The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests
Abstract Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players’ cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow–Pratt curvature of d, %$R_{d},%$ determines the effect on equilibrium...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Einy, Ezra [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2016 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Economic theory - Berlin : Springer, 1991, 63(2016), 4 vom: 14. Mai, Seite 925-942 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:63 ; year:2016 ; number:4 ; day:14 ; month:05 ; pages:925-942 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3 |
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| Katalog-ID: |
SPR001752308 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Einy, Ezra |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 4 | |a The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players’ cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow–Pratt curvature of d, %$R_{d},%$ determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If %$R_{d}%$ is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if %$R_{d}%$ is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive). | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Tullock contests |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Common values |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Value of public information |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Moreno, Diego |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Shitovitz, Benyamin |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Economic theory |d Berlin : Springer, 1991 |g 63(2016), 4 vom: 14. Mai, Seite 925-942 |w (DE-627)235503665 |w (DE-600)1398355-6 |x 1432-0479 |7 nnns |
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10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3 doi (DE-627)SPR001752308 (SPR)s00199-016-0974-3-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Einy, Ezra verfasserin aut The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 Abstract Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players’ cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow–Pratt curvature of d, %$R_{d},%$ determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If %$R_{d}%$ is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if %$R_{d}%$ is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive). Tullock contests (dpeaa)DE-He213 Common values (dpeaa)DE-He213 Value of public information (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moreno, Diego aut Shitovitz, Benyamin aut Enthalten in Economic theory Berlin : Springer, 1991 63(2016), 4 vom: 14. Mai, Seite 925-942 (DE-627)235503665 (DE-600)1398355-6 1432-0479 nnns volume:63 year:2016 number:4 day:14 month:05 pages:925-942 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2937 GBV_ILN_2941 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 63 2016 4 14 05 925-942 |
| spelling |
10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3 doi (DE-627)SPR001752308 (SPR)s00199-016-0974-3-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Einy, Ezra verfasserin aut The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 Abstract Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players’ cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow–Pratt curvature of d, %$R_{d},%$ determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If %$R_{d}%$ is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if %$R_{d}%$ is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive). Tullock contests (dpeaa)DE-He213 Common values (dpeaa)DE-He213 Value of public information (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moreno, Diego aut Shitovitz, Benyamin aut Enthalten in Economic theory Berlin : Springer, 1991 63(2016), 4 vom: 14. Mai, Seite 925-942 (DE-627)235503665 (DE-600)1398355-6 1432-0479 nnns volume:63 year:2016 number:4 day:14 month:05 pages:925-942 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2937 GBV_ILN_2941 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 63 2016 4 14 05 925-942 |
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10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3 doi (DE-627)SPR001752308 (SPR)s00199-016-0974-3-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Einy, Ezra verfasserin aut The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 Abstract Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players’ cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow–Pratt curvature of d, %$R_{d},%$ determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If %$R_{d}%$ is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if %$R_{d}%$ is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive). Tullock contests (dpeaa)DE-He213 Common values (dpeaa)DE-He213 Value of public information (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moreno, Diego aut Shitovitz, Benyamin aut Enthalten in Economic theory Berlin : Springer, 1991 63(2016), 4 vom: 14. Mai, Seite 925-942 (DE-627)235503665 (DE-600)1398355-6 1432-0479 nnns volume:63 year:2016 number:4 day:14 month:05 pages:925-942 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2937 GBV_ILN_2941 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 63 2016 4 14 05 925-942 |
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10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3 doi (DE-627)SPR001752308 (SPR)s00199-016-0974-3-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Einy, Ezra verfasserin aut The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 Abstract Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players’ cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow–Pratt curvature of d, %$R_{d},%$ determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If %$R_{d}%$ is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if %$R_{d}%$ is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive). Tullock contests (dpeaa)DE-He213 Common values (dpeaa)DE-He213 Value of public information (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moreno, Diego aut Shitovitz, Benyamin aut Enthalten in Economic theory Berlin : Springer, 1991 63(2016), 4 vom: 14. Mai, Seite 925-942 (DE-627)235503665 (DE-600)1398355-6 1432-0479 nnns volume:63 year:2016 number:4 day:14 month:05 pages:925-942 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2937 GBV_ILN_2941 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 63 2016 4 14 05 925-942 |
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10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3 doi (DE-627)SPR001752308 (SPR)s00199-016-0974-3-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Einy, Ezra verfasserin aut The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 Abstract Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players’ cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow–Pratt curvature of d, %$R_{d},%$ determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If %$R_{d}%$ is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if %$R_{d}%$ is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive). Tullock contests (dpeaa)DE-He213 Common values (dpeaa)DE-He213 Value of public information (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moreno, Diego aut Shitovitz, Benyamin aut Enthalten in Economic theory Berlin : Springer, 1991 63(2016), 4 vom: 14. Mai, Seite 925-942 (DE-627)235503665 (DE-600)1398355-6 1432-0479 nnns volume:63 year:2016 number:4 day:14 month:05 pages:925-942 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_267 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2937 GBV_ILN_2941 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 63 2016 4 14 05 925-942 |
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The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests Tullock contests (dpeaa)DE-He213 Common values (dpeaa)DE-He213 Value of public information (dpeaa)DE-He213 |
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value of public information in common-value tullock contests |
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The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests |
| abstract |
Abstract Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players’ cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow–Pratt curvature of d, %$R_{d},%$ determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If %$R_{d}%$ is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if %$R_{d}%$ is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive). © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 |
| abstractGer |
Abstract Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players’ cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow–Pratt curvature of d, %$R_{d},%$ determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If %$R_{d}%$ is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if %$R_{d}%$ is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive). © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players’ cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow–Pratt curvature of d, %$R_{d},%$ determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If %$R_{d}%$ is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if %$R_{d}%$ is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive). © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 |
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The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests |
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https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3 |
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Moreno, Diego Shitovitz, Benyamin |
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10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3 |
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| score |
7.3976717 |