The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy
Abstract Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of suc...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Goodwin, Geoffrey P. [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2009 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: The review of philosophy and psychology - Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2010, 1(2009), 2 vom: 17. Dez., Seite 161-188 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:1 ; year:2009 ; number:2 ; day:17 ; month:12 ; pages:161-188 |
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10.1007/s13164-009-0013-4 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively unexplored, and we argue that it merits more attention. We review recent psychological evidence which demonstrates that individuals differ in the extent to which they perceive ethical beliefs to be objective, that some ethical beliefs are perceived to be more objective than others, and that both these sources of variance are somewhat systematic. This evidence also shows that differences in perceptions of objectivity underpin quite different psychological reactions to ethical disagreement. Apart from reviewing this evidence, our aim in this paper is to draw attention to unanswered psychological questions about moral objectivity, and to discuss the relevance of moral objectivity to two issues of public policy. | ||
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10.1007/s13164-009-0013-4 doi (DE-627)SPR030715288 (SPR)s13164-009-0013-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Goodwin, Geoffrey P. verfasserin aut The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy 2009 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively unexplored, and we argue that it merits more attention. We review recent psychological evidence which demonstrates that individuals differ in the extent to which they perceive ethical beliefs to be objective, that some ethical beliefs are perceived to be more objective than others, and that both these sources of variance are somewhat systematic. This evidence also shows that differences in perceptions of objectivity underpin quite different psychological reactions to ethical disagreement. Apart from reviewing this evidence, our aim in this paper is to draw attention to unanswered psychological questions about moral objectivity, and to discuss the relevance of moral objectivity to two issues of public policy. Moral Judgment (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Belief (dpeaa)DE-He213 Vote Behavior (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Emotion (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Intuition (dpeaa)DE-He213 Darley, John M. aut Enthalten in The review of philosophy and psychology Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2010 1(2009), 2 vom: 17. Dez., Seite 161-188 (DE-627)620146826 (DE-600)2541851-8 1878-5166 nnns volume:1 year:2009 number:2 day:17 month:12 pages:161-188 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-009-0013-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER AR 1 2009 2 17 12 161-188 |
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10.1007/s13164-009-0013-4 doi (DE-627)SPR030715288 (SPR)s13164-009-0013-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Goodwin, Geoffrey P. verfasserin aut The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy 2009 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively unexplored, and we argue that it merits more attention. We review recent psychological evidence which demonstrates that individuals differ in the extent to which they perceive ethical beliefs to be objective, that some ethical beliefs are perceived to be more objective than others, and that both these sources of variance are somewhat systematic. This evidence also shows that differences in perceptions of objectivity underpin quite different psychological reactions to ethical disagreement. Apart from reviewing this evidence, our aim in this paper is to draw attention to unanswered psychological questions about moral objectivity, and to discuss the relevance of moral objectivity to two issues of public policy. Moral Judgment (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Belief (dpeaa)DE-He213 Vote Behavior (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Emotion (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Intuition (dpeaa)DE-He213 Darley, John M. aut Enthalten in The review of philosophy and psychology Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2010 1(2009), 2 vom: 17. Dez., Seite 161-188 (DE-627)620146826 (DE-600)2541851-8 1878-5166 nnns volume:1 year:2009 number:2 day:17 month:12 pages:161-188 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-009-0013-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER AR 1 2009 2 17 12 161-188 |
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10.1007/s13164-009-0013-4 doi (DE-627)SPR030715288 (SPR)s13164-009-0013-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Goodwin, Geoffrey P. verfasserin aut The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy 2009 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively unexplored, and we argue that it merits more attention. We review recent psychological evidence which demonstrates that individuals differ in the extent to which they perceive ethical beliefs to be objective, that some ethical beliefs are perceived to be more objective than others, and that both these sources of variance are somewhat systematic. This evidence also shows that differences in perceptions of objectivity underpin quite different psychological reactions to ethical disagreement. Apart from reviewing this evidence, our aim in this paper is to draw attention to unanswered psychological questions about moral objectivity, and to discuss the relevance of moral objectivity to two issues of public policy. Moral Judgment (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Belief (dpeaa)DE-He213 Vote Behavior (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Emotion (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Intuition (dpeaa)DE-He213 Darley, John M. aut Enthalten in The review of philosophy and psychology Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2010 1(2009), 2 vom: 17. Dez., Seite 161-188 (DE-627)620146826 (DE-600)2541851-8 1878-5166 nnns volume:1 year:2009 number:2 day:17 month:12 pages:161-188 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-009-0013-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER AR 1 2009 2 17 12 161-188 |
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10.1007/s13164-009-0013-4 doi (DE-627)SPR030715288 (SPR)s13164-009-0013-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Goodwin, Geoffrey P. verfasserin aut The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy 2009 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively unexplored, and we argue that it merits more attention. We review recent psychological evidence which demonstrates that individuals differ in the extent to which they perceive ethical beliefs to be objective, that some ethical beliefs are perceived to be more objective than others, and that both these sources of variance are somewhat systematic. This evidence also shows that differences in perceptions of objectivity underpin quite different psychological reactions to ethical disagreement. Apart from reviewing this evidence, our aim in this paper is to draw attention to unanswered psychological questions about moral objectivity, and to discuss the relevance of moral objectivity to two issues of public policy. Moral Judgment (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Belief (dpeaa)DE-He213 Vote Behavior (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Emotion (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Intuition (dpeaa)DE-He213 Darley, John M. aut Enthalten in The review of philosophy and psychology Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2010 1(2009), 2 vom: 17. Dez., Seite 161-188 (DE-627)620146826 (DE-600)2541851-8 1878-5166 nnns volume:1 year:2009 number:2 day:17 month:12 pages:161-188 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-009-0013-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER AR 1 2009 2 17 12 161-188 |
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10.1007/s13164-009-0013-4 doi (DE-627)SPR030715288 (SPR)s13164-009-0013-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Goodwin, Geoffrey P. verfasserin aut The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy 2009 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively unexplored, and we argue that it merits more attention. We review recent psychological evidence which demonstrates that individuals differ in the extent to which they perceive ethical beliefs to be objective, that some ethical beliefs are perceived to be more objective than others, and that both these sources of variance are somewhat systematic. This evidence also shows that differences in perceptions of objectivity underpin quite different psychological reactions to ethical disagreement. Apart from reviewing this evidence, our aim in this paper is to draw attention to unanswered psychological questions about moral objectivity, and to discuss the relevance of moral objectivity to two issues of public policy. Moral Judgment (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Belief (dpeaa)DE-He213 Vote Behavior (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Emotion (dpeaa)DE-He213 Moral Intuition (dpeaa)DE-He213 Darley, John M. aut Enthalten in The review of philosophy and psychology Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2010 1(2009), 2 vom: 17. Dez., Seite 161-188 (DE-627)620146826 (DE-600)2541851-8 1878-5166 nnns volume:1 year:2009 number:2 day:17 month:12 pages:161-188 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-009-0013-4 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER AR 1 2009 2 17 12 161-188 |
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Abstract Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively unexplored, and we argue that it merits more attention. We review recent psychological evidence which demonstrates that individuals differ in the extent to which they perceive ethical beliefs to be objective, that some ethical beliefs are perceived to be more objective than others, and that both these sources of variance are somewhat systematic. This evidence also shows that differences in perceptions of objectivity underpin quite different psychological reactions to ethical disagreement. Apart from reviewing this evidence, our aim in this paper is to draw attention to unanswered psychological questions about moral objectivity, and to discuss the relevance of moral objectivity to two issues of public policy. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 |
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Abstract Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively unexplored, and we argue that it merits more attention. We review recent psychological evidence which demonstrates that individuals differ in the extent to which they perceive ethical beliefs to be objective, that some ethical beliefs are perceived to be more objective than others, and that both these sources of variance are somewhat systematic. This evidence also shows that differences in perceptions of objectivity underpin quite different psychological reactions to ethical disagreement. Apart from reviewing this evidence, our aim in this paper is to draw attention to unanswered psychological questions about moral objectivity, and to discuss the relevance of moral objectivity to two issues of public policy. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 |
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Abstract Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively unexplored, and we argue that it merits more attention. We review recent psychological evidence which demonstrates that individuals differ in the extent to which they perceive ethical beliefs to be objective, that some ethical beliefs are perceived to be more objective than others, and that both these sources of variance are somewhat systematic. This evidence also shows that differences in perceptions of objectivity underpin quite different psychological reactions to ethical disagreement. Apart from reviewing this evidence, our aim in this paper is to draw attention to unanswered psychological questions about moral objectivity, and to discuss the relevance of moral objectivity to two issues of public policy. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 |
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10.1007/s13164-009-0013-4 |
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2024-07-03T19:42:39.702Z |
| _version_ |
1803588216772624384 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">SPR030715288</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230331101500.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">201007s2009 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/s13164-009-0013-4</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)SPR030715288</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(SPR)s13164-009-0013-4-e</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Goodwin, Geoffrey P.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively unexplored, and we argue that it merits more attention. We review recent psychological evidence which demonstrates that individuals differ in the extent to which they perceive ethical beliefs to be objective, that some ethical beliefs are perceived to be more objective than others, and that both these sources of variance are somewhat systematic. This evidence also shows that differences in perceptions of objectivity underpin quite different psychological reactions to ethical disagreement. 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7.400872 |