Causal Truthmaking

Abstract This paper provides an outline of a theory of causal truthmaking according to which contingent truths are made true by causal facts and dispositional mechanisms. These facts and mechanisms serve to account for the truth of propositions by explaining in a non-epistemic fashion why they have...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Stenwall, Robin [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2010

Schlagwörter:	Truthmaking Causation Probability Explanation Negative truth

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Metaphysica - Berlin : de Gruyter, 1999, 11(2010), 2 vom: 07. Aug., Seite 211-222
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:11 ; year:2010 ; number:2 ; day:07 ; month:08 ; pages:211-222

Links:	Volltext

DOI / URN:	10.1007/s12133-010-0069-8

Katalog-ID:	SPR024441619

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allfields	10.1007/s12133-010-0069-8 doi (DE-627)SPR024441619 (SPR)s12133-010-0069-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE 08.31 bkl Stenwall, Robin verfasserin aut Causal Truthmaking 2010 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract This paper provides an outline of a theory of causal truthmaking according to which contingent truths are made true by causal facts and dispositional mechanisms. These facts and mechanisms serve to account for the truth of propositions by explaining in a non-epistemic fashion why they have come about as truths. Given that negative causation is allowed for, we are able to provide truthmakers for negative truths without making appeal to negative facts, lacks or absences. The paper takes its starting point in the following claims by George Molnar: (1) the world is everything that exists; (2) everything that exists is positive; (3) some negative claims about the world are true; and (4) every true claim about the world is made true by something that exists. The conclusion is reached that we can keep (1–4) in a consistent manner if causal truthmaking is permitted. Truthmaking (dpeaa)DE-He213 Causation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Probability (dpeaa)DE-He213 Explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Negative truth (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Metaphysica Berlin : de Gruyter, 1999 11(2010), 2 vom: 07. Aug., Seite 211-222 (DE-627)550218203 (DE-600)2396831-X 1874-6373 nnns volume:11 year:2010 number:2 day:07 month:08 pages:211-222 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0069-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4338 08.31 ASE AR 11 2010 2 07 08 211-222
spelling	10.1007/s12133-010-0069-8 doi (DE-627)SPR024441619 (SPR)s12133-010-0069-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE 08.31 bkl Stenwall, Robin verfasserin aut Causal Truthmaking 2010 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract This paper provides an outline of a theory of causal truthmaking according to which contingent truths are made true by causal facts and dispositional mechanisms. These facts and mechanisms serve to account for the truth of propositions by explaining in a non-epistemic fashion why they have come about as truths. Given that negative causation is allowed for, we are able to provide truthmakers for negative truths without making appeal to negative facts, lacks or absences. The paper takes its starting point in the following claims by George Molnar: (1) the world is everything that exists; (2) everything that exists is positive; (3) some negative claims about the world are true; and (4) every true claim about the world is made true by something that exists. The conclusion is reached that we can keep (1–4) in a consistent manner if causal truthmaking is permitted. Truthmaking (dpeaa)DE-He213 Causation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Probability (dpeaa)DE-He213 Explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Negative truth (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Metaphysica Berlin : de Gruyter, 1999 11(2010), 2 vom: 07. Aug., Seite 211-222 (DE-627)550218203 (DE-600)2396831-X 1874-6373 nnns volume:11 year:2010 number:2 day:07 month:08 pages:211-222 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0069-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4338 08.31 ASE AR 11 2010 2 07 08 211-222
allfields_unstemmed	10.1007/s12133-010-0069-8 doi (DE-627)SPR024441619 (SPR)s12133-010-0069-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE 08.31 bkl Stenwall, Robin verfasserin aut Causal Truthmaking 2010 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract This paper provides an outline of a theory of causal truthmaking according to which contingent truths are made true by causal facts and dispositional mechanisms. These facts and mechanisms serve to account for the truth of propositions by explaining in a non-epistemic fashion why they have come about as truths. Given that negative causation is allowed for, we are able to provide truthmakers for negative truths without making appeal to negative facts, lacks or absences. The paper takes its starting point in the following claims by George Molnar: (1) the world is everything that exists; (2) everything that exists is positive; (3) some negative claims about the world are true; and (4) every true claim about the world is made true by something that exists. The conclusion is reached that we can keep (1–4) in a consistent manner if causal truthmaking is permitted. Truthmaking (dpeaa)DE-He213 Causation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Probability (dpeaa)DE-He213 Explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Negative truth (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Metaphysica Berlin : de Gruyter, 1999 11(2010), 2 vom: 07. Aug., Seite 211-222 (DE-627)550218203 (DE-600)2396831-X 1874-6373 nnns volume:11 year:2010 number:2 day:07 month:08 pages:211-222 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0069-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4338 08.31 ASE AR 11 2010 2 07 08 211-222
allfieldsGer	10.1007/s12133-010-0069-8 doi (DE-627)SPR024441619 (SPR)s12133-010-0069-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE 08.31 bkl Stenwall, Robin verfasserin aut Causal Truthmaking 2010 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract This paper provides an outline of a theory of causal truthmaking according to which contingent truths are made true by causal facts and dispositional mechanisms. These facts and mechanisms serve to account for the truth of propositions by explaining in a non-epistemic fashion why they have come about as truths. Given that negative causation is allowed for, we are able to provide truthmakers for negative truths without making appeal to negative facts, lacks or absences. The paper takes its starting point in the following claims by George Molnar: (1) the world is everything that exists; (2) everything that exists is positive; (3) some negative claims about the world are true; and (4) every true claim about the world is made true by something that exists. The conclusion is reached that we can keep (1–4) in a consistent manner if causal truthmaking is permitted. Truthmaking (dpeaa)DE-He213 Causation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Probability (dpeaa)DE-He213 Explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Negative truth (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Metaphysica Berlin : de Gruyter, 1999 11(2010), 2 vom: 07. Aug., Seite 211-222 (DE-627)550218203 (DE-600)2396831-X 1874-6373 nnns volume:11 year:2010 number:2 day:07 month:08 pages:211-222 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0069-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4338 08.31 ASE AR 11 2010 2 07 08 211-222
allfieldsSound	10.1007/s12133-010-0069-8 doi (DE-627)SPR024441619 (SPR)s12133-010-0069-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE 08.31 bkl Stenwall, Robin verfasserin aut Causal Truthmaking 2010 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract This paper provides an outline of a theory of causal truthmaking according to which contingent truths are made true by causal facts and dispositional mechanisms. These facts and mechanisms serve to account for the truth of propositions by explaining in a non-epistemic fashion why they have come about as truths. Given that negative causation is allowed for, we are able to provide truthmakers for negative truths without making appeal to negative facts, lacks or absences. The paper takes its starting point in the following claims by George Molnar: (1) the world is everything that exists; (2) everything that exists is positive; (3) some negative claims about the world are true; and (4) every true claim about the world is made true by something that exists. The conclusion is reached that we can keep (1–4) in a consistent manner if causal truthmaking is permitted. Truthmaking (dpeaa)DE-He213 Causation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Probability (dpeaa)DE-He213 Explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Negative truth (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Metaphysica Berlin : de Gruyter, 1999 11(2010), 2 vom: 07. Aug., Seite 211-222 (DE-627)550218203 (DE-600)2396831-X 1874-6373 nnns volume:11 year:2010 number:2 day:07 month:08 pages:211-222 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0069-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4338 08.31 ASE AR 11 2010 2 07 08 211-222
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source	Enthalten in Metaphysica 11(2010), 2 vom: 07. Aug., Seite 211-222 volume:11 year:2010 number:2 day:07 month:08 pages:211-222
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title	Causal Truthmaking
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title_full	Causal Truthmaking
author_sort	Stenwall, Robin
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title_sort	causal truthmaking
title_auth	Causal Truthmaking
abstract	Abstract This paper provides an outline of a theory of causal truthmaking according to which contingent truths are made true by causal facts and dispositional mechanisms. These facts and mechanisms serve to account for the truth of propositions by explaining in a non-epistemic fashion why they have come about as truths. Given that negative causation is allowed for, we are able to provide truthmakers for negative truths without making appeal to negative facts, lacks or absences. The paper takes its starting point in the following claims by George Molnar: (1) the world is everything that exists; (2) everything that exists is positive; (3) some negative claims about the world are true; and (4) every true claim about the world is made true by something that exists. The conclusion is reached that we can keep (1–4) in a consistent manner if causal truthmaking is permitted.
abstractGer	Abstract This paper provides an outline of a theory of causal truthmaking according to which contingent truths are made true by causal facts and dispositional mechanisms. These facts and mechanisms serve to account for the truth of propositions by explaining in a non-epistemic fashion why they have come about as truths. Given that negative causation is allowed for, we are able to provide truthmakers for negative truths without making appeal to negative facts, lacks or absences. The paper takes its starting point in the following claims by George Molnar: (1) the world is everything that exists; (2) everything that exists is positive; (3) some negative claims about the world are true; and (4) every true claim about the world is made true by something that exists. The conclusion is reached that we can keep (1–4) in a consistent manner if causal truthmaking is permitted.
abstract_unstemmed	Abstract This paper provides an outline of a theory of causal truthmaking according to which contingent truths are made true by causal facts and dispositional mechanisms. These facts and mechanisms serve to account for the truth of propositions by explaining in a non-epistemic fashion why they have come about as truths. Given that negative causation is allowed for, we are able to provide truthmakers for negative truths without making appeal to negative facts, lacks or absences. The paper takes its starting point in the following claims by George Molnar: (1) the world is everything that exists; (2) everything that exists is positive; (3) some negative claims about the world are true; and (4) every true claim about the world is made true by something that exists. The conclusion is reached that we can keep (1–4) in a consistent manner if causal truthmaking is permitted.
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title_short	Causal Truthmaking
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