A generalization of Paillier’s public-key system with applications to electronic voting
Abstract We propose a generalization of Paillier’s probabilistic public-key system, in which the expansion factor is reduced and which allows to adjust the block length of the scheme even after the public key has been fixed, without losing the homomorphic property. We show that the generalization is...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Damgård, Ivan [verfasserIn] Jurik, Mads [verfasserIn] Nielsen, Jesper Buus [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2010 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: International Journal of Information Security - Springer-Verlag, 2001, 9(2010), 6 vom: 30. Sept., Seite 371-385 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:9 ; year:2010 ; number:6 ; day:30 ; month:09 ; pages:371-385 |
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10.1007/s10207-010-0119-9 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract We propose a generalization of Paillier’s probabilistic public-key system, in which the expansion factor is reduced and which allows to adjust the block length of the scheme even after the public key has been fixed, without losing the homomorphic property. We show that the generalization is as secure as Paillier’s original system and propose several ways to optimize implementations of both the generalized and the original scheme. We construct a threshold variant of the generalized scheme as well as zero-knowledge protocols to show that a given ciphertext encrypts one of a set of given plaintexts, and protocols to verify multiplicative relations on plaintexts. We then show how these building blocks can be used for applying the scheme to efficient electronic voting. This reduces dramatically the work needed to compute the final result of an election, compared to the previously best known schemes. We show how the basic scheme for a yes/no vote can be easily adapted to casting a vote for up to t out of L candidates. The same basic building blocks can also be adapted to provide receipt-free elections, under appropriate physical assumptions. The scheme for 1 out of L elections can be optimized such that for a certain range of the other parameter values, the ballot size is logarithmic in L. | ||
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10.1007/s10207-010-0119-9 doi (DE-627)SPR009129405 (SPR)s10207-010-0119-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Damgård, Ivan verfasserin aut A generalization of Paillier’s public-key system with applications to electronic voting 2010 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract We propose a generalization of Paillier’s probabilistic public-key system, in which the expansion factor is reduced and which allows to adjust the block length of the scheme even after the public key has been fixed, without losing the homomorphic property. We show that the generalization is as secure as Paillier’s original system and propose several ways to optimize implementations of both the generalized and the original scheme. We construct a threshold variant of the generalized scheme as well as zero-knowledge protocols to show that a given ciphertext encrypts one of a set of given plaintexts, and protocols to verify multiplicative relations on plaintexts. We then show how these building blocks can be used for applying the scheme to efficient electronic voting. This reduces dramatically the work needed to compute the final result of an election, compared to the previously best known schemes. We show how the basic scheme for a yes/no vote can be easily adapted to casting a vote for up to t out of L candidates. The same basic building blocks can also be adapted to provide receipt-free elections, under appropriate physical assumptions. The scheme for 1 out of L elections can be optimized such that for a certain range of the other parameter values, the ballot size is logarithmic in L. Public-key encryption (dpeaa)DE-He213 Electronic voting (dpeaa)DE-He213 Homomorphic encryption (dpeaa)DE-He213 Zero-knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 Jurik, Mads verfasserin aut Nielsen, Jesper Buus verfasserin aut Enthalten in International Journal of Information Security Springer-Verlag, 2001 9(2010), 6 vom: 30. Sept., Seite 371-385 (DE-627)SPR009127291 nnns volume:9 year:2010 number:6 day:30 month:09 pages:371-385 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10207-010-0119-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER AR 9 2010 6 30 09 371-385 |
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10.1007/s10207-010-0119-9 doi (DE-627)SPR009129405 (SPR)s10207-010-0119-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Damgård, Ivan verfasserin aut A generalization of Paillier’s public-key system with applications to electronic voting 2010 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract We propose a generalization of Paillier’s probabilistic public-key system, in which the expansion factor is reduced and which allows to adjust the block length of the scheme even after the public key has been fixed, without losing the homomorphic property. We show that the generalization is as secure as Paillier’s original system and propose several ways to optimize implementations of both the generalized and the original scheme. We construct a threshold variant of the generalized scheme as well as zero-knowledge protocols to show that a given ciphertext encrypts one of a set of given plaintexts, and protocols to verify multiplicative relations on plaintexts. We then show how these building blocks can be used for applying the scheme to efficient electronic voting. This reduces dramatically the work needed to compute the final result of an election, compared to the previously best known schemes. We show how the basic scheme for a yes/no vote can be easily adapted to casting a vote for up to t out of L candidates. The same basic building blocks can also be adapted to provide receipt-free elections, under appropriate physical assumptions. The scheme for 1 out of L elections can be optimized such that for a certain range of the other parameter values, the ballot size is logarithmic in L. Public-key encryption (dpeaa)DE-He213 Electronic voting (dpeaa)DE-He213 Homomorphic encryption (dpeaa)DE-He213 Zero-knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 Jurik, Mads verfasserin aut Nielsen, Jesper Buus verfasserin aut Enthalten in International Journal of Information Security Springer-Verlag, 2001 9(2010), 6 vom: 30. Sept., Seite 371-385 (DE-627)SPR009127291 nnns volume:9 year:2010 number:6 day:30 month:09 pages:371-385 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10207-010-0119-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER AR 9 2010 6 30 09 371-385 |
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10.1007/s10207-010-0119-9 doi (DE-627)SPR009129405 (SPR)s10207-010-0119-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Damgård, Ivan verfasserin aut A generalization of Paillier’s public-key system with applications to electronic voting 2010 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract We propose a generalization of Paillier’s probabilistic public-key system, in which the expansion factor is reduced and which allows to adjust the block length of the scheme even after the public key has been fixed, without losing the homomorphic property. We show that the generalization is as secure as Paillier’s original system and propose several ways to optimize implementations of both the generalized and the original scheme. We construct a threshold variant of the generalized scheme as well as zero-knowledge protocols to show that a given ciphertext encrypts one of a set of given plaintexts, and protocols to verify multiplicative relations on plaintexts. We then show how these building blocks can be used for applying the scheme to efficient electronic voting. This reduces dramatically the work needed to compute the final result of an election, compared to the previously best known schemes. We show how the basic scheme for a yes/no vote can be easily adapted to casting a vote for up to t out of L candidates. The same basic building blocks can also be adapted to provide receipt-free elections, under appropriate physical assumptions. The scheme for 1 out of L elections can be optimized such that for a certain range of the other parameter values, the ballot size is logarithmic in L. Public-key encryption (dpeaa)DE-He213 Electronic voting (dpeaa)DE-He213 Homomorphic encryption (dpeaa)DE-He213 Zero-knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 Jurik, Mads verfasserin aut Nielsen, Jesper Buus verfasserin aut Enthalten in International Journal of Information Security Springer-Verlag, 2001 9(2010), 6 vom: 30. Sept., Seite 371-385 (DE-627)SPR009127291 nnns volume:9 year:2010 number:6 day:30 month:09 pages:371-385 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10207-010-0119-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER AR 9 2010 6 30 09 371-385 |
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10.1007/s10207-010-0119-9 doi (DE-627)SPR009129405 (SPR)s10207-010-0119-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Damgård, Ivan verfasserin aut A generalization of Paillier’s public-key system with applications to electronic voting 2010 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract We propose a generalization of Paillier’s probabilistic public-key system, in which the expansion factor is reduced and which allows to adjust the block length of the scheme even after the public key has been fixed, without losing the homomorphic property. We show that the generalization is as secure as Paillier’s original system and propose several ways to optimize implementations of both the generalized and the original scheme. We construct a threshold variant of the generalized scheme as well as zero-knowledge protocols to show that a given ciphertext encrypts one of a set of given plaintexts, and protocols to verify multiplicative relations on plaintexts. We then show how these building blocks can be used for applying the scheme to efficient electronic voting. This reduces dramatically the work needed to compute the final result of an election, compared to the previously best known schemes. We show how the basic scheme for a yes/no vote can be easily adapted to casting a vote for up to t out of L candidates. The same basic building blocks can also be adapted to provide receipt-free elections, under appropriate physical assumptions. The scheme for 1 out of L elections can be optimized such that for a certain range of the other parameter values, the ballot size is logarithmic in L. Public-key encryption (dpeaa)DE-He213 Electronic voting (dpeaa)DE-He213 Homomorphic encryption (dpeaa)DE-He213 Zero-knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 Jurik, Mads verfasserin aut Nielsen, Jesper Buus verfasserin aut Enthalten in International Journal of Information Security Springer-Verlag, 2001 9(2010), 6 vom: 30. Sept., Seite 371-385 (DE-627)SPR009127291 nnns volume:9 year:2010 number:6 day:30 month:09 pages:371-385 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10207-010-0119-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER AR 9 2010 6 30 09 371-385 |
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10.1007/s10207-010-0119-9 doi (DE-627)SPR009129405 (SPR)s10207-010-0119-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Damgård, Ivan verfasserin aut A generalization of Paillier’s public-key system with applications to electronic voting 2010 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract We propose a generalization of Paillier’s probabilistic public-key system, in which the expansion factor is reduced and which allows to adjust the block length of the scheme even after the public key has been fixed, without losing the homomorphic property. We show that the generalization is as secure as Paillier’s original system and propose several ways to optimize implementations of both the generalized and the original scheme. We construct a threshold variant of the generalized scheme as well as zero-knowledge protocols to show that a given ciphertext encrypts one of a set of given plaintexts, and protocols to verify multiplicative relations on plaintexts. We then show how these building blocks can be used for applying the scheme to efficient electronic voting. This reduces dramatically the work needed to compute the final result of an election, compared to the previously best known schemes. We show how the basic scheme for a yes/no vote can be easily adapted to casting a vote for up to t out of L candidates. The same basic building blocks can also be adapted to provide receipt-free elections, under appropriate physical assumptions. The scheme for 1 out of L elections can be optimized such that for a certain range of the other parameter values, the ballot size is logarithmic in L. Public-key encryption (dpeaa)DE-He213 Electronic voting (dpeaa)DE-He213 Homomorphic encryption (dpeaa)DE-He213 Zero-knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 Jurik, Mads verfasserin aut Nielsen, Jesper Buus verfasserin aut Enthalten in International Journal of Information Security Springer-Verlag, 2001 9(2010), 6 vom: 30. Sept., Seite 371-385 (DE-627)SPR009127291 nnns volume:9 year:2010 number:6 day:30 month:09 pages:371-385 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10207-010-0119-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER AR 9 2010 6 30 09 371-385 |
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Abstract We propose a generalization of Paillier’s probabilistic public-key system, in which the expansion factor is reduced and which allows to adjust the block length of the scheme even after the public key has been fixed, without losing the homomorphic property. We show that the generalization is as secure as Paillier’s original system and propose several ways to optimize implementations of both the generalized and the original scheme. We construct a threshold variant of the generalized scheme as well as zero-knowledge protocols to show that a given ciphertext encrypts one of a set of given plaintexts, and protocols to verify multiplicative relations on plaintexts. We then show how these building blocks can be used for applying the scheme to efficient electronic voting. This reduces dramatically the work needed to compute the final result of an election, compared to the previously best known schemes. We show how the basic scheme for a yes/no vote can be easily adapted to casting a vote for up to t out of L candidates. The same basic building blocks can also be adapted to provide receipt-free elections, under appropriate physical assumptions. The scheme for 1 out of L elections can be optimized such that for a certain range of the other parameter values, the ballot size is logarithmic in L. |
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Abstract We propose a generalization of Paillier’s probabilistic public-key system, in which the expansion factor is reduced and which allows to adjust the block length of the scheme even after the public key has been fixed, without losing the homomorphic property. We show that the generalization is as secure as Paillier’s original system and propose several ways to optimize implementations of both the generalized and the original scheme. We construct a threshold variant of the generalized scheme as well as zero-knowledge protocols to show that a given ciphertext encrypts one of a set of given plaintexts, and protocols to verify multiplicative relations on plaintexts. We then show how these building blocks can be used for applying the scheme to efficient electronic voting. This reduces dramatically the work needed to compute the final result of an election, compared to the previously best known schemes. We show how the basic scheme for a yes/no vote can be easily adapted to casting a vote for up to t out of L candidates. The same basic building blocks can also be adapted to provide receipt-free elections, under appropriate physical assumptions. The scheme for 1 out of L elections can be optimized such that for a certain range of the other parameter values, the ballot size is logarithmic in L. |
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Abstract We propose a generalization of Paillier’s probabilistic public-key system, in which the expansion factor is reduced and which allows to adjust the block length of the scheme even after the public key has been fixed, without losing the homomorphic property. We show that the generalization is as secure as Paillier’s original system and propose several ways to optimize implementations of both the generalized and the original scheme. We construct a threshold variant of the generalized scheme as well as zero-knowledge protocols to show that a given ciphertext encrypts one of a set of given plaintexts, and protocols to verify multiplicative relations on plaintexts. We then show how these building blocks can be used for applying the scheme to efficient electronic voting. This reduces dramatically the work needed to compute the final result of an election, compared to the previously best known schemes. We show how the basic scheme for a yes/no vote can be easily adapted to casting a vote for up to t out of L candidates. The same basic building blocks can also be adapted to provide receipt-free elections, under appropriate physical assumptions. The scheme for 1 out of L elections can be optimized such that for a certain range of the other parameter values, the ballot size is logarithmic in L. |
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c |
| isOA_txt |
false |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| doi_str |
10.1007/s10207-010-0119-9 |
| up_date |
2024-07-04T00:47:18.642Z |
| _version_ |
1803607383625170944 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">SPR009129405</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20201124063515.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">201005s2010 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s10207-010-0119-9</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)SPR009129405</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(SPR)s10207-010-0119-9-e</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Damgård, Ivan</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">A generalization of Paillier’s public-key system with applications to electronic voting</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2010</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract We propose a generalization of Paillier’s probabilistic public-key system, in which the expansion factor is reduced and which allows to adjust the block length of the scheme even after the public key has been fixed, without losing the homomorphic property. We show that the generalization is as secure as Paillier’s original system and propose several ways to optimize implementations of both the generalized and the original scheme. We construct a threshold variant of the generalized scheme as well as zero-knowledge protocols to show that a given ciphertext encrypts one of a set of given plaintexts, and protocols to verify multiplicative relations on plaintexts. We then show how these building blocks can be used for applying the scheme to efficient electronic voting. This reduces dramatically the work needed to compute the final result of an election, compared to the previously best known schemes. We show how the basic scheme for a yes/no vote can be easily adapted to casting a vote for up to t out of L candidates. The same basic building blocks can also be adapted to provide receipt-free elections, under appropriate physical assumptions. 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7.399806 |