Auction–Stackelberg game framework for access permission in femtocell networks with multiple network operators
Abstract With the explosive growth of indoor data traffic in forthcoming fifth generation cellular networks, it is imperative for mobile network operators to improve network coverage and capacity. Femtocells are widely recognized as a promising technology to address these demands. As femtocells are...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Sun, Sanshan [verfasserIn] Feng, Gang [verfasserIn] Qin, Shuang [verfasserIn] Sun, Yao [verfasserIn] Zhou, Zhaorong [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2016 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Wireless networks - [S.l.] : Proquest, 1995, 24(2016), 5 vom: 30. Nov., Seite 1525-1541 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:24 ; year:2016 ; number:5 ; day:30 ; month:11 ; pages:1525-1541 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11276-016-1406-9 |
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| Katalog-ID: |
SPR018522793 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract With the explosive growth of indoor data traffic in forthcoming fifth generation cellular networks, it is imperative for mobile network operators to improve network coverage and capacity. Femtocells are widely recognized as a promising technology to address these demands. As femtocells are sold or loaned by a mobile network operator (MNO) to its residential or enterprise customers, MNOs usually employ refunding scheme to compensate the femtocell holders (FHs) providing indoor access to other subscribers by configuring the femtocell to operate in open or hybrid access mode. Due to the selfishness nature, competition between network operators as well as femtocell holders makes it challenging for operators to select appropriate FHs for trading access resources. This inspires us to develop an effective refunding framework, with aim to improve overall network resource utilization, through promoting FHs to make reasonable access permission for well-matched macro users. In this paper, we develop a two-stage auction–Stackelberg game (ASGF) framework for access permission in femtocell networks, where MNO and mobile virtual network operator lease access resources from multiple FHs. We first design an auction mechanism to determine the winner femtocell that fulfils the access request of macro users. We next formulate the access permission problem between the winner femtocell and operators as a Stackelberg game, and theoretically prove the existence of unique equilibrium. As a higher system payoff can be gained by improving individual players’ payoff in the game, each player can choose the best response to others’ action by implementing access permission, while avoiding solving a complicated optimization problem. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our proposed ASGF based refunding framework and the overall network efficiency can be improved significantly. | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Mobile network operator |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Mobile virtual network operator |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Access permission |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Auction |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Stackelberg game |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
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| 700 | 1 | |a Sun, Yao |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Zhou, Zhaorong |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
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10.1007/s11276-016-1406-9 doi (DE-627)SPR018522793 (SPR)s11276-016-1406-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 620 004 ASE 53.74 bkl 54.32 bkl Sun, Sanshan verfasserin aut Auction–Stackelberg game framework for access permission in femtocell networks with multiple network operators 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract With the explosive growth of indoor data traffic in forthcoming fifth generation cellular networks, it is imperative for mobile network operators to improve network coverage and capacity. Femtocells are widely recognized as a promising technology to address these demands. As femtocells are sold or loaned by a mobile network operator (MNO) to its residential or enterprise customers, MNOs usually employ refunding scheme to compensate the femtocell holders (FHs) providing indoor access to other subscribers by configuring the femtocell to operate in open or hybrid access mode. Due to the selfishness nature, competition between network operators as well as femtocell holders makes it challenging for operators to select appropriate FHs for trading access resources. This inspires us to develop an effective refunding framework, with aim to improve overall network resource utilization, through promoting FHs to make reasonable access permission for well-matched macro users. In this paper, we develop a two-stage auction–Stackelberg game (ASGF) framework for access permission in femtocell networks, where MNO and mobile virtual network operator lease access resources from multiple FHs. We first design an auction mechanism to determine the winner femtocell that fulfils the access request of macro users. We next formulate the access permission problem between the winner femtocell and operators as a Stackelberg game, and theoretically prove the existence of unique equilibrium. As a higher system payoff can be gained by improving individual players’ payoff in the game, each player can choose the best response to others’ action by implementing access permission, while avoiding solving a complicated optimization problem. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our proposed ASGF based refunding framework and the overall network efficiency can be improved significantly. Femtocell (dpeaa)DE-He213 Mobile network operator (dpeaa)DE-He213 Mobile virtual network operator (dpeaa)DE-He213 Access permission (dpeaa)DE-He213 Auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Stackelberg game (dpeaa)DE-He213 Feng, Gang verfasserin aut Qin, Shuang verfasserin aut Sun, Yao verfasserin aut Zhou, Zhaorong verfasserin aut Enthalten in Wireless networks [S.l.] : Proquest, 1995 24(2016), 5 vom: 30. Nov., Seite 1525-1541 (DE-627)319427366 (DE-600)2006505-X 1572-8196 nnns volume:24 year:2016 number:5 day:30 month:11 pages:1525-1541 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11276-016-1406-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 53.74 ASE 54.32 ASE AR 24 2016 5 30 11 1525-1541 |
| spelling |
10.1007/s11276-016-1406-9 doi (DE-627)SPR018522793 (SPR)s11276-016-1406-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 620 004 ASE 53.74 bkl 54.32 bkl Sun, Sanshan verfasserin aut Auction–Stackelberg game framework for access permission in femtocell networks with multiple network operators 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract With the explosive growth of indoor data traffic in forthcoming fifth generation cellular networks, it is imperative for mobile network operators to improve network coverage and capacity. Femtocells are widely recognized as a promising technology to address these demands. As femtocells are sold or loaned by a mobile network operator (MNO) to its residential or enterprise customers, MNOs usually employ refunding scheme to compensate the femtocell holders (FHs) providing indoor access to other subscribers by configuring the femtocell to operate in open or hybrid access mode. Due to the selfishness nature, competition between network operators as well as femtocell holders makes it challenging for operators to select appropriate FHs for trading access resources. This inspires us to develop an effective refunding framework, with aim to improve overall network resource utilization, through promoting FHs to make reasonable access permission for well-matched macro users. In this paper, we develop a two-stage auction–Stackelberg game (ASGF) framework for access permission in femtocell networks, where MNO and mobile virtual network operator lease access resources from multiple FHs. We first design an auction mechanism to determine the winner femtocell that fulfils the access request of macro users. We next formulate the access permission problem between the winner femtocell and operators as a Stackelberg game, and theoretically prove the existence of unique equilibrium. As a higher system payoff can be gained by improving individual players’ payoff in the game, each player can choose the best response to others’ action by implementing access permission, while avoiding solving a complicated optimization problem. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our proposed ASGF based refunding framework and the overall network efficiency can be improved significantly. Femtocell (dpeaa)DE-He213 Mobile network operator (dpeaa)DE-He213 Mobile virtual network operator (dpeaa)DE-He213 Access permission (dpeaa)DE-He213 Auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Stackelberg game (dpeaa)DE-He213 Feng, Gang verfasserin aut Qin, Shuang verfasserin aut Sun, Yao verfasserin aut Zhou, Zhaorong verfasserin aut Enthalten in Wireless networks [S.l.] : Proquest, 1995 24(2016), 5 vom: 30. Nov., Seite 1525-1541 (DE-627)319427366 (DE-600)2006505-X 1572-8196 nnns volume:24 year:2016 number:5 day:30 month:11 pages:1525-1541 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11276-016-1406-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 53.74 ASE 54.32 ASE AR 24 2016 5 30 11 1525-1541 |
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10.1007/s11276-016-1406-9 doi (DE-627)SPR018522793 (SPR)s11276-016-1406-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 620 004 ASE 53.74 bkl 54.32 bkl Sun, Sanshan verfasserin aut Auction–Stackelberg game framework for access permission in femtocell networks with multiple network operators 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract With the explosive growth of indoor data traffic in forthcoming fifth generation cellular networks, it is imperative for mobile network operators to improve network coverage and capacity. Femtocells are widely recognized as a promising technology to address these demands. As femtocells are sold or loaned by a mobile network operator (MNO) to its residential or enterprise customers, MNOs usually employ refunding scheme to compensate the femtocell holders (FHs) providing indoor access to other subscribers by configuring the femtocell to operate in open or hybrid access mode. Due to the selfishness nature, competition between network operators as well as femtocell holders makes it challenging for operators to select appropriate FHs for trading access resources. This inspires us to develop an effective refunding framework, with aim to improve overall network resource utilization, through promoting FHs to make reasonable access permission for well-matched macro users. In this paper, we develop a two-stage auction–Stackelberg game (ASGF) framework for access permission in femtocell networks, where MNO and mobile virtual network operator lease access resources from multiple FHs. We first design an auction mechanism to determine the winner femtocell that fulfils the access request of macro users. We next formulate the access permission problem between the winner femtocell and operators as a Stackelberg game, and theoretically prove the existence of unique equilibrium. As a higher system payoff can be gained by improving individual players’ payoff in the game, each player can choose the best response to others’ action by implementing access permission, while avoiding solving a complicated optimization problem. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our proposed ASGF based refunding framework and the overall network efficiency can be improved significantly. Femtocell (dpeaa)DE-He213 Mobile network operator (dpeaa)DE-He213 Mobile virtual network operator (dpeaa)DE-He213 Access permission (dpeaa)DE-He213 Auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Stackelberg game (dpeaa)DE-He213 Feng, Gang verfasserin aut Qin, Shuang verfasserin aut Sun, Yao verfasserin aut Zhou, Zhaorong verfasserin aut Enthalten in Wireless networks [S.l.] : Proquest, 1995 24(2016), 5 vom: 30. Nov., Seite 1525-1541 (DE-627)319427366 (DE-600)2006505-X 1572-8196 nnns volume:24 year:2016 number:5 day:30 month:11 pages:1525-1541 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11276-016-1406-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 53.74 ASE 54.32 ASE AR 24 2016 5 30 11 1525-1541 |
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10.1007/s11276-016-1406-9 doi (DE-627)SPR018522793 (SPR)s11276-016-1406-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 620 004 ASE 53.74 bkl 54.32 bkl Sun, Sanshan verfasserin aut Auction–Stackelberg game framework for access permission in femtocell networks with multiple network operators 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract With the explosive growth of indoor data traffic in forthcoming fifth generation cellular networks, it is imperative for mobile network operators to improve network coverage and capacity. Femtocells are widely recognized as a promising technology to address these demands. As femtocells are sold or loaned by a mobile network operator (MNO) to its residential or enterprise customers, MNOs usually employ refunding scheme to compensate the femtocell holders (FHs) providing indoor access to other subscribers by configuring the femtocell to operate in open or hybrid access mode. Due to the selfishness nature, competition between network operators as well as femtocell holders makes it challenging for operators to select appropriate FHs for trading access resources. This inspires us to develop an effective refunding framework, with aim to improve overall network resource utilization, through promoting FHs to make reasonable access permission for well-matched macro users. In this paper, we develop a two-stage auction–Stackelberg game (ASGF) framework for access permission in femtocell networks, where MNO and mobile virtual network operator lease access resources from multiple FHs. We first design an auction mechanism to determine the winner femtocell that fulfils the access request of macro users. We next formulate the access permission problem between the winner femtocell and operators as a Stackelberg game, and theoretically prove the existence of unique equilibrium. As a higher system payoff can be gained by improving individual players’ payoff in the game, each player can choose the best response to others’ action by implementing access permission, while avoiding solving a complicated optimization problem. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our proposed ASGF based refunding framework and the overall network efficiency can be improved significantly. Femtocell (dpeaa)DE-He213 Mobile network operator (dpeaa)DE-He213 Mobile virtual network operator (dpeaa)DE-He213 Access permission (dpeaa)DE-He213 Auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Stackelberg game (dpeaa)DE-He213 Feng, Gang verfasserin aut Qin, Shuang verfasserin aut Sun, Yao verfasserin aut Zhou, Zhaorong verfasserin aut Enthalten in Wireless networks [S.l.] : Proquest, 1995 24(2016), 5 vom: 30. Nov., Seite 1525-1541 (DE-627)319427366 (DE-600)2006505-X 1572-8196 nnns volume:24 year:2016 number:5 day:30 month:11 pages:1525-1541 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11276-016-1406-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 53.74 ASE 54.32 ASE AR 24 2016 5 30 11 1525-1541 |
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10.1007/s11276-016-1406-9 doi (DE-627)SPR018522793 (SPR)s11276-016-1406-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 620 004 ASE 53.74 bkl 54.32 bkl Sun, Sanshan verfasserin aut Auction–Stackelberg game framework for access permission in femtocell networks with multiple network operators 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract With the explosive growth of indoor data traffic in forthcoming fifth generation cellular networks, it is imperative for mobile network operators to improve network coverage and capacity. Femtocells are widely recognized as a promising technology to address these demands. As femtocells are sold or loaned by a mobile network operator (MNO) to its residential or enterprise customers, MNOs usually employ refunding scheme to compensate the femtocell holders (FHs) providing indoor access to other subscribers by configuring the femtocell to operate in open or hybrid access mode. Due to the selfishness nature, competition between network operators as well as femtocell holders makes it challenging for operators to select appropriate FHs for trading access resources. This inspires us to develop an effective refunding framework, with aim to improve overall network resource utilization, through promoting FHs to make reasonable access permission for well-matched macro users. In this paper, we develop a two-stage auction–Stackelberg game (ASGF) framework for access permission in femtocell networks, where MNO and mobile virtual network operator lease access resources from multiple FHs. We first design an auction mechanism to determine the winner femtocell that fulfils the access request of macro users. We next formulate the access permission problem between the winner femtocell and operators as a Stackelberg game, and theoretically prove the existence of unique equilibrium. As a higher system payoff can be gained by improving individual players’ payoff in the game, each player can choose the best response to others’ action by implementing access permission, while avoiding solving a complicated optimization problem. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our proposed ASGF based refunding framework and the overall network efficiency can be improved significantly. Femtocell (dpeaa)DE-He213 Mobile network operator (dpeaa)DE-He213 Mobile virtual network operator (dpeaa)DE-He213 Access permission (dpeaa)DE-He213 Auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Stackelberg game (dpeaa)DE-He213 Feng, Gang verfasserin aut Qin, Shuang verfasserin aut Sun, Yao verfasserin aut Zhou, Zhaorong verfasserin aut Enthalten in Wireless networks [S.l.] : Proquest, 1995 24(2016), 5 vom: 30. Nov., Seite 1525-1541 (DE-627)319427366 (DE-600)2006505-X 1572-8196 nnns volume:24 year:2016 number:5 day:30 month:11 pages:1525-1541 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11276-016-1406-9 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 53.74 ASE 54.32 ASE AR 24 2016 5 30 11 1525-1541 |
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English |
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Enthalten in Wireless networks 24(2016), 5 vom: 30. Nov., Seite 1525-1541 volume:24 year:2016 number:5 day:30 month:11 pages:1525-1541 |
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Enthalten in Wireless networks 24(2016), 5 vom: 30. Nov., Seite 1525-1541 volume:24 year:2016 number:5 day:30 month:11 pages:1525-1541 |
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findex.gbv.de |
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Femtocell Mobile network operator Mobile virtual network operator Access permission Auction Stackelberg game |
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Wireless networks |
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Sun, Sanshan @@aut@@ Feng, Gang @@aut@@ Qin, Shuang @@aut@@ Sun, Yao @@aut@@ Zhou, Zhaorong @@aut@@ |
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2016-11-30T00:00:00Z |
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">SPR018522793</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20220111061522.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">201006s2016 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s11276-016-1406-9</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)SPR018522793</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(SPR)s11276-016-1406-9-e</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">620</subfield><subfield code="a">004</subfield><subfield code="q">ASE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">53.74</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">54.32</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Sun, Sanshan</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Auction–Stackelberg game framework for access permission in femtocell networks with multiple network operators</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2016</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract With the explosive growth of indoor data traffic in forthcoming fifth generation cellular networks, it is imperative for mobile network operators to improve network coverage and capacity. Femtocells are widely recognized as a promising technology to address these demands. As femtocells are sold or loaned by a mobile network operator (MNO) to its residential or enterprise customers, MNOs usually employ refunding scheme to compensate the femtocell holders (FHs) providing indoor access to other subscribers by configuring the femtocell to operate in open or hybrid access mode. Due to the selfishness nature, competition between network operators as well as femtocell holders makes it challenging for operators to select appropriate FHs for trading access resources. This inspires us to develop an effective refunding framework, with aim to improve overall network resource utilization, through promoting FHs to make reasonable access permission for well-matched macro users. In this paper, we develop a two-stage auction–Stackelberg game (ASGF) framework for access permission in femtocell networks, where MNO and mobile virtual network operator lease access resources from multiple FHs. We first design an auction mechanism to determine the winner femtocell that fulfils the access request of macro users. We next formulate the access permission problem between the winner femtocell and operators as a Stackelberg game, and theoretically prove the existence of unique equilibrium. As a higher system payoff can be gained by improving individual players’ payoff in the game, each player can choose the best response to others’ action by implementing access permission, while avoiding solving a complicated optimization problem. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our proposed ASGF based refunding framework and the overall network efficiency can be improved significantly.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Femtocell</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Mobile network operator</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Mobile virtual network operator</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Access permission</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Auction</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Stackelberg game</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Feng, Gang</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Qin, Shuang</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Sun, Yao</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zhou, Zhaorong</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Wireless networks</subfield><subfield code="d">[S.l.] : Proquest, 1995</subfield><subfield code="g">24(2016), 5 vom: 30. 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Sun, Sanshan |
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Sun, Sanshan ddc 620 bkl 53.74 bkl 54.32 misc Femtocell misc Mobile network operator misc Mobile virtual network operator misc Access permission misc Auction misc Stackelberg game Auction–Stackelberg game framework for access permission in femtocell networks with multiple network operators |
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620 004 ASE 53.74 bkl 54.32 bkl Auction–Stackelberg game framework for access permission in femtocell networks with multiple network operators Femtocell (dpeaa)DE-He213 Mobile network operator (dpeaa)DE-He213 Mobile virtual network operator (dpeaa)DE-He213 Access permission (dpeaa)DE-He213 Auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Stackelberg game (dpeaa)DE-He213 |
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ddc 620 bkl 53.74 bkl 54.32 misc Femtocell misc Mobile network operator misc Mobile virtual network operator misc Access permission misc Auction misc Stackelberg game |
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Sun, Sanshan |
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10.1007/s11276-016-1406-9 |
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verfasserin |
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auction–stackelberg game framework for access permission in femtocell networks with multiple network operators |
| title_auth |
Auction–Stackelberg game framework for access permission in femtocell networks with multiple network operators |
| abstract |
Abstract With the explosive growth of indoor data traffic in forthcoming fifth generation cellular networks, it is imperative for mobile network operators to improve network coverage and capacity. Femtocells are widely recognized as a promising technology to address these demands. As femtocells are sold or loaned by a mobile network operator (MNO) to its residential or enterprise customers, MNOs usually employ refunding scheme to compensate the femtocell holders (FHs) providing indoor access to other subscribers by configuring the femtocell to operate in open or hybrid access mode. Due to the selfishness nature, competition between network operators as well as femtocell holders makes it challenging for operators to select appropriate FHs for trading access resources. This inspires us to develop an effective refunding framework, with aim to improve overall network resource utilization, through promoting FHs to make reasonable access permission for well-matched macro users. In this paper, we develop a two-stage auction–Stackelberg game (ASGF) framework for access permission in femtocell networks, where MNO and mobile virtual network operator lease access resources from multiple FHs. We first design an auction mechanism to determine the winner femtocell that fulfils the access request of macro users. We next formulate the access permission problem between the winner femtocell and operators as a Stackelberg game, and theoretically prove the existence of unique equilibrium. As a higher system payoff can be gained by improving individual players’ payoff in the game, each player can choose the best response to others’ action by implementing access permission, while avoiding solving a complicated optimization problem. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our proposed ASGF based refunding framework and the overall network efficiency can be improved significantly. |
| abstractGer |
Abstract With the explosive growth of indoor data traffic in forthcoming fifth generation cellular networks, it is imperative for mobile network operators to improve network coverage and capacity. Femtocells are widely recognized as a promising technology to address these demands. As femtocells are sold or loaned by a mobile network operator (MNO) to its residential or enterprise customers, MNOs usually employ refunding scheme to compensate the femtocell holders (FHs) providing indoor access to other subscribers by configuring the femtocell to operate in open or hybrid access mode. Due to the selfishness nature, competition between network operators as well as femtocell holders makes it challenging for operators to select appropriate FHs for trading access resources. This inspires us to develop an effective refunding framework, with aim to improve overall network resource utilization, through promoting FHs to make reasonable access permission for well-matched macro users. In this paper, we develop a two-stage auction–Stackelberg game (ASGF) framework for access permission in femtocell networks, where MNO and mobile virtual network operator lease access resources from multiple FHs. We first design an auction mechanism to determine the winner femtocell that fulfils the access request of macro users. We next formulate the access permission problem between the winner femtocell and operators as a Stackelberg game, and theoretically prove the existence of unique equilibrium. As a higher system payoff can be gained by improving individual players’ payoff in the game, each player can choose the best response to others’ action by implementing access permission, while avoiding solving a complicated optimization problem. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our proposed ASGF based refunding framework and the overall network efficiency can be improved significantly. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract With the explosive growth of indoor data traffic in forthcoming fifth generation cellular networks, it is imperative for mobile network operators to improve network coverage and capacity. Femtocells are widely recognized as a promising technology to address these demands. As femtocells are sold or loaned by a mobile network operator (MNO) to its residential or enterprise customers, MNOs usually employ refunding scheme to compensate the femtocell holders (FHs) providing indoor access to other subscribers by configuring the femtocell to operate in open or hybrid access mode. Due to the selfishness nature, competition between network operators as well as femtocell holders makes it challenging for operators to select appropriate FHs for trading access resources. This inspires us to develop an effective refunding framework, with aim to improve overall network resource utilization, through promoting FHs to make reasonable access permission for well-matched macro users. In this paper, we develop a two-stage auction–Stackelberg game (ASGF) framework for access permission in femtocell networks, where MNO and mobile virtual network operator lease access resources from multiple FHs. We first design an auction mechanism to determine the winner femtocell that fulfils the access request of macro users. We next formulate the access permission problem between the winner femtocell and operators as a Stackelberg game, and theoretically prove the existence of unique equilibrium. As a higher system payoff can be gained by improving individual players’ payoff in the game, each player can choose the best response to others’ action by implementing access permission, while avoiding solving a complicated optimization problem. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our proposed ASGF based refunding framework and the overall network efficiency can be improved significantly. |
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Auction–Stackelberg game framework for access permission in femtocell networks with multiple network operators |
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Feng, Gang Qin, Shuang Sun, Yao Zhou, Zhaorong |
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2024-07-03T20:20:13.089Z |
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| score |
7.4012203 |