Egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media

Abstract The Egyptian media system shows a stark paradox: Despite its long history and pioneering position in the Arab media landscape, under the current authoritarian trends today the media system has extremely blocked potentials for the possibility of independent media and journalism. Analyzing the current situation in Egypt does not disclose its status as a country with 200 years of history in journalism in the region, which has been marked by struggles and paradoxes. Reviewing the history of the Egyptian media system shows that three elements have influenced the evolution of the country’s media system. These include the geo-political position that made possible an early contact to the colonial French expedition which introduced the print press technologies and the restrictive political role of all subsequent rulers, whether foreign or Egyptian, in regulating and shaping possible media outlets as well as Egypt’s close connections to the evolution of global communication technologies. The political and legal framework has been dominated by mainly illiberal phases, with brief intermittent phases of liberalization that led to short-lived flourished media landscapes. The state engages in methods that apply legal authoritarianism to convey an impression of observing the rule of law, while in fact restricting freedoms and, in addition, controlling the political economy through indirect state capitalism, where media ownership stays within the state or the loyalist business elite, in particularly the popular audio-visual media. Amid the global journalism crisis, Egypt’s media system struggles for its financial survival, professional quality and recognition among young generations. Experts speak openly of “death of journalism”. Investments in the media are not on the current political agenda. On the contrary, they are viewed by the rulers as adversaries. Instead of making them powerful, the current credo is to weaken the media, as their loyalty and public influence are not guaranteed. The serious economic crisis and the lack of public credibility in media institutions only make struggles for professional independence harder. Coupled with brain drain trends and self-exile of oppositional journalists, forces to renew the profession seem to be distant under current circumstances. The article takes a nuanced position in the debate on the liberalizing role of the media in relation to the Arab Spring debate. The relevance of new digital media in Egypt had increased in the past 15 years. Many scholars and commentators attribute the Tahrir Revolution in 2011 directly to the rise of the Internet, as it was widely called Facebook Revolution. However, the article maintains that this is a simplified view of the events and interactions between media, politics and the online sphere. While the semi-liberal phase in the mid-2000s and the new technologies led to a vibrant blogosphere and opened up online spaces for otherwise marginalized voices, it took real grievances and real activism on the ground that interacted together. Since 2015, there are increasing signs of controlling the Internet: zero toleration policies towards dissent and criticism have marked the years through increased police control and imprisoning journalists, as well as takeover of all semi-independent media outlets and use of online surveillance technologies. Currently, more than 500 websites and news media are banned within Egypt. Therefore, despite growing numbers of Internet users and high Facebook penetration we cannot expect a simple linear mobilization effect. On the contrary, a strong backlash awaits any attempts for challenging the current regime. Situated within the persistent socio-economic problems that caused the Tahrir Revolution in the first place, the political system fears a potential opening of the media system and attempts at keeping a fragile stabilization at any cost. Clinging to the national security concerns and harboring stability at any cost, encouraged by the current global rise of right-wing authoritarianism, suspends any pressures towards reforms as previous US governments pursued. In addition to the restrictions, the professional media scene faces numerous crises: one of which is the erosion of the economic viability of media in times of a massive journalism crisis. Another crisis is the declining professionalism and reproduction of loyalist and propagandistic practices due to self-censorship and clientelist practices within a highly restrictive environment. These developments fragment the professional community of journalists across numerous political camps and weakens unionizing efforts. Finally, the audiences are increasingly pushed away from politics. Based on the analysis and challenges, the Egyptian media are heading into the unknown: “death of journalism”, extreme depoliticization of the public sphere and restrictive media environment weaken the media system. Under the current circumstances—and unlike former President Mubarak’s policies—no politician will push for progress and investments in the media sector. The Supreme Media Regulatory Council announced an ambitious digitization plan of the media; no clear agenda is seen, except tightening control and advancing loyalist media. In the current globally interconnected world, this is a serious challenge for the power holders. The current weakened and stifled media system has many potentials if given the chance to grow autonomously: a strong legacy, unused economic assets, talented journalists and a big market. These unused resources for now make it unlikely for Egypt’s media system to witness another golden time soon. Having said that, the situation is extremely unpredictable on the mid- to long term. Therefore, in case of a political opening, whether through reforms from above or a system forced to respond by a renewed public upheaval, potential for transformation is there, if given the necessary freedoms of expression. Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Badr, Hanan [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2019

Schlagwörter:	Egypt Authoritarian media system Media freedom “Arab Spring”

Anmerkung:	© The Editors of the Journal 2019

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Publizistik - Wiesbaden : VS Verl. für Sozialwiss., 2000, 65(2019), 1 vom: 19. Dez., Seite 63-79
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:65 ; year:2019 ; number:1 ; day:19 ; month:12 ; pages:63-79

Links:	Volltext

DOI / URN:	10.1007/s11616-019-00537-8

Katalog-ID:	SPR021241295

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These include the geo-political position that made possible an early contact to the colonial French expedition which introduced the print press technologies and the restrictive political role of all subsequent rulers, whether foreign or Egyptian, in regulating and shaping possible media outlets as well as Egypt’s close connections to the evolution of global communication technologies. The political and legal framework has been dominated by mainly illiberal phases, with brief intermittent phases of liberalization that led to short-lived flourished media landscapes. The state engages in methods that apply legal authoritarianism to convey an impression of observing the rule of law, while in fact restricting freedoms and, in addition, controlling the political economy through indirect state capitalism, where media ownership stays within the state or the loyalist business elite, in particularly the popular audio-visual media. Amid the global journalism crisis, Egypt’s media system struggles for its financial survival, professional quality and recognition among young generations. Experts speak openly of “death of journalism”. Investments in the media are not on the current political agenda. On the contrary, they are viewed by the rulers as adversaries. Instead of making them powerful, the current credo is to weaken the media, as their loyalty and public influence are not guaranteed. The serious economic crisis and the lack of public credibility in media institutions only make struggles for professional independence harder. Coupled with brain drain trends and self-exile of oppositional journalists, forces to renew the profession seem to be distant under current circumstances. The article takes a nuanced position in the debate on the liberalizing role of the media in relation to the Arab Spring debate. The relevance of new digital media in Egypt had increased in the past 15 years. Many scholars and commentators attribute the Tahrir Revolution in 2011 directly to the rise of the Internet, as it was widely called Facebook Revolution. However, the article maintains that this is a simplified view of the events and interactions between media, politics and the online sphere. While the semi-liberal phase in the mid-2000s and the new technologies led to a vibrant blogosphere and opened up online spaces for otherwise marginalized voices, it took real grievances and real activism on the ground that interacted together. Since 2015, there are increasing signs of controlling the Internet: zero toleration policies towards dissent and criticism have marked the years through increased police control and imprisoning journalists, as well as takeover of all semi-independent media outlets and use of online surveillance technologies. Currently, more than 500 websites and news media are banned within Egypt. Therefore, despite growing numbers of Internet users and high Facebook penetration we cannot expect a simple linear mobilization effect. On the contrary, a strong backlash awaits any attempts for challenging the current regime. Situated within the persistent socio-economic problems that caused the Tahrir Revolution in the first place, the political system fears a potential opening of the media system and attempts at keeping a fragile stabilization at any cost. Clinging to the national security concerns and harboring stability at any cost, encouraged by the current global rise of right-wing authoritarianism, suspends any pressures towards reforms as previous US governments pursued. In addition to the restrictions, the professional media scene faces numerous crises: one of which is the erosion of the economic viability of media in times of a massive journalism crisis. Another crisis is the declining professionalism and reproduction of loyalist and propagandistic practices due to self-censorship and clientelist practices within a highly restrictive environment. These developments fragment the professional community of journalists across numerous political camps and weakens unionizing efforts. Finally, the audiences are increasingly pushed away from politics. Based on the analysis and challenges, the Egyptian media are heading into the unknown: “death of journalism”, extreme depoliticization of the public sphere and restrictive media environment weaken the media system. Under the current circumstances—and unlike former President Mubarak’s policies—no politician will push for progress and investments in the media sector. The Supreme Media Regulatory Council announced an ambitious digitization plan of the media; no clear agenda is seen, except tightening control and advancing loyalist media. In the current globally interconnected world, this is a serious challenge for the power holders. The current weakened and stifled media system has many potentials if given the chance to grow autonomously: a strong legacy, unused economic assets, talented journalists and a big market. These unused resources for now make it unlikely for Egypt’s media system to witness another golden time soon. Having said that, the situation is extremely unpredictable on the mid- to long term. Therefore, in case of a political opening, whether through reforms from above or a system forced to respond by a renewed public upheaval, potential for transformation is there, if given the necessary freedoms of expression.
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allfields	10.1007/s11616-019-00537-8 doi (DE-627)SPR021241295 (SPR)s11616-019-00537-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Badr, Hanan verfasserin aut Egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Editors of the Journal 2019 Abstract The Egyptian media system shows a stark paradox: Despite its long history and pioneering position in the Arab media landscape, under the current authoritarian trends today the media system has extremely blocked potentials for the possibility of independent media and journalism. Analyzing the current situation in Egypt does not disclose its status as a country with 200 years of history in journalism in the region, which has been marked by struggles and paradoxes. Reviewing the history of the Egyptian media system shows that three elements have influenced the evolution of the country’s media system. These include the geo-political position that made possible an early contact to the colonial French expedition which introduced the print press technologies and the restrictive political role of all subsequent rulers, whether foreign or Egyptian, in regulating and shaping possible media outlets as well as Egypt’s close connections to the evolution of global communication technologies. The political and legal framework has been dominated by mainly illiberal phases, with brief intermittent phases of liberalization that led to short-lived flourished media landscapes. The state engages in methods that apply legal authoritarianism to convey an impression of observing the rule of law, while in fact restricting freedoms and, in addition, controlling the political economy through indirect state capitalism, where media ownership stays within the state or the loyalist business elite, in particularly the popular audio-visual media. Amid the global journalism crisis, Egypt’s media system struggles for its financial survival, professional quality and recognition among young generations. Experts speak openly of “death of journalism”. Investments in the media are not on the current political agenda. On the contrary, they are viewed by the rulers as adversaries. Instead of making them powerful, the current credo is to weaken the media, as their loyalty and public influence are not guaranteed. The serious economic crisis and the lack of public credibility in media institutions only make struggles for professional independence harder. Coupled with brain drain trends and self-exile of oppositional journalists, forces to renew the profession seem to be distant under current circumstances. The article takes a nuanced position in the debate on the liberalizing role of the media in relation to the Arab Spring debate. The relevance of new digital media in Egypt had increased in the past 15 years. Many scholars and commentators attribute the Tahrir Revolution in 2011 directly to the rise of the Internet, as it was widely called Facebook Revolution. However, the article maintains that this is a simplified view of the events and interactions between media, politics and the online sphere. While the semi-liberal phase in the mid-2000s and the new technologies led to a vibrant blogosphere and opened up online spaces for otherwise marginalized voices, it took real grievances and real activism on the ground that interacted together. Since 2015, there are increasing signs of controlling the Internet: zero toleration policies towards dissent and criticism have marked the years through increased police control and imprisoning journalists, as well as takeover of all semi-independent media outlets and use of online surveillance technologies. Currently, more than 500 websites and news media are banned within Egypt. Therefore, despite growing numbers of Internet users and high Facebook penetration we cannot expect a simple linear mobilization effect. On the contrary, a strong backlash awaits any attempts for challenging the current regime. Situated within the persistent socio-economic problems that caused the Tahrir Revolution in the first place, the political system fears a potential opening of the media system and attempts at keeping a fragile stabilization at any cost. Clinging to the national security concerns and harboring stability at any cost, encouraged by the current global rise of right-wing authoritarianism, suspends any pressures towards reforms as previous US governments pursued. In addition to the restrictions, the professional media scene faces numerous crises: one of which is the erosion of the economic viability of media in times of a massive journalism crisis. Another crisis is the declining professionalism and reproduction of loyalist and propagandistic practices due to self-censorship and clientelist practices within a highly restrictive environment. These developments fragment the professional community of journalists across numerous political camps and weakens unionizing efforts. Finally, the audiences are increasingly pushed away from politics. Based on the analysis and challenges, the Egyptian media are heading into the unknown: “death of journalism”, extreme depoliticization of the public sphere and restrictive media environment weaken the media system. Under the current circumstances—and unlike former President Mubarak’s policies—no politician will push for progress and investments in the media sector. The Supreme Media Regulatory Council announced an ambitious digitization plan of the media; no clear agenda is seen, except tightening control and advancing loyalist media. In the current globally interconnected world, this is a serious challenge for the power holders. The current weakened and stifled media system has many potentials if given the chance to grow autonomously: a strong legacy, unused economic assets, talented journalists and a big market. These unused resources for now make it unlikely for Egypt’s media system to witness another golden time soon. Having said that, the situation is extremely unpredictable on the mid- to long term. Therefore, in case of a political opening, whether through reforms from above or a system forced to respond by a renewed public upheaval, potential for transformation is there, if given the necessary freedoms of expression. Egypt (dpeaa)DE-He213 Authoritarian media system (dpeaa)DE-He213 Media freedom (dpeaa)DE-He213 “Arab Spring” (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Publizistik Wiesbaden : VS Verl. für Sozialwiss., 2000 65(2019), 1 vom: 19. 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spelling	10.1007/s11616-019-00537-8 doi (DE-627)SPR021241295 (SPR)s11616-019-00537-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Badr, Hanan verfasserin aut Egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Editors of the Journal 2019 Abstract The Egyptian media system shows a stark paradox: Despite its long history and pioneering position in the Arab media landscape, under the current authoritarian trends today the media system has extremely blocked potentials for the possibility of independent media and journalism. Analyzing the current situation in Egypt does not disclose its status as a country with 200 years of history in journalism in the region, which has been marked by struggles and paradoxes. Reviewing the history of the Egyptian media system shows that three elements have influenced the evolution of the country’s media system. These include the geo-political position that made possible an early contact to the colonial French expedition which introduced the print press technologies and the restrictive political role of all subsequent rulers, whether foreign or Egyptian, in regulating and shaping possible media outlets as well as Egypt’s close connections to the evolution of global communication technologies. The political and legal framework has been dominated by mainly illiberal phases, with brief intermittent phases of liberalization that led to short-lived flourished media landscapes. The state engages in methods that apply legal authoritarianism to convey an impression of observing the rule of law, while in fact restricting freedoms and, in addition, controlling the political economy through indirect state capitalism, where media ownership stays within the state or the loyalist business elite, in particularly the popular audio-visual media. Amid the global journalism crisis, Egypt’s media system struggles for its financial survival, professional quality and recognition among young generations. Experts speak openly of “death of journalism”. Investments in the media are not on the current political agenda. On the contrary, they are viewed by the rulers as adversaries. Instead of making them powerful, the current credo is to weaken the media, as their loyalty and public influence are not guaranteed. The serious economic crisis and the lack of public credibility in media institutions only make struggles for professional independence harder. Coupled with brain drain trends and self-exile of oppositional journalists, forces to renew the profession seem to be distant under current circumstances. The article takes a nuanced position in the debate on the liberalizing role of the media in relation to the Arab Spring debate. The relevance of new digital media in Egypt had increased in the past 15 years. Many scholars and commentators attribute the Tahrir Revolution in 2011 directly to the rise of the Internet, as it was widely called Facebook Revolution. However, the article maintains that this is a simplified view of the events and interactions between media, politics and the online sphere. While the semi-liberal phase in the mid-2000s and the new technologies led to a vibrant blogosphere and opened up online spaces for otherwise marginalized voices, it took real grievances and real activism on the ground that interacted together. Since 2015, there are increasing signs of controlling the Internet: zero toleration policies towards dissent and criticism have marked the years through increased police control and imprisoning journalists, as well as takeover of all semi-independent media outlets and use of online surveillance technologies. Currently, more than 500 websites and news media are banned within Egypt. Therefore, despite growing numbers of Internet users and high Facebook penetration we cannot expect a simple linear mobilization effect. On the contrary, a strong backlash awaits any attempts for challenging the current regime. Situated within the persistent socio-economic problems that caused the Tahrir Revolution in the first place, the political system fears a potential opening of the media system and attempts at keeping a fragile stabilization at any cost. Clinging to the national security concerns and harboring stability at any cost, encouraged by the current global rise of right-wing authoritarianism, suspends any pressures towards reforms as previous US governments pursued. In addition to the restrictions, the professional media scene faces numerous crises: one of which is the erosion of the economic viability of media in times of a massive journalism crisis. Another crisis is the declining professionalism and reproduction of loyalist and propagandistic practices due to self-censorship and clientelist practices within a highly restrictive environment. These developments fragment the professional community of journalists across numerous political camps and weakens unionizing efforts. Finally, the audiences are increasingly pushed away from politics. Based on the analysis and challenges, the Egyptian media are heading into the unknown: “death of journalism”, extreme depoliticization of the public sphere and restrictive media environment weaken the media system. Under the current circumstances—and unlike former President Mubarak’s policies—no politician will push for progress and investments in the media sector. The Supreme Media Regulatory Council announced an ambitious digitization plan of the media; no clear agenda is seen, except tightening control and advancing loyalist media. In the current globally interconnected world, this is a serious challenge for the power holders. The current weakened and stifled media system has many potentials if given the chance to grow autonomously: a strong legacy, unused economic assets, talented journalists and a big market. These unused resources for now make it unlikely for Egypt’s media system to witness another golden time soon. Having said that, the situation is extremely unpredictable on the mid- to long term. Therefore, in case of a political opening, whether through reforms from above or a system forced to respond by a renewed public upheaval, potential for transformation is there, if given the necessary freedoms of expression. Egypt (dpeaa)DE-He213 Authoritarian media system (dpeaa)DE-He213 Media freedom (dpeaa)DE-He213 “Arab Spring” (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Publizistik Wiesbaden : VS Verl. für Sozialwiss., 2000 65(2019), 1 vom: 19. Dez., Seite 63-79 (DE-627)525876456 (DE-600)2273951-8 1862-2569 nnns volume:65 year:2019 number:1 day:19 month:12 pages:63-79 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11616-019-00537-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_61 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_121 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_163 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4320 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 65 2019 1 19 12 63-79
allfields_unstemmed	10.1007/s11616-019-00537-8 doi (DE-627)SPR021241295 (SPR)s11616-019-00537-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Badr, Hanan verfasserin aut Egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Editors of the Journal 2019 Abstract The Egyptian media system shows a stark paradox: Despite its long history and pioneering position in the Arab media landscape, under the current authoritarian trends today the media system has extremely blocked potentials for the possibility of independent media and journalism. Analyzing the current situation in Egypt does not disclose its status as a country with 200 years of history in journalism in the region, which has been marked by struggles and paradoxes. Reviewing the history of the Egyptian media system shows that three elements have influenced the evolution of the country’s media system. These include the geo-political position that made possible an early contact to the colonial French expedition which introduced the print press technologies and the restrictive political role of all subsequent rulers, whether foreign or Egyptian, in regulating and shaping possible media outlets as well as Egypt’s close connections to the evolution of global communication technologies. The political and legal framework has been dominated by mainly illiberal phases, with brief intermittent phases of liberalization that led to short-lived flourished media landscapes. The state engages in methods that apply legal authoritarianism to convey an impression of observing the rule of law, while in fact restricting freedoms and, in addition, controlling the political economy through indirect state capitalism, where media ownership stays within the state or the loyalist business elite, in particularly the popular audio-visual media. Amid the global journalism crisis, Egypt’s media system struggles for its financial survival, professional quality and recognition among young generations. Experts speak openly of “death of journalism”. Investments in the media are not on the current political agenda. On the contrary, they are viewed by the rulers as adversaries. Instead of making them powerful, the current credo is to weaken the media, as their loyalty and public influence are not guaranteed. The serious economic crisis and the lack of public credibility in media institutions only make struggles for professional independence harder. Coupled with brain drain trends and self-exile of oppositional journalists, forces to renew the profession seem to be distant under current circumstances. The article takes a nuanced position in the debate on the liberalizing role of the media in relation to the Arab Spring debate. The relevance of new digital media in Egypt had increased in the past 15 years. Many scholars and commentators attribute the Tahrir Revolution in 2011 directly to the rise of the Internet, as it was widely called Facebook Revolution. However, the article maintains that this is a simplified view of the events and interactions between media, politics and the online sphere. While the semi-liberal phase in the mid-2000s and the new technologies led to a vibrant blogosphere and opened up online spaces for otherwise marginalized voices, it took real grievances and real activism on the ground that interacted together. Since 2015, there are increasing signs of controlling the Internet: zero toleration policies towards dissent and criticism have marked the years through increased police control and imprisoning journalists, as well as takeover of all semi-independent media outlets and use of online surveillance technologies. Currently, more than 500 websites and news media are banned within Egypt. Therefore, despite growing numbers of Internet users and high Facebook penetration we cannot expect a simple linear mobilization effect. On the contrary, a strong backlash awaits any attempts for challenging the current regime. Situated within the persistent socio-economic problems that caused the Tahrir Revolution in the first place, the political system fears a potential opening of the media system and attempts at keeping a fragile stabilization at any cost. Clinging to the national security concerns and harboring stability at any cost, encouraged by the current global rise of right-wing authoritarianism, suspends any pressures towards reforms as previous US governments pursued. In addition to the restrictions, the professional media scene faces numerous crises: one of which is the erosion of the economic viability of media in times of a massive journalism crisis. Another crisis is the declining professionalism and reproduction of loyalist and propagandistic practices due to self-censorship and clientelist practices within a highly restrictive environment. These developments fragment the professional community of journalists across numerous political camps and weakens unionizing efforts. Finally, the audiences are increasingly pushed away from politics. Based on the analysis and challenges, the Egyptian media are heading into the unknown: “death of journalism”, extreme depoliticization of the public sphere and restrictive media environment weaken the media system. Under the current circumstances—and unlike former President Mubarak’s policies—no politician will push for progress and investments in the media sector. The Supreme Media Regulatory Council announced an ambitious digitization plan of the media; no clear agenda is seen, except tightening control and advancing loyalist media. In the current globally interconnected world, this is a serious challenge for the power holders. The current weakened and stifled media system has many potentials if given the chance to grow autonomously: a strong legacy, unused economic assets, talented journalists and a big market. These unused resources for now make it unlikely for Egypt’s media system to witness another golden time soon. Having said that, the situation is extremely unpredictable on the mid- to long term. Therefore, in case of a political opening, whether through reforms from above or a system forced to respond by a renewed public upheaval, potential for transformation is there, if given the necessary freedoms of expression. Egypt (dpeaa)DE-He213 Authoritarian media system (dpeaa)DE-He213 Media freedom (dpeaa)DE-He213 “Arab Spring” (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Publizistik Wiesbaden : VS Verl. für Sozialwiss., 2000 65(2019), 1 vom: 19. Dez., Seite 63-79 (DE-627)525876456 (DE-600)2273951-8 1862-2569 nnns volume:65 year:2019 number:1 day:19 month:12 pages:63-79 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11616-019-00537-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_61 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_121 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_163 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4320 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 65 2019 1 19 12 63-79
allfieldsGer	10.1007/s11616-019-00537-8 doi (DE-627)SPR021241295 (SPR)s11616-019-00537-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Badr, Hanan verfasserin aut Egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Editors of the Journal 2019 Abstract The Egyptian media system shows a stark paradox: Despite its long history and pioneering position in the Arab media landscape, under the current authoritarian trends today the media system has extremely blocked potentials for the possibility of independent media and journalism. Analyzing the current situation in Egypt does not disclose its status as a country with 200 years of history in journalism in the region, which has been marked by struggles and paradoxes. Reviewing the history of the Egyptian media system shows that three elements have influenced the evolution of the country’s media system. These include the geo-political position that made possible an early contact to the colonial French expedition which introduced the print press technologies and the restrictive political role of all subsequent rulers, whether foreign or Egyptian, in regulating and shaping possible media outlets as well as Egypt’s close connections to the evolution of global communication technologies. The political and legal framework has been dominated by mainly illiberal phases, with brief intermittent phases of liberalization that led to short-lived flourished media landscapes. The state engages in methods that apply legal authoritarianism to convey an impression of observing the rule of law, while in fact restricting freedoms and, in addition, controlling the political economy through indirect state capitalism, where media ownership stays within the state or the loyalist business elite, in particularly the popular audio-visual media. Amid the global journalism crisis, Egypt’s media system struggles for its financial survival, professional quality and recognition among young generations. Experts speak openly of “death of journalism”. Investments in the media are not on the current political agenda. On the contrary, they are viewed by the rulers as adversaries. Instead of making them powerful, the current credo is to weaken the media, as their loyalty and public influence are not guaranteed. The serious economic crisis and the lack of public credibility in media institutions only make struggles for professional independence harder. Coupled with brain drain trends and self-exile of oppositional journalists, forces to renew the profession seem to be distant under current circumstances. The article takes a nuanced position in the debate on the liberalizing role of the media in relation to the Arab Spring debate. The relevance of new digital media in Egypt had increased in the past 15 years. Many scholars and commentators attribute the Tahrir Revolution in 2011 directly to the rise of the Internet, as it was widely called Facebook Revolution. However, the article maintains that this is a simplified view of the events and interactions between media, politics and the online sphere. While the semi-liberal phase in the mid-2000s and the new technologies led to a vibrant blogosphere and opened up online spaces for otherwise marginalized voices, it took real grievances and real activism on the ground that interacted together. Since 2015, there are increasing signs of controlling the Internet: zero toleration policies towards dissent and criticism have marked the years through increased police control and imprisoning journalists, as well as takeover of all semi-independent media outlets and use of online surveillance technologies. Currently, more than 500 websites and news media are banned within Egypt. Therefore, despite growing numbers of Internet users and high Facebook penetration we cannot expect a simple linear mobilization effect. On the contrary, a strong backlash awaits any attempts for challenging the current regime. Situated within the persistent socio-economic problems that caused the Tahrir Revolution in the first place, the political system fears a potential opening of the media system and attempts at keeping a fragile stabilization at any cost. Clinging to the national security concerns and harboring stability at any cost, encouraged by the current global rise of right-wing authoritarianism, suspends any pressures towards reforms as previous US governments pursued. In addition to the restrictions, the professional media scene faces numerous crises: one of which is the erosion of the economic viability of media in times of a massive journalism crisis. Another crisis is the declining professionalism and reproduction of loyalist and propagandistic practices due to self-censorship and clientelist practices within a highly restrictive environment. These developments fragment the professional community of journalists across numerous political camps and weakens unionizing efforts. Finally, the audiences are increasingly pushed away from politics. Based on the analysis and challenges, the Egyptian media are heading into the unknown: “death of journalism”, extreme depoliticization of the public sphere and restrictive media environment weaken the media system. Under the current circumstances—and unlike former President Mubarak’s policies—no politician will push for progress and investments in the media sector. The Supreme Media Regulatory Council announced an ambitious digitization plan of the media; no clear agenda is seen, except tightening control and advancing loyalist media. In the current globally interconnected world, this is a serious challenge for the power holders. The current weakened and stifled media system has many potentials if given the chance to grow autonomously: a strong legacy, unused economic assets, talented journalists and a big market. These unused resources for now make it unlikely for Egypt’s media system to witness another golden time soon. Having said that, the situation is extremely unpredictable on the mid- to long term. Therefore, in case of a political opening, whether through reforms from above or a system forced to respond by a renewed public upheaval, potential for transformation is there, if given the necessary freedoms of expression. Egypt (dpeaa)DE-He213 Authoritarian media system (dpeaa)DE-He213 Media freedom (dpeaa)DE-He213 “Arab Spring” (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Publizistik Wiesbaden : VS Verl. für Sozialwiss., 2000 65(2019), 1 vom: 19. Dez., Seite 63-79 (DE-627)525876456 (DE-600)2273951-8 1862-2569 nnns volume:65 year:2019 number:1 day:19 month:12 pages:63-79 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11616-019-00537-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_61 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_121 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_163 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4320 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 65 2019 1 19 12 63-79
allfieldsSound	10.1007/s11616-019-00537-8 doi (DE-627)SPR021241295 (SPR)s11616-019-00537-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Badr, Hanan verfasserin aut Egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Editors of the Journal 2019 Abstract The Egyptian media system shows a stark paradox: Despite its long history and pioneering position in the Arab media landscape, under the current authoritarian trends today the media system has extremely blocked potentials for the possibility of independent media and journalism. Analyzing the current situation in Egypt does not disclose its status as a country with 200 years of history in journalism in the region, which has been marked by struggles and paradoxes. Reviewing the history of the Egyptian media system shows that three elements have influenced the evolution of the country’s media system. These include the geo-political position that made possible an early contact to the colonial French expedition which introduced the print press technologies and the restrictive political role of all subsequent rulers, whether foreign or Egyptian, in regulating and shaping possible media outlets as well as Egypt’s close connections to the evolution of global communication technologies. The political and legal framework has been dominated by mainly illiberal phases, with brief intermittent phases of liberalization that led to short-lived flourished media landscapes. The state engages in methods that apply legal authoritarianism to convey an impression of observing the rule of law, while in fact restricting freedoms and, in addition, controlling the political economy through indirect state capitalism, where media ownership stays within the state or the loyalist business elite, in particularly the popular audio-visual media. Amid the global journalism crisis, Egypt’s media system struggles for its financial survival, professional quality and recognition among young generations. Experts speak openly of “death of journalism”. Investments in the media are not on the current political agenda. On the contrary, they are viewed by the rulers as adversaries. Instead of making them powerful, the current credo is to weaken the media, as their loyalty and public influence are not guaranteed. The serious economic crisis and the lack of public credibility in media institutions only make struggles for professional independence harder. Coupled with brain drain trends and self-exile of oppositional journalists, forces to renew the profession seem to be distant under current circumstances. The article takes a nuanced position in the debate on the liberalizing role of the media in relation to the Arab Spring debate. The relevance of new digital media in Egypt had increased in the past 15 years. Many scholars and commentators attribute the Tahrir Revolution in 2011 directly to the rise of the Internet, as it was widely called Facebook Revolution. However, the article maintains that this is a simplified view of the events and interactions between media, politics and the online sphere. While the semi-liberal phase in the mid-2000s and the new technologies led to a vibrant blogosphere and opened up online spaces for otherwise marginalized voices, it took real grievances and real activism on the ground that interacted together. Since 2015, there are increasing signs of controlling the Internet: zero toleration policies towards dissent and criticism have marked the years through increased police control and imprisoning journalists, as well as takeover of all semi-independent media outlets and use of online surveillance technologies. Currently, more than 500 websites and news media are banned within Egypt. Therefore, despite growing numbers of Internet users and high Facebook penetration we cannot expect a simple linear mobilization effect. On the contrary, a strong backlash awaits any attempts for challenging the current regime. Situated within the persistent socio-economic problems that caused the Tahrir Revolution in the first place, the political system fears a potential opening of the media system and attempts at keeping a fragile stabilization at any cost. Clinging to the national security concerns and harboring stability at any cost, encouraged by the current global rise of right-wing authoritarianism, suspends any pressures towards reforms as previous US governments pursued. In addition to the restrictions, the professional media scene faces numerous crises: one of which is the erosion of the economic viability of media in times of a massive journalism crisis. Another crisis is the declining professionalism and reproduction of loyalist and propagandistic practices due to self-censorship and clientelist practices within a highly restrictive environment. These developments fragment the professional community of journalists across numerous political camps and weakens unionizing efforts. Finally, the audiences are increasingly pushed away from politics. Based on the analysis and challenges, the Egyptian media are heading into the unknown: “death of journalism”, extreme depoliticization of the public sphere and restrictive media environment weaken the media system. Under the current circumstances—and unlike former President Mubarak’s policies—no politician will push for progress and investments in the media sector. The Supreme Media Regulatory Council announced an ambitious digitization plan of the media; no clear agenda is seen, except tightening control and advancing loyalist media. In the current globally interconnected world, this is a serious challenge for the power holders. The current weakened and stifled media system has many potentials if given the chance to grow autonomously: a strong legacy, unused economic assets, talented journalists and a big market. These unused resources for now make it unlikely for Egypt’s media system to witness another golden time soon. Having said that, the situation is extremely unpredictable on the mid- to long term. Therefore, in case of a political opening, whether through reforms from above or a system forced to respond by a renewed public upheaval, potential for transformation is there, if given the necessary freedoms of expression. Egypt (dpeaa)DE-He213 Authoritarian media system (dpeaa)DE-He213 Media freedom (dpeaa)DE-He213 “Arab Spring” (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Publizistik Wiesbaden : VS Verl. für Sozialwiss., 2000 65(2019), 1 vom: 19. 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language	English
source	Enthalten in Publizistik 65(2019), 1 vom: 19. Dez., Seite 63-79 volume:65 year:2019 number:1 day:19 month:12 pages:63-79
sourceStr	Enthalten in Publizistik 65(2019), 1 vom: 19. Dez., Seite 63-79 volume:65 year:2019 number:1 day:19 month:12 pages:63-79
format_phy_str_mv	Article
institution	findex.gbv.de
topic_facet	Egypt Authoritarian media system Media freedom “Arab Spring”
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container_title	Publizistik
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Badr, Hanan @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2019-12-19T00:00:00Z
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fullrecord	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">SPR021241295</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230330165926.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">201006s2019 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s11616-019-00537-8</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)SPR021241295</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(SPR)s11616-019-00537-8-e</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Badr, Hanan</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2019</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© The Editors of the Journal 2019</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract The Egyptian media system shows a stark paradox: Despite its long history and pioneering position in the Arab media landscape, under the current authoritarian trends today the media system has extremely blocked potentials for the possibility of independent media and journalism. Analyzing the current situation in Egypt does not disclose its status as a country with 200 years of history in journalism in the region, which has been marked by struggles and paradoxes. Reviewing the history of the Egyptian media system shows that three elements have influenced the evolution of the country’s media system. These include the geo-political position that made possible an early contact to the colonial French expedition which introduced the print press technologies and the restrictive political role of all subsequent rulers, whether foreign or Egyptian, in regulating and shaping possible media outlets as well as Egypt’s close connections to the evolution of global communication technologies. The political and legal framework has been dominated by mainly illiberal phases, with brief intermittent phases of liberalization that led to short-lived flourished media landscapes. The state engages in methods that apply legal authoritarianism to convey an impression of observing the rule of law, while in fact restricting freedoms and, in addition, controlling the political economy through indirect state capitalism, where media ownership stays within the state or the loyalist business elite, in particularly the popular audio-visual media. Amid the global journalism crisis, Egypt’s media system struggles for its financial survival, professional quality and recognition among young generations. Experts speak openly of “death of journalism”. Investments in the media are not on the current political agenda. On the contrary, they are viewed by the rulers as adversaries. Instead of making them powerful, the current credo is to weaken the media, as their loyalty and public influence are not guaranteed. The serious economic crisis and the lack of public credibility in media institutions only make struggles for professional independence harder. Coupled with brain drain trends and self-exile of oppositional journalists, forces to renew the profession seem to be distant under current circumstances. The article takes a nuanced position in the debate on the liberalizing role of the media in relation to the Arab Spring debate. The relevance of new digital media in Egypt had increased in the past 15 years. Many scholars and commentators attribute the Tahrir Revolution in 2011 directly to the rise of the Internet, as it was widely called Facebook Revolution. However, the article maintains that this is a simplified view of the events and interactions between media, politics and the online sphere. While the semi-liberal phase in the mid-2000s and the new technologies led to a vibrant blogosphere and opened up online spaces for otherwise marginalized voices, it took real grievances and real activism on the ground that interacted together. Since 2015, there are increasing signs of controlling the Internet: zero toleration policies towards dissent and criticism have marked the years through increased police control and imprisoning journalists, as well as takeover of all semi-independent media outlets and use of online surveillance technologies. Currently, more than 500 websites and news media are banned within Egypt. Therefore, despite growing numbers of Internet users and high Facebook penetration we cannot expect a simple linear mobilization effect. On the contrary, a strong backlash awaits any attempts for challenging the current regime. Situated within the persistent socio-economic problems that caused the Tahrir Revolution in the first place, the political system fears a potential opening of the media system and attempts at keeping a fragile stabilization at any cost. Clinging to the national security concerns and harboring stability at any cost, encouraged by the current global rise of right-wing authoritarianism, suspends any pressures towards reforms as previous US governments pursued. In addition to the restrictions, the professional media scene faces numerous crises: one of which is the erosion of the economic viability of media in times of a massive journalism crisis. Another crisis is the declining professionalism and reproduction of loyalist and propagandistic practices due to self-censorship and clientelist practices within a highly restrictive environment. These developments fragment the professional community of journalists across numerous political camps and weakens unionizing efforts. Finally, the audiences are increasingly pushed away from politics. Based on the analysis and challenges, the Egyptian media are heading into the unknown: “death of journalism”, extreme depoliticization of the public sphere and restrictive media environment weaken the media system. Under the current circumstances—and unlike former President Mubarak’s policies—no politician will push for progress and investments in the media sector. The Supreme Media Regulatory Council announced an ambitious digitization plan of the media; no clear agenda is seen, except tightening control and advancing loyalist media. In the current globally interconnected world, this is a serious challenge for the power holders. The current weakened and stifled media system has many potentials if given the chance to grow autonomously: a strong legacy, unused economic assets, talented journalists and a big market. These unused resources for now make it unlikely for Egypt’s media system to witness another golden time soon. Having said that, the situation is extremely unpredictable on the mid- to long term. 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author	Badr, Hanan
spellingShingle	Badr, Hanan misc Egypt misc Authoritarian media system misc Media freedom misc “Arab Spring” Egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media
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topic_title	Egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media Egypt (dpeaa)DE-He213 Authoritarian media system (dpeaa)DE-He213 Media freedom (dpeaa)DE-He213 “Arab Spring” (dpeaa)DE-He213
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title	Egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media
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title_full	Egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media
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title_sort	egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media
title_auth	Egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media
abstract	Abstract The Egyptian media system shows a stark paradox: Despite its long history and pioneering position in the Arab media landscape, under the current authoritarian trends today the media system has extremely blocked potentials for the possibility of independent media and journalism. Analyzing the current situation in Egypt does not disclose its status as a country with 200 years of history in journalism in the region, which has been marked by struggles and paradoxes. Reviewing the history of the Egyptian media system shows that three elements have influenced the evolution of the country’s media system. These include the geo-political position that made possible an early contact to the colonial French expedition which introduced the print press technologies and the restrictive political role of all subsequent rulers, whether foreign or Egyptian, in regulating and shaping possible media outlets as well as Egypt’s close connections to the evolution of global communication technologies. The political and legal framework has been dominated by mainly illiberal phases, with brief intermittent phases of liberalization that led to short-lived flourished media landscapes. The state engages in methods that apply legal authoritarianism to convey an impression of observing the rule of law, while in fact restricting freedoms and, in addition, controlling the political economy through indirect state capitalism, where media ownership stays within the state or the loyalist business elite, in particularly the popular audio-visual media. Amid the global journalism crisis, Egypt’s media system struggles for its financial survival, professional quality and recognition among young generations. Experts speak openly of “death of journalism”. Investments in the media are not on the current political agenda. On the contrary, they are viewed by the rulers as adversaries. Instead of making them powerful, the current credo is to weaken the media, as their loyalty and public influence are not guaranteed. The serious economic crisis and the lack of public credibility in media institutions only make struggles for professional independence harder. Coupled with brain drain trends and self-exile of oppositional journalists, forces to renew the profession seem to be distant under current circumstances. The article takes a nuanced position in the debate on the liberalizing role of the media in relation to the Arab Spring debate. The relevance of new digital media in Egypt had increased in the past 15 years. Many scholars and commentators attribute the Tahrir Revolution in 2011 directly to the rise of the Internet, as it was widely called Facebook Revolution. However, the article maintains that this is a simplified view of the events and interactions between media, politics and the online sphere. While the semi-liberal phase in the mid-2000s and the new technologies led to a vibrant blogosphere and opened up online spaces for otherwise marginalized voices, it took real grievances and real activism on the ground that interacted together. Since 2015, there are increasing signs of controlling the Internet: zero toleration policies towards dissent and criticism have marked the years through increased police control and imprisoning journalists, as well as takeover of all semi-independent media outlets and use of online surveillance technologies. Currently, more than 500 websites and news media are banned within Egypt. Therefore, despite growing numbers of Internet users and high Facebook penetration we cannot expect a simple linear mobilization effect. On the contrary, a strong backlash awaits any attempts for challenging the current regime. Situated within the persistent socio-economic problems that caused the Tahrir Revolution in the first place, the political system fears a potential opening of the media system and attempts at keeping a fragile stabilization at any cost. Clinging to the national security concerns and harboring stability at any cost, encouraged by the current global rise of right-wing authoritarianism, suspends any pressures towards reforms as previous US governments pursued. In addition to the restrictions, the professional media scene faces numerous crises: one of which is the erosion of the economic viability of media in times of a massive journalism crisis. Another crisis is the declining professionalism and reproduction of loyalist and propagandistic practices due to self-censorship and clientelist practices within a highly restrictive environment. These developments fragment the professional community of journalists across numerous political camps and weakens unionizing efforts. Finally, the audiences are increasingly pushed away from politics. Based on the analysis and challenges, the Egyptian media are heading into the unknown: “death of journalism”, extreme depoliticization of the public sphere and restrictive media environment weaken the media system. Under the current circumstances—and unlike former President Mubarak’s policies—no politician will push for progress and investments in the media sector. The Supreme Media Regulatory Council announced an ambitious digitization plan of the media; no clear agenda is seen, except tightening control and advancing loyalist media. In the current globally interconnected world, this is a serious challenge for the power holders. The current weakened and stifled media system has many potentials if given the chance to grow autonomously: a strong legacy, unused economic assets, talented journalists and a big market. These unused resources for now make it unlikely for Egypt’s media system to witness another golden time soon. Having said that, the situation is extremely unpredictable on the mid- to long term. Therefore, in case of a political opening, whether through reforms from above or a system forced to respond by a renewed public upheaval, potential for transformation is there, if given the necessary freedoms of expression. © The Editors of the Journal 2019
abstractGer	Abstract The Egyptian media system shows a stark paradox: Despite its long history and pioneering position in the Arab media landscape, under the current authoritarian trends today the media system has extremely blocked potentials for the possibility of independent media and journalism. Analyzing the current situation in Egypt does not disclose its status as a country with 200 years of history in journalism in the region, which has been marked by struggles and paradoxes. Reviewing the history of the Egyptian media system shows that three elements have influenced the evolution of the country’s media system. These include the geo-political position that made possible an early contact to the colonial French expedition which introduced the print press technologies and the restrictive political role of all subsequent rulers, whether foreign or Egyptian, in regulating and shaping possible media outlets as well as Egypt’s close connections to the evolution of global communication technologies. The political and legal framework has been dominated by mainly illiberal phases, with brief intermittent phases of liberalization that led to short-lived flourished media landscapes. The state engages in methods that apply legal authoritarianism to convey an impression of observing the rule of law, while in fact restricting freedoms and, in addition, controlling the political economy through indirect state capitalism, where media ownership stays within the state or the loyalist business elite, in particularly the popular audio-visual media. Amid the global journalism crisis, Egypt’s media system struggles for its financial survival, professional quality and recognition among young generations. Experts speak openly of “death of journalism”. Investments in the media are not on the current political agenda. On the contrary, they are viewed by the rulers as adversaries. Instead of making them powerful, the current credo is to weaken the media, as their loyalty and public influence are not guaranteed. The serious economic crisis and the lack of public credibility in media institutions only make struggles for professional independence harder. Coupled with brain drain trends and self-exile of oppositional journalists, forces to renew the profession seem to be distant under current circumstances. The article takes a nuanced position in the debate on the liberalizing role of the media in relation to the Arab Spring debate. The relevance of new digital media in Egypt had increased in the past 15 years. Many scholars and commentators attribute the Tahrir Revolution in 2011 directly to the rise of the Internet, as it was widely called Facebook Revolution. However, the article maintains that this is a simplified view of the events and interactions between media, politics and the online sphere. While the semi-liberal phase in the mid-2000s and the new technologies led to a vibrant blogosphere and opened up online spaces for otherwise marginalized voices, it took real grievances and real activism on the ground that interacted together. Since 2015, there are increasing signs of controlling the Internet: zero toleration policies towards dissent and criticism have marked the years through increased police control and imprisoning journalists, as well as takeover of all semi-independent media outlets and use of online surveillance technologies. Currently, more than 500 websites and news media are banned within Egypt. Therefore, despite growing numbers of Internet users and high Facebook penetration we cannot expect a simple linear mobilization effect. On the contrary, a strong backlash awaits any attempts for challenging the current regime. Situated within the persistent socio-economic problems that caused the Tahrir Revolution in the first place, the political system fears a potential opening of the media system and attempts at keeping a fragile stabilization at any cost. Clinging to the national security concerns and harboring stability at any cost, encouraged by the current global rise of right-wing authoritarianism, suspends any pressures towards reforms as previous US governments pursued. In addition to the restrictions, the professional media scene faces numerous crises: one of which is the erosion of the economic viability of media in times of a massive journalism crisis. Another crisis is the declining professionalism and reproduction of loyalist and propagandistic practices due to self-censorship and clientelist practices within a highly restrictive environment. These developments fragment the professional community of journalists across numerous political camps and weakens unionizing efforts. Finally, the audiences are increasingly pushed away from politics. Based on the analysis and challenges, the Egyptian media are heading into the unknown: “death of journalism”, extreme depoliticization of the public sphere and restrictive media environment weaken the media system. Under the current circumstances—and unlike former President Mubarak’s policies—no politician will push for progress and investments in the media sector. The Supreme Media Regulatory Council announced an ambitious digitization plan of the media; no clear agenda is seen, except tightening control and advancing loyalist media. In the current globally interconnected world, this is a serious challenge for the power holders. The current weakened and stifled media system has many potentials if given the chance to grow autonomously: a strong legacy, unused economic assets, talented journalists and a big market. These unused resources for now make it unlikely for Egypt’s media system to witness another golden time soon. Having said that, the situation is extremely unpredictable on the mid- to long term. Therefore, in case of a political opening, whether through reforms from above or a system forced to respond by a renewed public upheaval, potential for transformation is there, if given the necessary freedoms of expression. © The Editors of the Journal 2019
abstract_unstemmed	Abstract The Egyptian media system shows a stark paradox: Despite its long history and pioneering position in the Arab media landscape, under the current authoritarian trends today the media system has extremely blocked potentials for the possibility of independent media and journalism. Analyzing the current situation in Egypt does not disclose its status as a country with 200 years of history in journalism in the region, which has been marked by struggles and paradoxes. Reviewing the history of the Egyptian media system shows that three elements have influenced the evolution of the country’s media system. These include the geo-political position that made possible an early contact to the colonial French expedition which introduced the print press technologies and the restrictive political role of all subsequent rulers, whether foreign or Egyptian, in regulating and shaping possible media outlets as well as Egypt’s close connections to the evolution of global communication technologies. The political and legal framework has been dominated by mainly illiberal phases, with brief intermittent phases of liberalization that led to short-lived flourished media landscapes. The state engages in methods that apply legal authoritarianism to convey an impression of observing the rule of law, while in fact restricting freedoms and, in addition, controlling the political economy through indirect state capitalism, where media ownership stays within the state or the loyalist business elite, in particularly the popular audio-visual media. Amid the global journalism crisis, Egypt’s media system struggles for its financial survival, professional quality and recognition among young generations. Experts speak openly of “death of journalism”. Investments in the media are not on the current political agenda. On the contrary, they are viewed by the rulers as adversaries. Instead of making them powerful, the current credo is to weaken the media, as their loyalty and public influence are not guaranteed. The serious economic crisis and the lack of public credibility in media institutions only make struggles for professional independence harder. Coupled with brain drain trends and self-exile of oppositional journalists, forces to renew the profession seem to be distant under current circumstances. The article takes a nuanced position in the debate on the liberalizing role of the media in relation to the Arab Spring debate. The relevance of new digital media in Egypt had increased in the past 15 years. Many scholars and commentators attribute the Tahrir Revolution in 2011 directly to the rise of the Internet, as it was widely called Facebook Revolution. However, the article maintains that this is a simplified view of the events and interactions between media, politics and the online sphere. While the semi-liberal phase in the mid-2000s and the new technologies led to a vibrant blogosphere and opened up online spaces for otherwise marginalized voices, it took real grievances and real activism on the ground that interacted together. Since 2015, there are increasing signs of controlling the Internet: zero toleration policies towards dissent and criticism have marked the years through increased police control and imprisoning journalists, as well as takeover of all semi-independent media outlets and use of online surveillance technologies. Currently, more than 500 websites and news media are banned within Egypt. Therefore, despite growing numbers of Internet users and high Facebook penetration we cannot expect a simple linear mobilization effect. On the contrary, a strong backlash awaits any attempts for challenging the current regime. Situated within the persistent socio-economic problems that caused the Tahrir Revolution in the first place, the political system fears a potential opening of the media system and attempts at keeping a fragile stabilization at any cost. Clinging to the national security concerns and harboring stability at any cost, encouraged by the current global rise of right-wing authoritarianism, suspends any pressures towards reforms as previous US governments pursued. In addition to the restrictions, the professional media scene faces numerous crises: one of which is the erosion of the economic viability of media in times of a massive journalism crisis. Another crisis is the declining professionalism and reproduction of loyalist and propagandistic practices due to self-censorship and clientelist practices within a highly restrictive environment. These developments fragment the professional community of journalists across numerous political camps and weakens unionizing efforts. Finally, the audiences are increasingly pushed away from politics. Based on the analysis and challenges, the Egyptian media are heading into the unknown: “death of journalism”, extreme depoliticization of the public sphere and restrictive media environment weaken the media system. Under the current circumstances—and unlike former President Mubarak’s policies—no politician will push for progress and investments in the media sector. The Supreme Media Regulatory Council announced an ambitious digitization plan of the media; no clear agenda is seen, except tightening control and advancing loyalist media. In the current globally interconnected world, this is a serious challenge for the power holders. The current weakened and stifled media system has many potentials if given the chance to grow autonomously: a strong legacy, unused economic assets, talented journalists and a big market. These unused resources for now make it unlikely for Egypt’s media system to witness another golden time soon. Having said that, the situation is extremely unpredictable on the mid- to long term. Therefore, in case of a political opening, whether through reforms from above or a system forced to respond by a renewed public upheaval, potential for transformation is there, if given the necessary freedoms of expression. © The Editors of the Journal 2019
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fullrecord_marcxml	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">SPR021241295</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230330165926.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">201006s2019 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s11616-019-00537-8</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)SPR021241295</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(SPR)s11616-019-00537-8-e</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Badr, Hanan</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2019</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© The Editors of the Journal 2019</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract The Egyptian media system shows a stark paradox: Despite its long history and pioneering position in the Arab media landscape, under the current authoritarian trends today the media system has extremely blocked potentials for the possibility of independent media and journalism. Analyzing the current situation in Egypt does not disclose its status as a country with 200 years of history in journalism in the region, which has been marked by struggles and paradoxes. Reviewing the history of the Egyptian media system shows that three elements have influenced the evolution of the country’s media system. These include the geo-political position that made possible an early contact to the colonial French expedition which introduced the print press technologies and the restrictive political role of all subsequent rulers, whether foreign or Egyptian, in regulating and shaping possible media outlets as well as Egypt’s close connections to the evolution of global communication technologies. The political and legal framework has been dominated by mainly illiberal phases, with brief intermittent phases of liberalization that led to short-lived flourished media landscapes. The state engages in methods that apply legal authoritarianism to convey an impression of observing the rule of law, while in fact restricting freedoms and, in addition, controlling the political economy through indirect state capitalism, where media ownership stays within the state or the loyalist business elite, in particularly the popular audio-visual media. Amid the global journalism crisis, Egypt’s media system struggles for its financial survival, professional quality and recognition among young generations. Experts speak openly of “death of journalism”. Investments in the media are not on the current political agenda. On the contrary, they are viewed by the rulers as adversaries. Instead of making them powerful, the current credo is to weaken the media, as their loyalty and public influence are not guaranteed. The serious economic crisis and the lack of public credibility in media institutions only make struggles for professional independence harder. Coupled with brain drain trends and self-exile of oppositional journalists, forces to renew the profession seem to be distant under current circumstances. The article takes a nuanced position in the debate on the liberalizing role of the media in relation to the Arab Spring debate. The relevance of new digital media in Egypt had increased in the past 15 years. Many scholars and commentators attribute the Tahrir Revolution in 2011 directly to the rise of the Internet, as it was widely called Facebook Revolution. However, the article maintains that this is a simplified view of the events and interactions between media, politics and the online sphere. While the semi-liberal phase in the mid-2000s and the new technologies led to a vibrant blogosphere and opened up online spaces for otherwise marginalized voices, it took real grievances and real activism on the ground that interacted together. Since 2015, there are increasing signs of controlling the Internet: zero toleration policies towards dissent and criticism have marked the years through increased police control and imprisoning journalists, as well as takeover of all semi-independent media outlets and use of online surveillance technologies. Currently, more than 500 websites and news media are banned within Egypt. Therefore, despite growing numbers of Internet users and high Facebook penetration we cannot expect a simple linear mobilization effect. On the contrary, a strong backlash awaits any attempts for challenging the current regime. Situated within the persistent socio-economic problems that caused the Tahrir Revolution in the first place, the political system fears a potential opening of the media system and attempts at keeping a fragile stabilization at any cost. Clinging to the national security concerns and harboring stability at any cost, encouraged by the current global rise of right-wing authoritarianism, suspends any pressures towards reforms as previous US governments pursued. In addition to the restrictions, the professional media scene faces numerous crises: one of which is the erosion of the economic viability of media in times of a massive journalism crisis. Another crisis is the declining professionalism and reproduction of loyalist and propagandistic practices due to self-censorship and clientelist practices within a highly restrictive environment. These developments fragment the professional community of journalists across numerous political camps and weakens unionizing efforts. Finally, the audiences are increasingly pushed away from politics. Based on the analysis and challenges, the Egyptian media are heading into the unknown: “death of journalism”, extreme depoliticization of the public sphere and restrictive media environment weaken the media system. Under the current circumstances—and unlike former President Mubarak’s policies—no politician will push for progress and investments in the media sector. The Supreme Media Regulatory Council announced an ambitious digitization plan of the media; no clear agenda is seen, except tightening control and advancing loyalist media. In the current globally interconnected world, this is a serious challenge for the power holders. The current weakened and stifled media system has many potentials if given the chance to grow autonomously: a strong legacy, unused economic assets, talented journalists and a big market. These unused resources for now make it unlikely for Egypt’s media system to witness another golden time soon. Having said that, the situation is extremely unpredictable on the mid- to long term. Therefore, in case of a political opening, whether through reforms from above or a system forced to respond by a renewed public upheaval, potential for transformation is there, if given the necessary freedoms of expression.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Egypt</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Authoritarian media system</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Media freedom</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">“Arab Spring”</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Publizistik</subfield><subfield code="d">Wiesbaden : VS Verl. für Sozialwiss., 2000</subfield><subfield code="g">65(2019), 1 vom: 19. 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Egypt’s media system: historic legacies and blocked potentials for independent media

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