A game theory based approach for emergy analysis of industrial ecosystem under uncertainty
Abstract A well-designed and operated industrial ecological system should be able to utilize effectively the generated wastes from one member as the feed to another member. Nevertheless, due to heavy interactions among the member entities, particularly with various uncertainties, the coordinative ma...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Lou, Helen H. [verfasserIn] Kulkarni, M. A. [verfasserIn] Singh, A. [verfasserIn] Huang, Yinlun L. [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2003 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Clean Products and Processes - Springer-Verlag, 2001, 6(2003), 3 vom: 17. Dez., Seite 156-161 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:6 ; year:2003 ; number:3 ; day:17 ; month:12 ; pages:156-161 |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s10098-003-0235-6 |
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10.1007/s10098-003-0235-6 doi (DE-627)SPR008713308 (SPR)s10098-003-0235-6-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Lou, Helen H. verfasserin aut A game theory based approach for emergy analysis of industrial ecosystem under uncertainty 2003 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract A well-designed and operated industrial ecological system should be able to utilize effectively the generated wastes from one member as the feed to another member. Nevertheless, due to heavy interactions among the member entities, particularly with various uncertainties, the coordinative material and energy reuse is a very complex task. In this paper, the issues of optimal operation of an industrial ecosystem under uncertainty are addressed. A game theory based approach is then introduced to derive an economically and environmentally optimal status of an industrial ecosystem. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated by tackling a case study problem, where the Nash Equilibrium for the profit payoff and sustainability payoff of the member entities is identified. The possible conflicts of the profit and sustainability objectives of the member entities in the ecosystem are resolved. Industrial ecology (dpeaa)DE-He213 Emergy analysis (dpeaa)DE-He213 Uncertainty (dpeaa)DE-He213 Game theory (dpeaa)DE-He213 Kulkarni, M. A. verfasserin aut Singh, A. verfasserin aut Huang, Yinlun L. verfasserin aut Enthalten in Clean Products and Processes Springer-Verlag, 2001 6(2003), 3 vom: 17. Dez., Seite 156-161 (DE-627)SPR008711836 nnns volume:6 year:2003 number:3 day:17 month:12 pages:156-161 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10098-003-0235-6 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER AR 6 2003 3 17 12 156-161 |
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10.1007/s10098-003-0235-6 doi (DE-627)SPR008713308 (SPR)s10098-003-0235-6-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Lou, Helen H. verfasserin aut A game theory based approach for emergy analysis of industrial ecosystem under uncertainty 2003 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract A well-designed and operated industrial ecological system should be able to utilize effectively the generated wastes from one member as the feed to another member. Nevertheless, due to heavy interactions among the member entities, particularly with various uncertainties, the coordinative material and energy reuse is a very complex task. In this paper, the issues of optimal operation of an industrial ecosystem under uncertainty are addressed. A game theory based approach is then introduced to derive an economically and environmentally optimal status of an industrial ecosystem. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated by tackling a case study problem, where the Nash Equilibrium for the profit payoff and sustainability payoff of the member entities is identified. The possible conflicts of the profit and sustainability objectives of the member entities in the ecosystem are resolved. Industrial ecology (dpeaa)DE-He213 Emergy analysis (dpeaa)DE-He213 Uncertainty (dpeaa)DE-He213 Game theory (dpeaa)DE-He213 Kulkarni, M. A. verfasserin aut Singh, A. verfasserin aut Huang, Yinlun L. verfasserin aut Enthalten in Clean Products and Processes Springer-Verlag, 2001 6(2003), 3 vom: 17. Dez., Seite 156-161 (DE-627)SPR008711836 nnns volume:6 year:2003 number:3 day:17 month:12 pages:156-161 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10098-003-0235-6 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER AR 6 2003 3 17 12 156-161 |
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10.1007/s10098-003-0235-6 doi (DE-627)SPR008713308 (SPR)s10098-003-0235-6-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Lou, Helen H. verfasserin aut A game theory based approach for emergy analysis of industrial ecosystem under uncertainty 2003 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract A well-designed and operated industrial ecological system should be able to utilize effectively the generated wastes from one member as the feed to another member. Nevertheless, due to heavy interactions among the member entities, particularly with various uncertainties, the coordinative material and energy reuse is a very complex task. In this paper, the issues of optimal operation of an industrial ecosystem under uncertainty are addressed. A game theory based approach is then introduced to derive an economically and environmentally optimal status of an industrial ecosystem. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated by tackling a case study problem, where the Nash Equilibrium for the profit payoff and sustainability payoff of the member entities is identified. The possible conflicts of the profit and sustainability objectives of the member entities in the ecosystem are resolved. Industrial ecology (dpeaa)DE-He213 Emergy analysis (dpeaa)DE-He213 Uncertainty (dpeaa)DE-He213 Game theory (dpeaa)DE-He213 Kulkarni, M. A. verfasserin aut Singh, A. verfasserin aut Huang, Yinlun L. verfasserin aut Enthalten in Clean Products and Processes Springer-Verlag, 2001 6(2003), 3 vom: 17. Dez., Seite 156-161 (DE-627)SPR008711836 nnns volume:6 year:2003 number:3 day:17 month:12 pages:156-161 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10098-003-0235-6 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER AR 6 2003 3 17 12 156-161 |
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Abstract A well-designed and operated industrial ecological system should be able to utilize effectively the generated wastes from one member as the feed to another member. Nevertheless, due to heavy interactions among the member entities, particularly with various uncertainties, the coordinative material and energy reuse is a very complex task. In this paper, the issues of optimal operation of an industrial ecosystem under uncertainty are addressed. A game theory based approach is then introduced to derive an economically and environmentally optimal status of an industrial ecosystem. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated by tackling a case study problem, where the Nash Equilibrium for the profit payoff and sustainability payoff of the member entities is identified. The possible conflicts of the profit and sustainability objectives of the member entities in the ecosystem are resolved. |
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Abstract A well-designed and operated industrial ecological system should be able to utilize effectively the generated wastes from one member as the feed to another member. Nevertheless, due to heavy interactions among the member entities, particularly with various uncertainties, the coordinative material and energy reuse is a very complex task. In this paper, the issues of optimal operation of an industrial ecosystem under uncertainty are addressed. A game theory based approach is then introduced to derive an economically and environmentally optimal status of an industrial ecosystem. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated by tackling a case study problem, where the Nash Equilibrium for the profit payoff and sustainability payoff of the member entities is identified. The possible conflicts of the profit and sustainability objectives of the member entities in the ecosystem are resolved. |
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Abstract A well-designed and operated industrial ecological system should be able to utilize effectively the generated wastes from one member as the feed to another member. Nevertheless, due to heavy interactions among the member entities, particularly with various uncertainties, the coordinative material and energy reuse is a very complex task. In this paper, the issues of optimal operation of an industrial ecosystem under uncertainty are addressed. A game theory based approach is then introduced to derive an economically and environmentally optimal status of an industrial ecosystem. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated by tackling a case study problem, where the Nash Equilibrium for the profit payoff and sustainability payoff of the member entities is identified. The possible conflicts of the profit and sustainability objectives of the member entities in the ecosystem are resolved. |
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">SPR008713308</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20201124050051.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">201005s2003 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s10098-003-0235-6</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)SPR008713308</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(SPR)s10098-003-0235-6-e</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Lou, Helen H.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">A game theory based approach for emergy analysis of industrial ecosystem under uncertainty</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2003</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract A well-designed and operated industrial ecological system should be able to utilize effectively the generated wastes from one member as the feed to another member. Nevertheless, due to heavy interactions among the member entities, particularly with various uncertainties, the coordinative material and energy reuse is a very complex task. In this paper, the issues of optimal operation of an industrial ecosystem under uncertainty are addressed. A game theory based approach is then introduced to derive an economically and environmentally optimal status of an industrial ecosystem. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated by tackling a case study problem, where the Nash Equilibrium for the profit payoff and sustainability payoff of the member entities is identified. The possible conflicts of the profit and sustainability objectives of the member entities in the ecosystem are resolved.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Industrial ecology</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Emergy analysis</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Uncertainty</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Game theory</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Kulkarni, M. A.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Singh, A.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Huang, Yinlun L.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Clean Products and Processes</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer-Verlag, 2001</subfield><subfield code="g">6(2003), 3 vom: 17. 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