Representing credal imprecision: from sets of measures to hierarchical Bayesian models

Abstract The basic Bayesian model of credence states, where each individual’s belief state is represented by a single probability measure, has been criticized as psychologically implausible, unable to represent the intuitive distinction between precise and imprecise probabilities, and normatively un...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Autor*in:

Lassiter, Daniel [verfasserIn]

Format:

E-Artikel

Sprache:

Englisch

Erschienen:

2019

Schlagwörter:

Bayesian epistemology

Bayesian cognitive science

Probability

Credal imprecision

Philosophy of cognitive science

Hierarchical Bayesian models

Bayesian networks

Übergeordnetes Werk:

Enthalten in: Philosophical studies - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., 1950, 177(2019), 6 vom: 15. Feb., Seite 1463-1485

Übergeordnetes Werk:

volume:177 ; year:2019 ; number:6 ; day:15 ; month:02 ; pages:1463-1485

Links:

Volltext

DOI / URN:

10.1007/s11098-019-01262-8

Katalog-ID:

SPR039545105

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