Disjunctivism and skepticism

Abstract Disjunctivism is the view that perceptual experience is either constituted by fact in the world or mere appearance. This view is said to be able to guarantee our cognitive contact with the world, and thus remove a crucial “prop” upon which skepticism depends. This paper has two aims. First,...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Wang, Huaping [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2011

Schlagwörter:	reflective knowledge disjunctivism Cartesian skepticism Pyrrhonian skepticism

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Frontiers of philosophy in China - Leiden : Brill, 2006, 6(2011), 3 vom: 19. Aug.
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:6 ; year:2011 ; number:3 ; day:19 ; month:08

Links:	Volltext

DOI / URN:	10.1007/s11466-011-0149-z

Katalog-ID:	SPR019873697

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allfields	10.1007/s11466-011-0149-z doi (DE-627)SPR019873697 (SPR)s11466-011-0149-z-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE Wang, Huaping verfasserin aut Disjunctivism and skepticism 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Disjunctivism is the view that perceptual experience is either constituted by fact in the world or mere appearance. This view is said to be able to guarantee our cognitive contact with the world, and thus remove a crucial “prop” upon which skepticism depends. This paper has two aims. First, it aims to show that disjunctivism is a solution to Cartesian skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is an epistemological thesis, not an ontological one. Therefore, if there is an external world, we may well undergo a veridical experience, and thus we can take advantage of disjunctivism to adopt an anti-evidential-skepticism strategy to counter Cartesian skepticism. Second, this paper argues that disjunctivism fails to solve Pyrrhonian skepticism. To counter Pyrrhonian skepticism, one has to give reasons both for his belief and for his believing. But disjunctivism can only account the former, that is, the reason for the content of perceptual belief. Given that one’s experience in good case and bad case is subjectively indistinguishable, one cannot just use his experience to justify his believing. This shows that disjunctivism cannot meet the requirement to provide an adequate account for reflective knowledge. reflective knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 disjunctivism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Cartesian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Pyrrhonian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Frontiers of philosophy in China Leiden : Brill, 2006 6(2011), 3 vom: 19. Aug. (DE-627)510464254 (DE-600)2230599-3 1673-355X nnns volume:6 year:2011 number:3 day:19 month:08 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11466-011-0149-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_1200 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2936 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4392 GBV_ILN_4393 AR 6 2011 3 19 08
spelling	10.1007/s11466-011-0149-z doi (DE-627)SPR019873697 (SPR)s11466-011-0149-z-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE Wang, Huaping verfasserin aut Disjunctivism and skepticism 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Disjunctivism is the view that perceptual experience is either constituted by fact in the world or mere appearance. This view is said to be able to guarantee our cognitive contact with the world, and thus remove a crucial “prop” upon which skepticism depends. This paper has two aims. First, it aims to show that disjunctivism is a solution to Cartesian skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is an epistemological thesis, not an ontological one. Therefore, if there is an external world, we may well undergo a veridical experience, and thus we can take advantage of disjunctivism to adopt an anti-evidential-skepticism strategy to counter Cartesian skepticism. Second, this paper argues that disjunctivism fails to solve Pyrrhonian skepticism. To counter Pyrrhonian skepticism, one has to give reasons both for his belief and for his believing. But disjunctivism can only account the former, that is, the reason for the content of perceptual belief. Given that one’s experience in good case and bad case is subjectively indistinguishable, one cannot just use his experience to justify his believing. This shows that disjunctivism cannot meet the requirement to provide an adequate account for reflective knowledge. reflective knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 disjunctivism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Cartesian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Pyrrhonian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Frontiers of philosophy in China Leiden : Brill, 2006 6(2011), 3 vom: 19. Aug. (DE-627)510464254 (DE-600)2230599-3 1673-355X nnns volume:6 year:2011 number:3 day:19 month:08 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11466-011-0149-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_1200 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2936 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4392 GBV_ILN_4393 AR 6 2011 3 19 08
allfields_unstemmed	10.1007/s11466-011-0149-z doi (DE-627)SPR019873697 (SPR)s11466-011-0149-z-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE Wang, Huaping verfasserin aut Disjunctivism and skepticism 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Disjunctivism is the view that perceptual experience is either constituted by fact in the world or mere appearance. This view is said to be able to guarantee our cognitive contact with the world, and thus remove a crucial “prop” upon which skepticism depends. This paper has two aims. First, it aims to show that disjunctivism is a solution to Cartesian skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is an epistemological thesis, not an ontological one. Therefore, if there is an external world, we may well undergo a veridical experience, and thus we can take advantage of disjunctivism to adopt an anti-evidential-skepticism strategy to counter Cartesian skepticism. Second, this paper argues that disjunctivism fails to solve Pyrrhonian skepticism. To counter Pyrrhonian skepticism, one has to give reasons both for his belief and for his believing. But disjunctivism can only account the former, that is, the reason for the content of perceptual belief. Given that one’s experience in good case and bad case is subjectively indistinguishable, one cannot just use his experience to justify his believing. This shows that disjunctivism cannot meet the requirement to provide an adequate account for reflective knowledge. reflective knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 disjunctivism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Cartesian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Pyrrhonian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Frontiers of philosophy in China Leiden : Brill, 2006 6(2011), 3 vom: 19. Aug. (DE-627)510464254 (DE-600)2230599-3 1673-355X nnns volume:6 year:2011 number:3 day:19 month:08 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11466-011-0149-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_1200 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2936 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4392 GBV_ILN_4393 AR 6 2011 3 19 08
allfieldsGer	10.1007/s11466-011-0149-z doi (DE-627)SPR019873697 (SPR)s11466-011-0149-z-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE Wang, Huaping verfasserin aut Disjunctivism and skepticism 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Disjunctivism is the view that perceptual experience is either constituted by fact in the world or mere appearance. This view is said to be able to guarantee our cognitive contact with the world, and thus remove a crucial “prop” upon which skepticism depends. This paper has two aims. First, it aims to show that disjunctivism is a solution to Cartesian skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is an epistemological thesis, not an ontological one. Therefore, if there is an external world, we may well undergo a veridical experience, and thus we can take advantage of disjunctivism to adopt an anti-evidential-skepticism strategy to counter Cartesian skepticism. Second, this paper argues that disjunctivism fails to solve Pyrrhonian skepticism. To counter Pyrrhonian skepticism, one has to give reasons both for his belief and for his believing. But disjunctivism can only account the former, that is, the reason for the content of perceptual belief. Given that one’s experience in good case and bad case is subjectively indistinguishable, one cannot just use his experience to justify his believing. This shows that disjunctivism cannot meet the requirement to provide an adequate account for reflective knowledge. reflective knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 disjunctivism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Cartesian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Pyrrhonian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Frontiers of philosophy in China Leiden : Brill, 2006 6(2011), 3 vom: 19. Aug. (DE-627)510464254 (DE-600)2230599-3 1673-355X nnns volume:6 year:2011 number:3 day:19 month:08 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11466-011-0149-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_1200 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2936 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4392 GBV_ILN_4393 AR 6 2011 3 19 08
allfieldsSound	10.1007/s11466-011-0149-z doi (DE-627)SPR019873697 (SPR)s11466-011-0149-z-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE Wang, Huaping verfasserin aut Disjunctivism and skepticism 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Disjunctivism is the view that perceptual experience is either constituted by fact in the world or mere appearance. This view is said to be able to guarantee our cognitive contact with the world, and thus remove a crucial “prop” upon which skepticism depends. This paper has two aims. First, it aims to show that disjunctivism is a solution to Cartesian skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is an epistemological thesis, not an ontological one. Therefore, if there is an external world, we may well undergo a veridical experience, and thus we can take advantage of disjunctivism to adopt an anti-evidential-skepticism strategy to counter Cartesian skepticism. Second, this paper argues that disjunctivism fails to solve Pyrrhonian skepticism. To counter Pyrrhonian skepticism, one has to give reasons both for his belief and for his believing. But disjunctivism can only account the former, that is, the reason for the content of perceptual belief. Given that one’s experience in good case and bad case is subjectively indistinguishable, one cannot just use his experience to justify his believing. This shows that disjunctivism cannot meet the requirement to provide an adequate account for reflective knowledge. reflective knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 disjunctivism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Cartesian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Pyrrhonian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Frontiers of philosophy in China Leiden : Brill, 2006 6(2011), 3 vom: 19. Aug. (DE-627)510464254 (DE-600)2230599-3 1673-355X nnns volume:6 year:2011 number:3 day:19 month:08 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11466-011-0149-z lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_1200 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2936 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4392 GBV_ILN_4393 AR 6 2011 3 19 08
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title_auth	Disjunctivism and skepticism
abstract	Abstract Disjunctivism is the view that perceptual experience is either constituted by fact in the world or mere appearance. This view is said to be able to guarantee our cognitive contact with the world, and thus remove a crucial “prop” upon which skepticism depends. This paper has two aims. First, it aims to show that disjunctivism is a solution to Cartesian skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is an epistemological thesis, not an ontological one. Therefore, if there is an external world, we may well undergo a veridical experience, and thus we can take advantage of disjunctivism to adopt an anti-evidential-skepticism strategy to counter Cartesian skepticism. Second, this paper argues that disjunctivism fails to solve Pyrrhonian skepticism. To counter Pyrrhonian skepticism, one has to give reasons both for his belief and for his believing. But disjunctivism can only account the former, that is, the reason for the content of perceptual belief. Given that one’s experience in good case and bad case is subjectively indistinguishable, one cannot just use his experience to justify his believing. This shows that disjunctivism cannot meet the requirement to provide an adequate account for reflective knowledge.
abstractGer	Abstract Disjunctivism is the view that perceptual experience is either constituted by fact in the world or mere appearance. This view is said to be able to guarantee our cognitive contact with the world, and thus remove a crucial “prop” upon which skepticism depends. This paper has two aims. First, it aims to show that disjunctivism is a solution to Cartesian skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is an epistemological thesis, not an ontological one. Therefore, if there is an external world, we may well undergo a veridical experience, and thus we can take advantage of disjunctivism to adopt an anti-evidential-skepticism strategy to counter Cartesian skepticism. Second, this paper argues that disjunctivism fails to solve Pyrrhonian skepticism. To counter Pyrrhonian skepticism, one has to give reasons both for his belief and for his believing. But disjunctivism can only account the former, that is, the reason for the content of perceptual belief. Given that one’s experience in good case and bad case is subjectively indistinguishable, one cannot just use his experience to justify his believing. This shows that disjunctivism cannot meet the requirement to provide an adequate account for reflective knowledge.
abstract_unstemmed	Abstract Disjunctivism is the view that perceptual experience is either constituted by fact in the world or mere appearance. This view is said to be able to guarantee our cognitive contact with the world, and thus remove a crucial “prop” upon which skepticism depends. This paper has two aims. First, it aims to show that disjunctivism is a solution to Cartesian skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is an epistemological thesis, not an ontological one. Therefore, if there is an external world, we may well undergo a veridical experience, and thus we can take advantage of disjunctivism to adopt an anti-evidential-skepticism strategy to counter Cartesian skepticism. Second, this paper argues that disjunctivism fails to solve Pyrrhonian skepticism. To counter Pyrrhonian skepticism, one has to give reasons both for his belief and for his believing. But disjunctivism can only account the former, that is, the reason for the content of perceptual belief. Given that one’s experience in good case and bad case is subjectively indistinguishable, one cannot just use his experience to justify his believing. This shows that disjunctivism cannot meet the requirement to provide an adequate account for reflective knowledge.
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Disjunctivism and skepticism

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