi (DE-627)OLC214369038X (DE-He213)s00182-022-00826-z-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 VZ 510 VZ Polanski, Arnold verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-9146-6364 aut The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders 2022 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s) 2022 Abstract Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize a focal Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. In particular, we find that senders’ lying propensities are strategic complements so that increasing one sender’s bias decreases both senders’ truthfulness. We also analyse the role of polarization across senders. Information Externalities Communication Polarization Le Quement, Mark aut Enthalten in International journal of game theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1971 52(2022), 2 vom: 29. Nov., Seite 463-483 (DE-627)129290653 (DE-600)120387-3 (DE-576)01447199X 0020-7276 nnns volume:52 year:2022 number:2 day:29 month:11 pages:463-483 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00826-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2244 GBV_ILN_4277 AR 52 2022 2 29 11 463-483 |
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10.1007/s00182-022-00826-z doi (DE-627)OLC214369038X (DE-He213)s00182-022-00826-z-p DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 510 VZ 510 VZ Polanski, Arnold verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-9146-6364 aut The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders 2022 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier © The Author(s) 2022 Abstract Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize a focal Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. In particular, we find that senders’ lying propensities are strategic complements so that increasing one sender’s bias decreases both senders’ truthfulness. We also analyse the role of polarization across senders. Information Externalities Communication Polarization Le Quement, Mark aut Enthalten in International journal of game theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1971 52(2022), 2 vom: 29. Nov., Seite 463-483 (DE-627)129290653 (DE-600)120387-3 (DE-576)01447199X 0020-7276 nnns volume:52 year:2022 number:2 day:29 month:11 pages:463-483 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00826-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-MAT SSG-OLC-WIW SSG-OPC-MAT GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2244 GBV_ILN_4277 AR 52 2022 2 29 11 463-483 |
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Abstract Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize a focal Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. In particular, we find that senders’ lying propensities are strategic complements so that increasing one sender’s bias decreases both senders’ truthfulness. We also analyse the role of polarization across senders. © The Author(s) 2022 |
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Abstract Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize a focal Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. In particular, we find that senders’ lying propensities are strategic complements so that increasing one sender’s bias decreases both senders’ truthfulness. We also analyse the role of polarization across senders. © The Author(s) 2022 |
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Abstract Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize a focal Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. In particular, we find that senders’ lying propensities are strategic complements so that increasing one sender’s bias decreases both senders’ truthfulness. We also analyse the role of polarization across senders. © The Author(s) 2022 |
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Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause audiences to switch to the competitor. We fully characterize a focal Markov perfect equilibrium of this game and discuss the impact of exogenous parameters on the truthfulness of equilibrium reporting. In particular, we find that senders’ lying propensities are strategic complements so that increasing one sender’s bias decreases both senders’ truthfulness. 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