Short horizons, time inconsistency, and optimal social security

Abstract We study the optimal provision of social security in a dynamically efficient economy using a continuous-time overlapping-generations model in which consumers have short planning horizons. The short-horizon mechanism leads to dynamic optimization that is time-inconsistent over the life cycle...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Autor*in:

Findley, T. Scott [verfasserIn]

Caliendo, Frank N. [verfasserIn]

Format:

E-Artikel

Sprache:

Englisch

Erschienen:

2009

Schlagwörter:

Short planning horizons

Time-inconsistent preferences

Social security

Optimal taxation

Dynamic optimization

Life-cycle consumption

Dynamic welfare analysis

Übergeordnetes Werk:

Enthalten in: International tax and public finance - New York, NY : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., 1994, 16(2009), 4 vom: 08. Mai, Seite 487-513

Übergeordnetes Werk:

volume:16 ; year:2009 ; number:4 ; day:08 ; month:05 ; pages:487-513

Links:

Volltext

DOI / URN:

10.1007/s10797-009-9115-2

Katalog-ID:

SPR013282328

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