A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives

Abstract I prove that under each strategy-proof and unanimous social choice correspondence, there is at least one agent who is decisive. Because the result is established on a weak requirement on preferences over sets, the existence of a decisive agent is an underlying feature of most strategy-proof...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Autor*in:

Sato, Shin [verfasserIn]

Format:

E-Artikel

Sprache:

Englisch

Erschienen:

2013

Schlagwörter:

Preference Relation

Social Choice

Weak Order

Impossibility Result

Preference Profile

Anmerkung:

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Übergeordnetes Werk:

Enthalten in: Social choice and welfare - Berlin : Springer, 1984, 42(2013), 4 vom: 27. Juli, Seite 831-851

Übergeordnetes Werk:

volume:42 ; year:2013 ; number:4 ; day:27 ; month:07 ; pages:831-851

Links:

Volltext

DOI / URN:

10.1007/s00355-013-0755-x

Katalog-ID:

SPR004445724

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