Understanding does not depend on (causal) explanation
Abstract One can find in the literature two sets of views concerning the relationship between understanding and explanation: that one understands only if 1) one has knowledge of causes and 2) that knowledge is provided by an explanation. Taken together, these tenets characterize what I call the narr...
Full description
| Author: |
Verreault-Julien, Philippe [VerfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Electronic Article |
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| Language: |
English |
| Published: |
2019 |
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| Subjects: |
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| Containing Work: |
Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of science - Berlin : Springer, 2011, 9(2019), 2 vom: 04. Jan. |
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| Containing Work: |
volume:9 ; year:2019 ; number:2 ; day:04 ; month:01 |
| Links: |
Volltext [kostenfrei] |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s13194-018-0240-6 |
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| Catalog id: |
SPR03081037X |
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| 520 | |a Abstract One can find in the literature two sets of views concerning the relationship between understanding and explanation: that one understands only if 1) one has knowledge of causes and 2) that knowledge is provided by an explanation. Taken together, these tenets characterize what I call the narrow knowledge account of understanding (narrow KAU). While the first tenet has recently come under severe attack, the second has been more resistant to change. I argue that we have good reasons to reject it on the basis of theoretical models that provide how-possibly explanations. These models, while they do not explain in the strict (narrow KAU) sense, afford understanding. In response, I propose an alternative epistemology of understanding, broad KAU, that takes cases of theoretical modelling into account. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Understanding | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Explanation | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Non-causal | |
| 650 | 4 | |a How-possibly explanations | |
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