In Defence of the Sensible Theory of Indeterminacy

Abstract Can the world itself be vague, so that rather than vagueness be a deficiency in our mode of describing the world, it is a necessary feature of any true description of it? Gareth Evans famously poses this question in his paper ‘Can There Be Vague Objects’ (Analysis 38(4):208, 1978). In his r...
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Autor*in:	Noonan, Harold W. [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2013

Schlagwörter:	Vagueness Indeterminacy Identity Existence

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Metaphysica - Berlin : de Gruyter, 1999, 14(2013), 2 vom: 30. Apr., Seite 239-252
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:14 ; year:2013 ; number:2 ; day:30 ; month:04 ; pages:239-252

Links:	Volltext

DOI / URN:	10.1007/s12133-013-0124-3

Katalog-ID:	SPR024442216

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author_browse	Noonan, Harold W.
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title_sort	in defence of the sensible theory of indeterminacy
title_auth	In Defence of the Sensible Theory of Indeterminacy
abstract	Abstract Can the world itself be vague, so that rather than vagueness be a deficiency in our mode of describing the world, it is a necessary feature of any true description of it? Gareth Evans famously poses this question in his paper ‘Can There Be Vague Objects’ (Analysis 38(4):208, 1978). In his recent paper ‘Indeterminacy and Vagueness: Logic and Metaphysics’, Peter van Inwagen (2009) elaborates the account of vagueness and, in particular, in the case of sentences, consequent indeterminacy in truth value, to which this conception of ‘worldly’ vagueness is opposed, calling it the ‘sensible’ theory of indeterminacy and rejecting it. In what follows, I defend the sensible theory van Inwagen rejects. I first explain more fully what it involves and, as importantly, what it does not.
abstractGer	Abstract Can the world itself be vague, so that rather than vagueness be a deficiency in our mode of describing the world, it is a necessary feature of any true description of it? Gareth Evans famously poses this question in his paper ‘Can There Be Vague Objects’ (Analysis 38(4):208, 1978). In his recent paper ‘Indeterminacy and Vagueness: Logic and Metaphysics’, Peter van Inwagen (2009) elaborates the account of vagueness and, in particular, in the case of sentences, consequent indeterminacy in truth value, to which this conception of ‘worldly’ vagueness is opposed, calling it the ‘sensible’ theory of indeterminacy and rejecting it. In what follows, I defend the sensible theory van Inwagen rejects. I first explain more fully what it involves and, as importantly, what it does not.
abstract_unstemmed	Abstract Can the world itself be vague, so that rather than vagueness be a deficiency in our mode of describing the world, it is a necessary feature of any true description of it? Gareth Evans famously poses this question in his paper ‘Can There Be Vague Objects’ (Analysis 38(4):208, 1978). In his recent paper ‘Indeterminacy and Vagueness: Logic and Metaphysics’, Peter van Inwagen (2009) elaborates the account of vagueness and, in particular, in the case of sentences, consequent indeterminacy in truth value, to which this conception of ‘worldly’ vagueness is opposed, calling it the ‘sensible’ theory of indeterminacy and rejecting it. In what follows, I defend the sensible theory van Inwagen rejects. I first explain more fully what it involves and, as importantly, what it does not.
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title_short	In Defence of the Sensible Theory of Indeterminacy
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