Symmetric cryptographic protocols for extended millionaires’ problem
Abstract Yao’s millionaires’ problem is a fundamental problem in secure multiparty computation, and its solutions have become building blocks of many secure multiparty computation solutions. Unfortunately, most protocols for millionaires’ problem are constructed based on public cryptography, and thu...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Li, ShunDong [verfasserIn] Wang, DaoShun [verfasserIn] Dai, YiQi [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2009 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Science in China - Heidelberg : Springer, 2001, 52(2009), 6 vom: Juni, Seite 974-982 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:52 ; year:2009 ; number:6 ; month:06 ; pages:974-982 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11432-009-0109-6 |
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Katalog-ID: |
SPR019300662 |
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520 | |a Abstract Yao’s millionaires’ problem is a fundamental problem in secure multiparty computation, and its solutions have become building blocks of many secure multiparty computation solutions. Unfortunately, most protocols for millionaires’ problem are constructed based on public cryptography, and thus are inefficient. Furthermore, all protocols are designed to solve the basic millionaires’ problem, that is, to privately determine which of two natural numbers is greater. If the numbers are real, existing solutions do not directly work. These features limit the extensive application of the existing protocols. This study introduces and refines the first symmetric cryptographic protocol for the basic millionaires’ problem, and then extends the symmetric cryptographic protocol to privately determining which of two real numbers is greater, which are called the extended millionaires’ problem, and proposes corresponding protocols. We further prove, by a well accepted simulation paradigm, that these protocols are private. Constructed based on symmetric cryptography, these protocols are very efficient. | ||
650 | 4 | |a cryptography |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
650 | 4 | |a secure multiparty computation |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
650 | 4 | |a extended millionaires’ problem |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
650 | 4 | |a symmetric cryptography |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
650 | 4 | |a simulation paradigm |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
700 | 1 | |a Wang, DaoShun |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
700 | 1 | |a Dai, YiQi |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Science in China |d Heidelberg : Springer, 2001 |g 52(2009), 6 vom: Juni, Seite 974-982 |w (DE-627)385614764 |w (DE-600)2142898-0 |x 1862-2836 |7 nnns |
773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:52 |g year:2009 |g number:6 |g month:06 |g pages:974-982 |
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10.1007/s11432-009-0109-6 doi (DE-627)SPR019300662 (SPR)s11432-009-0109-6-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 070 004 ASE 54.00 bkl Li, ShunDong verfasserin aut Symmetric cryptographic protocols for extended millionaires’ problem 2009 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Yao’s millionaires’ problem is a fundamental problem in secure multiparty computation, and its solutions have become building blocks of many secure multiparty computation solutions. Unfortunately, most protocols for millionaires’ problem are constructed based on public cryptography, and thus are inefficient. Furthermore, all protocols are designed to solve the basic millionaires’ problem, that is, to privately determine which of two natural numbers is greater. If the numbers are real, existing solutions do not directly work. These features limit the extensive application of the existing protocols. This study introduces and refines the first symmetric cryptographic protocol for the basic millionaires’ problem, and then extends the symmetric cryptographic protocol to privately determining which of two real numbers is greater, which are called the extended millionaires’ problem, and proposes corresponding protocols. We further prove, by a well accepted simulation paradigm, that these protocols are private. Constructed based on symmetric cryptography, these protocols are very efficient. cryptography (dpeaa)DE-He213 secure multiparty computation (dpeaa)DE-He213 extended millionaires’ problem (dpeaa)DE-He213 symmetric cryptography (dpeaa)DE-He213 simulation paradigm (dpeaa)DE-He213 Wang, DaoShun verfasserin aut Dai, YiQi verfasserin aut Enthalten in Science in China Heidelberg : Springer, 2001 52(2009), 6 vom: Juni, Seite 974-982 (DE-627)385614764 (DE-600)2142898-0 1862-2836 nnns volume:52 year:2009 number:6 month:06 pages:974-982 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11432-009-0109-6 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER SSG-OPC-BBI SSG-OPC-ASE GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2700 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 54.00 ASE AR 52 2009 6 06 974-982 |
spelling |
10.1007/s11432-009-0109-6 doi (DE-627)SPR019300662 (SPR)s11432-009-0109-6-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 070 004 ASE 54.00 bkl Li, ShunDong verfasserin aut Symmetric cryptographic protocols for extended millionaires’ problem 2009 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Yao’s millionaires’ problem is a fundamental problem in secure multiparty computation, and its solutions have become building blocks of many secure multiparty computation solutions. Unfortunately, most protocols for millionaires’ problem are constructed based on public cryptography, and thus are inefficient. Furthermore, all protocols are designed to solve the basic millionaires’ problem, that is, to privately determine which of two natural numbers is greater. If the numbers are real, existing solutions do not directly work. These features limit the extensive application of the existing protocols. This study introduces and refines the first symmetric cryptographic protocol for the basic millionaires’ problem, and then extends the symmetric cryptographic protocol to privately determining which of two real numbers is greater, which are called the extended millionaires’ problem, and proposes corresponding protocols. We further prove, by a well accepted simulation paradigm, that these protocols are private. Constructed based on symmetric cryptography, these protocols are very efficient. cryptography (dpeaa)DE-He213 secure multiparty computation (dpeaa)DE-He213 extended millionaires’ problem (dpeaa)DE-He213 symmetric cryptography (dpeaa)DE-He213 simulation paradigm (dpeaa)DE-He213 Wang, DaoShun verfasserin aut Dai, YiQi verfasserin aut Enthalten in Science in China Heidelberg : Springer, 2001 52(2009), 6 vom: Juni, Seite 974-982 (DE-627)385614764 (DE-600)2142898-0 1862-2836 nnns volume:52 year:2009 number:6 month:06 pages:974-982 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11432-009-0109-6 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER SSG-OPC-BBI SSG-OPC-ASE GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2700 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 54.00 ASE AR 52 2009 6 06 974-982 |
allfields_unstemmed |
10.1007/s11432-009-0109-6 doi (DE-627)SPR019300662 (SPR)s11432-009-0109-6-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 070 004 ASE 54.00 bkl Li, ShunDong verfasserin aut Symmetric cryptographic protocols for extended millionaires’ problem 2009 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Yao’s millionaires’ problem is a fundamental problem in secure multiparty computation, and its solutions have become building blocks of many secure multiparty computation solutions. Unfortunately, most protocols for millionaires’ problem are constructed based on public cryptography, and thus are inefficient. Furthermore, all protocols are designed to solve the basic millionaires’ problem, that is, to privately determine which of two natural numbers is greater. If the numbers are real, existing solutions do not directly work. These features limit the extensive application of the existing protocols. This study introduces and refines the first symmetric cryptographic protocol for the basic millionaires’ problem, and then extends the symmetric cryptographic protocol to privately determining which of two real numbers is greater, which are called the extended millionaires’ problem, and proposes corresponding protocols. We further prove, by a well accepted simulation paradigm, that these protocols are private. Constructed based on symmetric cryptography, these protocols are very efficient. cryptography (dpeaa)DE-He213 secure multiparty computation (dpeaa)DE-He213 extended millionaires’ problem (dpeaa)DE-He213 symmetric cryptography (dpeaa)DE-He213 simulation paradigm (dpeaa)DE-He213 Wang, DaoShun verfasserin aut Dai, YiQi verfasserin aut Enthalten in Science in China Heidelberg : Springer, 2001 52(2009), 6 vom: Juni, Seite 974-982 (DE-627)385614764 (DE-600)2142898-0 1862-2836 nnns volume:52 year:2009 number:6 month:06 pages:974-982 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11432-009-0109-6 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER SSG-OPC-BBI SSG-OPC-ASE GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2700 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 54.00 ASE AR 52 2009 6 06 974-982 |
allfieldsGer |
10.1007/s11432-009-0109-6 doi (DE-627)SPR019300662 (SPR)s11432-009-0109-6-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 070 004 ASE 54.00 bkl Li, ShunDong verfasserin aut Symmetric cryptographic protocols for extended millionaires’ problem 2009 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Yao’s millionaires’ problem is a fundamental problem in secure multiparty computation, and its solutions have become building blocks of many secure multiparty computation solutions. Unfortunately, most protocols for millionaires’ problem are constructed based on public cryptography, and thus are inefficient. Furthermore, all protocols are designed to solve the basic millionaires’ problem, that is, to privately determine which of two natural numbers is greater. If the numbers are real, existing solutions do not directly work. These features limit the extensive application of the existing protocols. This study introduces and refines the first symmetric cryptographic protocol for the basic millionaires’ problem, and then extends the symmetric cryptographic protocol to privately determining which of two real numbers is greater, which are called the extended millionaires’ problem, and proposes corresponding protocols. We further prove, by a well accepted simulation paradigm, that these protocols are private. Constructed based on symmetric cryptography, these protocols are very efficient. cryptography (dpeaa)DE-He213 secure multiparty computation (dpeaa)DE-He213 extended millionaires’ problem (dpeaa)DE-He213 symmetric cryptography (dpeaa)DE-He213 simulation paradigm (dpeaa)DE-He213 Wang, DaoShun verfasserin aut Dai, YiQi verfasserin aut Enthalten in Science in China Heidelberg : Springer, 2001 52(2009), 6 vom: Juni, Seite 974-982 (DE-627)385614764 (DE-600)2142898-0 1862-2836 nnns volume:52 year:2009 number:6 month:06 pages:974-982 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11432-009-0109-6 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER SSG-OPC-BBI SSG-OPC-ASE GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2700 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 54.00 ASE AR 52 2009 6 06 974-982 |
allfieldsSound |
10.1007/s11432-009-0109-6 doi (DE-627)SPR019300662 (SPR)s11432-009-0109-6-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 070 004 ASE 54.00 bkl Li, ShunDong verfasserin aut Symmetric cryptographic protocols for extended millionaires’ problem 2009 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Yao’s millionaires’ problem is a fundamental problem in secure multiparty computation, and its solutions have become building blocks of many secure multiparty computation solutions. Unfortunately, most protocols for millionaires’ problem are constructed based on public cryptography, and thus are inefficient. Furthermore, all protocols are designed to solve the basic millionaires’ problem, that is, to privately determine which of two natural numbers is greater. If the numbers are real, existing solutions do not directly work. These features limit the extensive application of the existing protocols. This study introduces and refines the first symmetric cryptographic protocol for the basic millionaires’ problem, and then extends the symmetric cryptographic protocol to privately determining which of two real numbers is greater, which are called the extended millionaires’ problem, and proposes corresponding protocols. We further prove, by a well accepted simulation paradigm, that these protocols are private. Constructed based on symmetric cryptography, these protocols are very efficient. cryptography (dpeaa)DE-He213 secure multiparty computation (dpeaa)DE-He213 extended millionaires’ problem (dpeaa)DE-He213 symmetric cryptography (dpeaa)DE-He213 simulation paradigm (dpeaa)DE-He213 Wang, DaoShun verfasserin aut Dai, YiQi verfasserin aut Enthalten in Science in China Heidelberg : Springer, 2001 52(2009), 6 vom: Juni, Seite 974-982 (DE-627)385614764 (DE-600)2142898-0 1862-2836 nnns volume:52 year:2009 number:6 month:06 pages:974-982 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11432-009-0109-6 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER SSG-OPC-BBI SSG-OPC-ASE GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2700 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 54.00 ASE AR 52 2009 6 06 974-982 |
language |
English |
source |
Enthalten in Science in China 52(2009), 6 vom: Juni, Seite 974-982 volume:52 year:2009 number:6 month:06 pages:974-982 |
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Science in China |
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Li, ShunDong @@aut@@ Wang, DaoShun @@aut@@ Dai, YiQi @@aut@@ |
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2009-06-01T00:00:00Z |
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Unfortunately, most protocols for millionaires’ problem are constructed based on public cryptography, and thus are inefficient. Furthermore, all protocols are designed to solve the basic millionaires’ problem, that is, to privately determine which of two natural numbers is greater. If the numbers are real, existing solutions do not directly work. These features limit the extensive application of the existing protocols. This study introduces and refines the first symmetric cryptographic protocol for the basic millionaires’ problem, and then extends the symmetric cryptographic protocol to privately determining which of two real numbers is greater, which are called the extended millionaires’ problem, and proposes corresponding protocols. We further prove, by a well accepted simulation paradigm, that these protocols are private. 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Li, ShunDong |
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Li, ShunDong ddc 070 bkl 54.00 misc cryptography misc secure multiparty computation misc extended millionaires’ problem misc symmetric cryptography misc simulation paradigm Symmetric cryptographic protocols for extended millionaires’ problem |
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070 004 ASE 54.00 bkl Symmetric cryptographic protocols for extended millionaires’ problem cryptography (dpeaa)DE-He213 secure multiparty computation (dpeaa)DE-He213 extended millionaires’ problem (dpeaa)DE-He213 symmetric cryptography (dpeaa)DE-He213 simulation paradigm (dpeaa)DE-He213 |
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ddc 070 bkl 54.00 misc cryptography misc secure multiparty computation misc extended millionaires’ problem misc symmetric cryptography misc simulation paradigm |
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Symmetric cryptographic protocols for extended millionaires’ problem |
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symmetric cryptographic protocols for extended millionaires’ problem |
title_auth |
Symmetric cryptographic protocols for extended millionaires’ problem |
abstract |
Abstract Yao’s millionaires’ problem is a fundamental problem in secure multiparty computation, and its solutions have become building blocks of many secure multiparty computation solutions. Unfortunately, most protocols for millionaires’ problem are constructed based on public cryptography, and thus are inefficient. Furthermore, all protocols are designed to solve the basic millionaires’ problem, that is, to privately determine which of two natural numbers is greater. If the numbers are real, existing solutions do not directly work. These features limit the extensive application of the existing protocols. This study introduces and refines the first symmetric cryptographic protocol for the basic millionaires’ problem, and then extends the symmetric cryptographic protocol to privately determining which of two real numbers is greater, which are called the extended millionaires’ problem, and proposes corresponding protocols. We further prove, by a well accepted simulation paradigm, that these protocols are private. Constructed based on symmetric cryptography, these protocols are very efficient. |
abstractGer |
Abstract Yao’s millionaires’ problem is a fundamental problem in secure multiparty computation, and its solutions have become building blocks of many secure multiparty computation solutions. Unfortunately, most protocols for millionaires’ problem are constructed based on public cryptography, and thus are inefficient. Furthermore, all protocols are designed to solve the basic millionaires’ problem, that is, to privately determine which of two natural numbers is greater. If the numbers are real, existing solutions do not directly work. These features limit the extensive application of the existing protocols. This study introduces and refines the first symmetric cryptographic protocol for the basic millionaires’ problem, and then extends the symmetric cryptographic protocol to privately determining which of two real numbers is greater, which are called the extended millionaires’ problem, and proposes corresponding protocols. We further prove, by a well accepted simulation paradigm, that these protocols are private. Constructed based on symmetric cryptography, these protocols are very efficient. |
abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract Yao’s millionaires’ problem is a fundamental problem in secure multiparty computation, and its solutions have become building blocks of many secure multiparty computation solutions. Unfortunately, most protocols for millionaires’ problem are constructed based on public cryptography, and thus are inefficient. Furthermore, all protocols are designed to solve the basic millionaires’ problem, that is, to privately determine which of two natural numbers is greater. If the numbers are real, existing solutions do not directly work. These features limit the extensive application of the existing protocols. This study introduces and refines the first symmetric cryptographic protocol for the basic millionaires’ problem, and then extends the symmetric cryptographic protocol to privately determining which of two real numbers is greater, which are called the extended millionaires’ problem, and proposes corresponding protocols. We further prove, by a well accepted simulation paradigm, that these protocols are private. Constructed based on symmetric cryptography, these protocols are very efficient. |
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container_issue |
6 |
title_short |
Symmetric cryptographic protocols for extended millionaires’ problem |
url |
https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11432-009-0109-6 |
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true |
author2 |
Wang, DaoShun Dai, YiQi |
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Wang, DaoShun Dai, YiQi |
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doi_str |
10.1007/s11432-009-0109-6 |
up_date |
2024-07-04T01:01:28.708Z |
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score |
7.4004097 |