Explanation in Metaphysics?
Abstract Arguments from explanation, i.e. arguments in which the explanatory value of a hypothesis or premise is appealed to, are common in science, and explanatory considerations are becoming more popular in metaphysics. The paper begins by arguing that explanatory arguments in science—even when th...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Persson, Johannes [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2011 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Metaphysica - Berlin : de Gruyter, 1999, 12(2011), 2 vom: 08. Sept. |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:12 ; year:2011 ; number:2 ; day:08 ; month:09 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s12133-011-0084-4 |
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| Katalog-ID: |
SPR024441783 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Arguments from explanation, i.e. arguments in which the explanatory value of a hypothesis or premise is appealed to, are common in science, and explanatory considerations are becoming more popular in metaphysics. The paper begins by arguing that explanatory arguments in science—even when these are metaphysical explanations—may fail to be explanatory in metaphysics; there is a distinction to be drawn between metaphysical explanation and explanation in metaphysics. This makes it potentially problematic to deploy arguments from explanation in, for instance, metaphysics of science. Part of this problem has its source in that the explanatory concept differs between contexts. The paper discusses a few explanatory concepts and their corresponding arguments from explanation. Towards the end of the paper, I identify two allegedly explanatory arguments in metaphysical discourse by the concluding decisions they give rise to: the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X does not explain anything (the argument from explanatory inability) and the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X can be non-metaphysically explained (the argument from the non-metaphysically explained). I ask: What kind of concept of explanation do these arguments rely upon, and is that concept suited to the metaphysical task? Two recent examples of these arguments are used as illustration. The preliminary conclusion is that several of the strengths of arguments from explanation in science seem not to be present in metaphysical contexts. | ||
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10.1007/s12133-011-0084-4 doi (DE-627)SPR024441783 (SPR)s12133-011-0084-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE 08.31 bkl Persson, Johannes verfasserin aut Explanation in Metaphysics? 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Arguments from explanation, i.e. arguments in which the explanatory value of a hypothesis or premise is appealed to, are common in science, and explanatory considerations are becoming more popular in metaphysics. The paper begins by arguing that explanatory arguments in science—even when these are metaphysical explanations—may fail to be explanatory in metaphysics; there is a distinction to be drawn between metaphysical explanation and explanation in metaphysics. This makes it potentially problematic to deploy arguments from explanation in, for instance, metaphysics of science. Part of this problem has its source in that the explanatory concept differs between contexts. The paper discusses a few explanatory concepts and their corresponding arguments from explanation. Towards the end of the paper, I identify two allegedly explanatory arguments in metaphysical discourse by the concluding decisions they give rise to: the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X does not explain anything (the argument from explanatory inability) and the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X can be non-metaphysically explained (the argument from the non-metaphysically explained). I ask: What kind of concept of explanation do these arguments rely upon, and is that concept suited to the metaphysical task? Two recent examples of these arguments are used as illustration. The preliminary conclusion is that several of the strengths of arguments from explanation in science seem not to be present in metaphysical contexts. Metaphysical explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Scientific explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Explanation in metaphysics (dpeaa)DE-He213 Laws of nature (dpeaa)DE-He213 Causation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Metaphysica Berlin : de Gruyter, 1999 12(2011), 2 vom: 08. Sept. (DE-627)550218203 (DE-600)2396831-X 1874-6373 nnns volume:12 year:2011 number:2 day:08 month:09 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-011-0084-4 kostenfrei Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4338 08.31 ASE AR 12 2011 2 08 09 |
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10.1007/s12133-011-0084-4 doi (DE-627)SPR024441783 (SPR)s12133-011-0084-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE 08.31 bkl Persson, Johannes verfasserin aut Explanation in Metaphysics? 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Arguments from explanation, i.e. arguments in which the explanatory value of a hypothesis or premise is appealed to, are common in science, and explanatory considerations are becoming more popular in metaphysics. The paper begins by arguing that explanatory arguments in science—even when these are metaphysical explanations—may fail to be explanatory in metaphysics; there is a distinction to be drawn between metaphysical explanation and explanation in metaphysics. This makes it potentially problematic to deploy arguments from explanation in, for instance, metaphysics of science. Part of this problem has its source in that the explanatory concept differs between contexts. The paper discusses a few explanatory concepts and their corresponding arguments from explanation. Towards the end of the paper, I identify two allegedly explanatory arguments in metaphysical discourse by the concluding decisions they give rise to: the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X does not explain anything (the argument from explanatory inability) and the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X can be non-metaphysically explained (the argument from the non-metaphysically explained). I ask: What kind of concept of explanation do these arguments rely upon, and is that concept suited to the metaphysical task? Two recent examples of these arguments are used as illustration. The preliminary conclusion is that several of the strengths of arguments from explanation in science seem not to be present in metaphysical contexts. Metaphysical explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Scientific explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Explanation in metaphysics (dpeaa)DE-He213 Laws of nature (dpeaa)DE-He213 Causation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Metaphysica Berlin : de Gruyter, 1999 12(2011), 2 vom: 08. Sept. (DE-627)550218203 (DE-600)2396831-X 1874-6373 nnns volume:12 year:2011 number:2 day:08 month:09 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-011-0084-4 kostenfrei Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4338 08.31 ASE AR 12 2011 2 08 09 |
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10.1007/s12133-011-0084-4 doi (DE-627)SPR024441783 (SPR)s12133-011-0084-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE 08.31 bkl Persson, Johannes verfasserin aut Explanation in Metaphysics? 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Arguments from explanation, i.e. arguments in which the explanatory value of a hypothesis or premise is appealed to, are common in science, and explanatory considerations are becoming more popular in metaphysics. The paper begins by arguing that explanatory arguments in science—even when these are metaphysical explanations—may fail to be explanatory in metaphysics; there is a distinction to be drawn between metaphysical explanation and explanation in metaphysics. This makes it potentially problematic to deploy arguments from explanation in, for instance, metaphysics of science. Part of this problem has its source in that the explanatory concept differs between contexts. The paper discusses a few explanatory concepts and their corresponding arguments from explanation. Towards the end of the paper, I identify two allegedly explanatory arguments in metaphysical discourse by the concluding decisions they give rise to: the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X does not explain anything (the argument from explanatory inability) and the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X can be non-metaphysically explained (the argument from the non-metaphysically explained). I ask: What kind of concept of explanation do these arguments rely upon, and is that concept suited to the metaphysical task? Two recent examples of these arguments are used as illustration. The preliminary conclusion is that several of the strengths of arguments from explanation in science seem not to be present in metaphysical contexts. Metaphysical explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Scientific explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Explanation in metaphysics (dpeaa)DE-He213 Laws of nature (dpeaa)DE-He213 Causation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Metaphysica Berlin : de Gruyter, 1999 12(2011), 2 vom: 08. Sept. (DE-627)550218203 (DE-600)2396831-X 1874-6373 nnns volume:12 year:2011 number:2 day:08 month:09 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-011-0084-4 kostenfrei Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4338 08.31 ASE AR 12 2011 2 08 09 |
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10.1007/s12133-011-0084-4 doi (DE-627)SPR024441783 (SPR)s12133-011-0084-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE 08.31 bkl Persson, Johannes verfasserin aut Explanation in Metaphysics? 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Arguments from explanation, i.e. arguments in which the explanatory value of a hypothesis or premise is appealed to, are common in science, and explanatory considerations are becoming more popular in metaphysics. The paper begins by arguing that explanatory arguments in science—even when these are metaphysical explanations—may fail to be explanatory in metaphysics; there is a distinction to be drawn between metaphysical explanation and explanation in metaphysics. This makes it potentially problematic to deploy arguments from explanation in, for instance, metaphysics of science. Part of this problem has its source in that the explanatory concept differs between contexts. The paper discusses a few explanatory concepts and their corresponding arguments from explanation. Towards the end of the paper, I identify two allegedly explanatory arguments in metaphysical discourse by the concluding decisions they give rise to: the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X does not explain anything (the argument from explanatory inability) and the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X can be non-metaphysically explained (the argument from the non-metaphysically explained). I ask: What kind of concept of explanation do these arguments rely upon, and is that concept suited to the metaphysical task? Two recent examples of these arguments are used as illustration. The preliminary conclusion is that several of the strengths of arguments from explanation in science seem not to be present in metaphysical contexts. Metaphysical explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Scientific explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Explanation in metaphysics (dpeaa)DE-He213 Laws of nature (dpeaa)DE-He213 Causation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Metaphysica Berlin : de Gruyter, 1999 12(2011), 2 vom: 08. Sept. (DE-627)550218203 (DE-600)2396831-X 1874-6373 nnns volume:12 year:2011 number:2 day:08 month:09 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-011-0084-4 kostenfrei Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4338 08.31 ASE AR 12 2011 2 08 09 |
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10.1007/s12133-011-0084-4 doi (DE-627)SPR024441783 (SPR)s12133-011-0084-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 100 ASE 08.31 bkl Persson, Johannes verfasserin aut Explanation in Metaphysics? 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Arguments from explanation, i.e. arguments in which the explanatory value of a hypothesis or premise is appealed to, are common in science, and explanatory considerations are becoming more popular in metaphysics. The paper begins by arguing that explanatory arguments in science—even when these are metaphysical explanations—may fail to be explanatory in metaphysics; there is a distinction to be drawn between metaphysical explanation and explanation in metaphysics. This makes it potentially problematic to deploy arguments from explanation in, for instance, metaphysics of science. Part of this problem has its source in that the explanatory concept differs between contexts. The paper discusses a few explanatory concepts and their corresponding arguments from explanation. Towards the end of the paper, I identify two allegedly explanatory arguments in metaphysical discourse by the concluding decisions they give rise to: the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X does not explain anything (the argument from explanatory inability) and the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X can be non-metaphysically explained (the argument from the non-metaphysically explained). I ask: What kind of concept of explanation do these arguments rely upon, and is that concept suited to the metaphysical task? Two recent examples of these arguments are used as illustration. The preliminary conclusion is that several of the strengths of arguments from explanation in science seem not to be present in metaphysical contexts. Metaphysical explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Scientific explanation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Explanation in metaphysics (dpeaa)DE-He213 Laws of nature (dpeaa)DE-He213 Causation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Metaphysica Berlin : de Gruyter, 1999 12(2011), 2 vom: 08. Sept. (DE-627)550218203 (DE-600)2396831-X 1874-6373 nnns volume:12 year:2011 number:2 day:08 month:09 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-011-0084-4 kostenfrei Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4338 08.31 ASE AR 12 2011 2 08 09 |
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Abstract Arguments from explanation, i.e. arguments in which the explanatory value of a hypothesis or premise is appealed to, are common in science, and explanatory considerations are becoming more popular in metaphysics. The paper begins by arguing that explanatory arguments in science—even when these are metaphysical explanations—may fail to be explanatory in metaphysics; there is a distinction to be drawn between metaphysical explanation and explanation in metaphysics. This makes it potentially problematic to deploy arguments from explanation in, for instance, metaphysics of science. Part of this problem has its source in that the explanatory concept differs between contexts. The paper discusses a few explanatory concepts and their corresponding arguments from explanation. Towards the end of the paper, I identify two allegedly explanatory arguments in metaphysical discourse by the concluding decisions they give rise to: the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X does not explain anything (the argument from explanatory inability) and the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X can be non-metaphysically explained (the argument from the non-metaphysically explained). I ask: What kind of concept of explanation do these arguments rely upon, and is that concept suited to the metaphysical task? Two recent examples of these arguments are used as illustration. The preliminary conclusion is that several of the strengths of arguments from explanation in science seem not to be present in metaphysical contexts. |
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Abstract Arguments from explanation, i.e. arguments in which the explanatory value of a hypothesis or premise is appealed to, are common in science, and explanatory considerations are becoming more popular in metaphysics. The paper begins by arguing that explanatory arguments in science—even when these are metaphysical explanations—may fail to be explanatory in metaphysics; there is a distinction to be drawn between metaphysical explanation and explanation in metaphysics. This makes it potentially problematic to deploy arguments from explanation in, for instance, metaphysics of science. Part of this problem has its source in that the explanatory concept differs between contexts. The paper discusses a few explanatory concepts and their corresponding arguments from explanation. Towards the end of the paper, I identify two allegedly explanatory arguments in metaphysical discourse by the concluding decisions they give rise to: the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X does not explain anything (the argument from explanatory inability) and the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X can be non-metaphysically explained (the argument from the non-metaphysically explained). I ask: What kind of concept of explanation do these arguments rely upon, and is that concept suited to the metaphysical task? Two recent examples of these arguments are used as illustration. The preliminary conclusion is that several of the strengths of arguments from explanation in science seem not to be present in metaphysical contexts. |
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Abstract Arguments from explanation, i.e. arguments in which the explanatory value of a hypothesis or premise is appealed to, are common in science, and explanatory considerations are becoming more popular in metaphysics. The paper begins by arguing that explanatory arguments in science—even when these are metaphysical explanations—may fail to be explanatory in metaphysics; there is a distinction to be drawn between metaphysical explanation and explanation in metaphysics. This makes it potentially problematic to deploy arguments from explanation in, for instance, metaphysics of science. Part of this problem has its source in that the explanatory concept differs between contexts. The paper discusses a few explanatory concepts and their corresponding arguments from explanation. Towards the end of the paper, I identify two allegedly explanatory arguments in metaphysical discourse by the concluding decisions they give rise to: the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X does not explain anything (the argument from explanatory inability) and the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X can be non-metaphysically explained (the argument from the non-metaphysically explained). I ask: What kind of concept of explanation do these arguments rely upon, and is that concept suited to the metaphysical task? Two recent examples of these arguments are used as illustration. The preliminary conclusion is that several of the strengths of arguments from explanation in science seem not to be present in metaphysical contexts. |
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