Can the mind be embodied, enactive, affective, and extended?

Abstract In recent years, a growing number of thinkers have begun to challenge the long-held view that the mind is neurally realized. One strand of critique comes from work on extended cognition, a second comes from research on embodied cognition, and a third comes from enactivism. I argue that theo...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Autor*in:

Maiese, Michelle [verfasserIn]

Format:

E-Artikel

Sprache:

Englisch

Erschienen:

2017

Schlagwörter:

Embodied cognition

Extended mind

Extended life

Extended affectivity

Enactivism

Übergeordnetes Werk:

Enthalten in: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences - Dordrecht : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., 2002, 17(2017), 2 vom: 11. Mai, Seite 343-361

Übergeordnetes Werk:

volume:17 ; year:2017 ; number:2 ; day:11 ; month:05 ; pages:343-361

Links:

Volltext

DOI / URN:

10.1007/s11097-017-9510-6

Katalog-ID:

SPR016619668

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