Is the Rate of Generic Drug Prescribing a Fair Measure for Pay for Performance?
Abstract Prescription drugs are a significant and rising component of healthcare costs. To limit this expenditure and maximize cost savings, half of the pay-for-performance health programs in the US reward generic drug prescribing once the patents on brand-name drugs expire. This article discusses a...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Buetow, Stephen [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2008 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Adis Data Information BV 2008 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Disease Management & Health Outcomes - Springer International Publishing, 1997, 16(2008), 6 vom: Juni, Seite 377-380 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:16 ; year:2008 ; number:6 ; month:06 ; pages:377-380 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.2165/0115677-200816060-00002 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract Prescription drugs are a significant and rising component of healthcare costs. To limit this expenditure and maximize cost savings, half of the pay-for-performance health programs in the US reward generic drug prescribing once the patents on brand-name drugs expire. This article discusses arguments for and against the rate of generic drug prescribing as a fair measure for pay for performance from both provider and patient perspectives. Compared with brand-name drugs, generic drugs are usually cheaper to purchase, can avoid confusion over different names for the same drug, minimize commercial influences from drug manufacturers, and can allow pharmacists to dispense any medicine that meets the necessary specifications. However, saving money may be a responsibility of governments and payers rather than providers. Some providers and patients are uneasy that financial incentives for generic prescribing may not directly aim to improve patient care and may motivate providers to put their own financial interests above the welfare of patients. It has not been proven that the financial incentives are large enough to change prescribing behavior or that generic drugs are less safe or less effective than their brand-name counterparts. However, there are legitimate concerns around bioequivalence standards, and some providers and patients object to attempts to compromise their autonomy. High-quality care requires not a rigid adherence to performance indicators but a careful and flexible balancing of provider and patient interests. A final concern is patient non-adherence or mistakes in adherence following a change to a generic drug. It is uncertain that pay for performance is the best way — or a fair way — to contain spiraling health costs. | ||
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10.2165/0115677-200816060-00002 doi (DE-627)SPR035657316 (SPR)0115677-200816060-00002-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Buetow, Stephen verfasserin aut Is the Rate of Generic Drug Prescribing a Fair Measure for Pay for Performance? 2008 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Adis Data Information BV 2008 Abstract Prescription drugs are a significant and rising component of healthcare costs. To limit this expenditure and maximize cost savings, half of the pay-for-performance health programs in the US reward generic drug prescribing once the patents on brand-name drugs expire. This article discusses arguments for and against the rate of generic drug prescribing as a fair measure for pay for performance from both provider and patient perspectives. Compared with brand-name drugs, generic drugs are usually cheaper to purchase, can avoid confusion over different names for the same drug, minimize commercial influences from drug manufacturers, and can allow pharmacists to dispense any medicine that meets the necessary specifications. However, saving money may be a responsibility of governments and payers rather than providers. Some providers and patients are uneasy that financial incentives for generic prescribing may not directly aim to improve patient care and may motivate providers to put their own financial interests above the welfare of patients. It has not been proven that the financial incentives are large enough to change prescribing behavior or that generic drugs are less safe or less effective than their brand-name counterparts. However, there are legitimate concerns around bioequivalence standards, and some providers and patients object to attempts to compromise their autonomy. High-quality care requires not a rigid adherence to performance indicators but a careful and flexible balancing of provider and patient interests. A final concern is patient non-adherence or mistakes in adherence following a change to a generic drug. It is uncertain that pay for performance is the best way — or a fair way — to contain spiraling health costs. Financial Incentive (dpeaa)DE-He213 Generic Drug (dpeaa)DE-He213 Generic Substitution (dpeaa)DE-He213 Generic Prescribe (dpeaa)DE-He213 Payment Bonus (dpeaa)DE-He213 Bryant, Linda aut Enthalten in Disease Management & Health Outcomes Springer International Publishing, 1997 16(2008), 6 vom: Juni, Seite 377-380 (DE-627)SPR035648813 nnns volume:16 year:2008 number:6 month:06 pages:377-380 https://dx.doi.org/10.2165/0115677-200816060-00002 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER SSG-OLC-PHA AR 16 2008 6 06 377-380 |
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10.2165/0115677-200816060-00002 doi (DE-627)SPR035657316 (SPR)0115677-200816060-00002-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Buetow, Stephen verfasserin aut Is the Rate of Generic Drug Prescribing a Fair Measure for Pay for Performance? 2008 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Adis Data Information BV 2008 Abstract Prescription drugs are a significant and rising component of healthcare costs. To limit this expenditure and maximize cost savings, half of the pay-for-performance health programs in the US reward generic drug prescribing once the patents on brand-name drugs expire. This article discusses arguments for and against the rate of generic drug prescribing as a fair measure for pay for performance from both provider and patient perspectives. Compared with brand-name drugs, generic drugs are usually cheaper to purchase, can avoid confusion over different names for the same drug, minimize commercial influences from drug manufacturers, and can allow pharmacists to dispense any medicine that meets the necessary specifications. However, saving money may be a responsibility of governments and payers rather than providers. Some providers and patients are uneasy that financial incentives for generic prescribing may not directly aim to improve patient care and may motivate providers to put their own financial interests above the welfare of patients. It has not been proven that the financial incentives are large enough to change prescribing behavior or that generic drugs are less safe or less effective than their brand-name counterparts. However, there are legitimate concerns around bioequivalence standards, and some providers and patients object to attempts to compromise their autonomy. High-quality care requires not a rigid adherence to performance indicators but a careful and flexible balancing of provider and patient interests. A final concern is patient non-adherence or mistakes in adherence following a change to a generic drug. It is uncertain that pay for performance is the best way — or a fair way — to contain spiraling health costs. Financial Incentive (dpeaa)DE-He213 Generic Drug (dpeaa)DE-He213 Generic Substitution (dpeaa)DE-He213 Generic Prescribe (dpeaa)DE-He213 Payment Bonus (dpeaa)DE-He213 Bryant, Linda aut Enthalten in Disease Management & Health Outcomes Springer International Publishing, 1997 16(2008), 6 vom: Juni, Seite 377-380 (DE-627)SPR035648813 nnns volume:16 year:2008 number:6 month:06 pages:377-380 https://dx.doi.org/10.2165/0115677-200816060-00002 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER SSG-OLC-PHA AR 16 2008 6 06 377-380 |
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10.2165/0115677-200816060-00002 doi (DE-627)SPR035657316 (SPR)0115677-200816060-00002-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Buetow, Stephen verfasserin aut Is the Rate of Generic Drug Prescribing a Fair Measure for Pay for Performance? 2008 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Adis Data Information BV 2008 Abstract Prescription drugs are a significant and rising component of healthcare costs. To limit this expenditure and maximize cost savings, half of the pay-for-performance health programs in the US reward generic drug prescribing once the patents on brand-name drugs expire. This article discusses arguments for and against the rate of generic drug prescribing as a fair measure for pay for performance from both provider and patient perspectives. Compared with brand-name drugs, generic drugs are usually cheaper to purchase, can avoid confusion over different names for the same drug, minimize commercial influences from drug manufacturers, and can allow pharmacists to dispense any medicine that meets the necessary specifications. However, saving money may be a responsibility of governments and payers rather than providers. Some providers and patients are uneasy that financial incentives for generic prescribing may not directly aim to improve patient care and may motivate providers to put their own financial interests above the welfare of patients. It has not been proven that the financial incentives are large enough to change prescribing behavior or that generic drugs are less safe or less effective than their brand-name counterparts. However, there are legitimate concerns around bioequivalence standards, and some providers and patients object to attempts to compromise their autonomy. High-quality care requires not a rigid adherence to performance indicators but a careful and flexible balancing of provider and patient interests. A final concern is patient non-adherence or mistakes in adherence following a change to a generic drug. It is uncertain that pay for performance is the best way — or a fair way — to contain spiraling health costs. Financial Incentive (dpeaa)DE-He213 Generic Drug (dpeaa)DE-He213 Generic Substitution (dpeaa)DE-He213 Generic Prescribe (dpeaa)DE-He213 Payment Bonus (dpeaa)DE-He213 Bryant, Linda aut Enthalten in Disease Management & Health Outcomes Springer International Publishing, 1997 16(2008), 6 vom: Juni, Seite 377-380 (DE-627)SPR035648813 nnns volume:16 year:2008 number:6 month:06 pages:377-380 https://dx.doi.org/10.2165/0115677-200816060-00002 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER SSG-OLC-PHA AR 16 2008 6 06 377-380 |
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Abstract Prescription drugs are a significant and rising component of healthcare costs. To limit this expenditure and maximize cost savings, half of the pay-for-performance health programs in the US reward generic drug prescribing once the patents on brand-name drugs expire. This article discusses arguments for and against the rate of generic drug prescribing as a fair measure for pay for performance from both provider and patient perspectives. Compared with brand-name drugs, generic drugs are usually cheaper to purchase, can avoid confusion over different names for the same drug, minimize commercial influences from drug manufacturers, and can allow pharmacists to dispense any medicine that meets the necessary specifications. However, saving money may be a responsibility of governments and payers rather than providers. Some providers and patients are uneasy that financial incentives for generic prescribing may not directly aim to improve patient care and may motivate providers to put their own financial interests above the welfare of patients. It has not been proven that the financial incentives are large enough to change prescribing behavior or that generic drugs are less safe or less effective than their brand-name counterparts. However, there are legitimate concerns around bioequivalence standards, and some providers and patients object to attempts to compromise their autonomy. High-quality care requires not a rigid adherence to performance indicators but a careful and flexible balancing of provider and patient interests. A final concern is patient non-adherence or mistakes in adherence following a change to a generic drug. It is uncertain that pay for performance is the best way — or a fair way — to contain spiraling health costs. © Adis Data Information BV 2008 |
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Abstract Prescription drugs are a significant and rising component of healthcare costs. To limit this expenditure and maximize cost savings, half of the pay-for-performance health programs in the US reward generic drug prescribing once the patents on brand-name drugs expire. This article discusses arguments for and against the rate of generic drug prescribing as a fair measure for pay for performance from both provider and patient perspectives. Compared with brand-name drugs, generic drugs are usually cheaper to purchase, can avoid confusion over different names for the same drug, minimize commercial influences from drug manufacturers, and can allow pharmacists to dispense any medicine that meets the necessary specifications. However, saving money may be a responsibility of governments and payers rather than providers. Some providers and patients are uneasy that financial incentives for generic prescribing may not directly aim to improve patient care and may motivate providers to put their own financial interests above the welfare of patients. It has not been proven that the financial incentives are large enough to change prescribing behavior or that generic drugs are less safe or less effective than their brand-name counterparts. However, there are legitimate concerns around bioequivalence standards, and some providers and patients object to attempts to compromise their autonomy. High-quality care requires not a rigid adherence to performance indicators but a careful and flexible balancing of provider and patient interests. A final concern is patient non-adherence or mistakes in adherence following a change to a generic drug. It is uncertain that pay for performance is the best way — or a fair way — to contain spiraling health costs. © Adis Data Information BV 2008 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract Prescription drugs are a significant and rising component of healthcare costs. To limit this expenditure and maximize cost savings, half of the pay-for-performance health programs in the US reward generic drug prescribing once the patents on brand-name drugs expire. This article discusses arguments for and against the rate of generic drug prescribing as a fair measure for pay for performance from both provider and patient perspectives. Compared with brand-name drugs, generic drugs are usually cheaper to purchase, can avoid confusion over different names for the same drug, minimize commercial influences from drug manufacturers, and can allow pharmacists to dispense any medicine that meets the necessary specifications. However, saving money may be a responsibility of governments and payers rather than providers. Some providers and patients are uneasy that financial incentives for generic prescribing may not directly aim to improve patient care and may motivate providers to put their own financial interests above the welfare of patients. It has not been proven that the financial incentives are large enough to change prescribing behavior or that generic drugs are less safe or less effective than their brand-name counterparts. However, there are legitimate concerns around bioequivalence standards, and some providers and patients object to attempts to compromise their autonomy. High-quality care requires not a rigid adherence to performance indicators but a careful and flexible balancing of provider and patient interests. A final concern is patient non-adherence or mistakes in adherence following a change to a generic drug. It is uncertain that pay for performance is the best way — or a fair way — to contain spiraling health costs. © Adis Data Information BV 2008 |
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