Robust cooperative car-parking: implications and solutions for selfish inter-vehicular social behaviour

Abstract Vehicular cooperation mechanisms are known to provide efficiency and scalability benefits but for the mechanisms to be human-centric, there is a need for them to be robust and resilient to anti-social behaviours such as deception. More specifically, decentralised vehicle-to-vehicle cooperat...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Aliedani, Ali [verfasserIn] Loke, Seng W. [verfasserIn] Glaser, Sebastien [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2020

Schlagwörter:	Decentralized vehicle cooperation mechanism Selfish behaviour Deception detection mechanism

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Human-centric computing and information sciences - [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : KIPS-CSWRG, 2012, 10(2020), 1 vom: 26. Aug.
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:10 ; year:2020 ; number:1 ; day:26 ; month:08

Links:	Volltext

DOI / URN:	10.1186/s13673-020-00243-9

Katalog-ID:	SPR040752550

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allfields	10.1186/s13673-020-00243-9 doi (DE-627)SPR040752550 (SPR)s13673-020-00243-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 ASE 004 ASE 54.70 bkl Aliedani, Ali verfasserin aut Robust cooperative car-parking: implications and solutions for selfish inter-vehicular social behaviour 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Vehicular cooperation mechanisms are known to provide efficiency and scalability benefits but for the mechanisms to be human-centric, there is a need for them to be robust and resilient to anti-social behaviours such as deception. More specifically, decentralised vehicle-to-vehicle cooperation has been shown to be an effective and convenient approach to coordinate the use of dynamically changing common road resources such as car parking. However, the potential for selfish behaviour of some vehicles in the form of sending false information for self-benefit has a significant effect on the value of cooperation. In this paper, we investigate, via extensive simulations, the deception behaviour of malicious vehicles looking to park by sending false information in decentralized vehicle cooperation. Furthermore, Deception Detection Mechanisms (DDMs) are introduced and are shown to be valuable in ameliorating the effects of malicious vehicles. The work has broader implications for an open world of autonomous and adaptive systems with decentralized control and ownership which need to cooperate to use shared resources; they are susceptible to malicious behaviour, and hence, need to be built to be robust to such behaviour. Decentralized vehicle cooperation mechanism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Selfish behaviour (dpeaa)DE-He213 Deception detection mechanism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Loke, Seng W. verfasserin aut Glaser, Sebastien verfasserin aut Enthalten in Human-centric computing and information sciences [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : KIPS-CSWRG, 2012 10(2020), 1 vom: 26. Aug. (DE-627)752436686 (DE-600)2724362-X 2192-1962 nnns volume:10 year:2020 number:1 day:26 month:08 https://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13673-020-00243-9 kostenfrei Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 54.70 ASE AR 10 2020 1 26 08
spelling	10.1186/s13673-020-00243-9 doi (DE-627)SPR040752550 (SPR)s13673-020-00243-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 ASE 004 ASE 54.70 bkl Aliedani, Ali verfasserin aut Robust cooperative car-parking: implications and solutions for selfish inter-vehicular social behaviour 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Vehicular cooperation mechanisms are known to provide efficiency and scalability benefits but for the mechanisms to be human-centric, there is a need for them to be robust and resilient to anti-social behaviours such as deception. More specifically, decentralised vehicle-to-vehicle cooperation has been shown to be an effective and convenient approach to coordinate the use of dynamically changing common road resources such as car parking. However, the potential for selfish behaviour of some vehicles in the form of sending false information for self-benefit has a significant effect on the value of cooperation. In this paper, we investigate, via extensive simulations, the deception behaviour of malicious vehicles looking to park by sending false information in decentralized vehicle cooperation. Furthermore, Deception Detection Mechanisms (DDMs) are introduced and are shown to be valuable in ameliorating the effects of malicious vehicles. The work has broader implications for an open world of autonomous and adaptive systems with decentralized control and ownership which need to cooperate to use shared resources; they are susceptible to malicious behaviour, and hence, need to be built to be robust to such behaviour. Decentralized vehicle cooperation mechanism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Selfish behaviour (dpeaa)DE-He213 Deception detection mechanism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Loke, Seng W. verfasserin aut Glaser, Sebastien verfasserin aut Enthalten in Human-centric computing and information sciences [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : KIPS-CSWRG, 2012 10(2020), 1 vom: 26. Aug. (DE-627)752436686 (DE-600)2724362-X 2192-1962 nnns volume:10 year:2020 number:1 day:26 month:08 https://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13673-020-00243-9 kostenfrei Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 54.70 ASE AR 10 2020 1 26 08
allfields_unstemmed	10.1186/s13673-020-00243-9 doi (DE-627)SPR040752550 (SPR)s13673-020-00243-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 ASE 004 ASE 54.70 bkl Aliedani, Ali verfasserin aut Robust cooperative car-parking: implications and solutions for selfish inter-vehicular social behaviour 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Vehicular cooperation mechanisms are known to provide efficiency and scalability benefits but for the mechanisms to be human-centric, there is a need for them to be robust and resilient to anti-social behaviours such as deception. More specifically, decentralised vehicle-to-vehicle cooperation has been shown to be an effective and convenient approach to coordinate the use of dynamically changing common road resources such as car parking. However, the potential for selfish behaviour of some vehicles in the form of sending false information for self-benefit has a significant effect on the value of cooperation. In this paper, we investigate, via extensive simulations, the deception behaviour of malicious vehicles looking to park by sending false information in decentralized vehicle cooperation. Furthermore, Deception Detection Mechanisms (DDMs) are introduced and are shown to be valuable in ameliorating the effects of malicious vehicles. The work has broader implications for an open world of autonomous and adaptive systems with decentralized control and ownership which need to cooperate to use shared resources; they are susceptible to malicious behaviour, and hence, need to be built to be robust to such behaviour. Decentralized vehicle cooperation mechanism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Selfish behaviour (dpeaa)DE-He213 Deception detection mechanism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Loke, Seng W. verfasserin aut Glaser, Sebastien verfasserin aut Enthalten in Human-centric computing and information sciences [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : KIPS-CSWRG, 2012 10(2020), 1 vom: 26. Aug. (DE-627)752436686 (DE-600)2724362-X 2192-1962 nnns volume:10 year:2020 number:1 day:26 month:08 https://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13673-020-00243-9 kostenfrei Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 54.70 ASE AR 10 2020 1 26 08
allfieldsGer	10.1186/s13673-020-00243-9 doi (DE-627)SPR040752550 (SPR)s13673-020-00243-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 ASE 004 ASE 54.70 bkl Aliedani, Ali verfasserin aut Robust cooperative car-parking: implications and solutions for selfish inter-vehicular social behaviour 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Vehicular cooperation mechanisms are known to provide efficiency and scalability benefits but for the mechanisms to be human-centric, there is a need for them to be robust and resilient to anti-social behaviours such as deception. More specifically, decentralised vehicle-to-vehicle cooperation has been shown to be an effective and convenient approach to coordinate the use of dynamically changing common road resources such as car parking. However, the potential for selfish behaviour of some vehicles in the form of sending false information for self-benefit has a significant effect on the value of cooperation. In this paper, we investigate, via extensive simulations, the deception behaviour of malicious vehicles looking to park by sending false information in decentralized vehicle cooperation. Furthermore, Deception Detection Mechanisms (DDMs) are introduced and are shown to be valuable in ameliorating the effects of malicious vehicles. The work has broader implications for an open world of autonomous and adaptive systems with decentralized control and ownership which need to cooperate to use shared resources; they are susceptible to malicious behaviour, and hence, need to be built to be robust to such behaviour. Decentralized vehicle cooperation mechanism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Selfish behaviour (dpeaa)DE-He213 Deception detection mechanism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Loke, Seng W. verfasserin aut Glaser, Sebastien verfasserin aut Enthalten in Human-centric computing and information sciences [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : KIPS-CSWRG, 2012 10(2020), 1 vom: 26. Aug. (DE-627)752436686 (DE-600)2724362-X 2192-1962 nnns volume:10 year:2020 number:1 day:26 month:08 https://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13673-020-00243-9 kostenfrei Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 54.70 ASE AR 10 2020 1 26 08
allfieldsSound	10.1186/s13673-020-00243-9 doi (DE-627)SPR040752550 (SPR)s13673-020-00243-9-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 ASE 004 ASE 54.70 bkl Aliedani, Ali verfasserin aut Robust cooperative car-parking: implications and solutions for selfish inter-vehicular social behaviour 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Vehicular cooperation mechanisms are known to provide efficiency and scalability benefits but for the mechanisms to be human-centric, there is a need for them to be robust and resilient to anti-social behaviours such as deception. More specifically, decentralised vehicle-to-vehicle cooperation has been shown to be an effective and convenient approach to coordinate the use of dynamically changing common road resources such as car parking. However, the potential for selfish behaviour of some vehicles in the form of sending false information for self-benefit has a significant effect on the value of cooperation. In this paper, we investigate, via extensive simulations, the deception behaviour of malicious vehicles looking to park by sending false information in decentralized vehicle cooperation. Furthermore, Deception Detection Mechanisms (DDMs) are introduced and are shown to be valuable in ameliorating the effects of malicious vehicles. The work has broader implications for an open world of autonomous and adaptive systems with decentralized control and ownership which need to cooperate to use shared resources; they are susceptible to malicious behaviour, and hence, need to be built to be robust to such behaviour. Decentralized vehicle cooperation mechanism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Selfish behaviour (dpeaa)DE-He213 Deception detection mechanism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Loke, Seng W. verfasserin aut Glaser, Sebastien verfasserin aut Enthalten in Human-centric computing and information sciences [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : KIPS-CSWRG, 2012 10(2020), 1 vom: 26. Aug. (DE-627)752436686 (DE-600)2724362-X 2192-1962 nnns volume:10 year:2020 number:1 day:26 month:08 https://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13673-020-00243-9 kostenfrei Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 54.70 ASE AR 10 2020 1 26 08
language	English
source	Enthalten in Human-centric computing and information sciences 10(2020), 1 vom: 26. Aug. volume:10 year:2020 number:1 day:26 month:08
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institution	findex.gbv.de
topic_facet	Decentralized vehicle cooperation mechanism Selfish behaviour Deception detection mechanism
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container_title	Human-centric computing and information sciences
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Aliedani, Ali @@aut@@ Loke, Seng W. @@aut@@ Glaser, Sebastien @@aut@@
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author	Aliedani, Ali
spellingShingle	Aliedani, Ali ddc 004 bkl 54.70 misc Decentralized vehicle cooperation mechanism misc Selfish behaviour misc Deception detection mechanism Robust cooperative car-parking: implications and solutions for selfish inter-vehicular social behaviour
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topic_title	004 ASE 54.70 bkl Robust cooperative car-parking: implications and solutions for selfish inter-vehicular social behaviour Decentralized vehicle cooperation mechanism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Selfish behaviour (dpeaa)DE-He213 Deception detection mechanism (dpeaa)DE-He213
topic	ddc 004 bkl 54.70 misc Decentralized vehicle cooperation mechanism misc Selfish behaviour misc Deception detection mechanism
topic_unstemmed	ddc 004 bkl 54.70 misc Decentralized vehicle cooperation mechanism misc Selfish behaviour misc Deception detection mechanism
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title	Robust cooperative car-parking: implications and solutions for selfish inter-vehicular social behaviour
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title_full	Robust cooperative car-parking: implications and solutions for selfish inter-vehicular social behaviour
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title_sort	robust cooperative car-parking: implications and solutions for selfish inter-vehicular social behaviour
title_auth	Robust cooperative car-parking: implications and solutions for selfish inter-vehicular social behaviour
abstract	Abstract Vehicular cooperation mechanisms are known to provide efficiency and scalability benefits but for the mechanisms to be human-centric, there is a need for them to be robust and resilient to anti-social behaviours such as deception. More specifically, decentralised vehicle-to-vehicle cooperation has been shown to be an effective and convenient approach to coordinate the use of dynamically changing common road resources such as car parking. However, the potential for selfish behaviour of some vehicles in the form of sending false information for self-benefit has a significant effect on the value of cooperation. In this paper, we investigate, via extensive simulations, the deception behaviour of malicious vehicles looking to park by sending false information in decentralized vehicle cooperation. Furthermore, Deception Detection Mechanisms (DDMs) are introduced and are shown to be valuable in ameliorating the effects of malicious vehicles. The work has broader implications for an open world of autonomous and adaptive systems with decentralized control and ownership which need to cooperate to use shared resources; they are susceptible to malicious behaviour, and hence, need to be built to be robust to such behaviour.
abstractGer	Abstract Vehicular cooperation mechanisms are known to provide efficiency and scalability benefits but for the mechanisms to be human-centric, there is a need for them to be robust and resilient to anti-social behaviours such as deception. More specifically, decentralised vehicle-to-vehicle cooperation has been shown to be an effective and convenient approach to coordinate the use of dynamically changing common road resources such as car parking. However, the potential for selfish behaviour of some vehicles in the form of sending false information for self-benefit has a significant effect on the value of cooperation. In this paper, we investigate, via extensive simulations, the deception behaviour of malicious vehicles looking to park by sending false information in decentralized vehicle cooperation. Furthermore, Deception Detection Mechanisms (DDMs) are introduced and are shown to be valuable in ameliorating the effects of malicious vehicles. The work has broader implications for an open world of autonomous and adaptive systems with decentralized control and ownership which need to cooperate to use shared resources; they are susceptible to malicious behaviour, and hence, need to be built to be robust to such behaviour.
abstract_unstemmed	Abstract Vehicular cooperation mechanisms are known to provide efficiency and scalability benefits but for the mechanisms to be human-centric, there is a need for them to be robust and resilient to anti-social behaviours such as deception. More specifically, decentralised vehicle-to-vehicle cooperation has been shown to be an effective and convenient approach to coordinate the use of dynamically changing common road resources such as car parking. However, the potential for selfish behaviour of some vehicles in the form of sending false information for self-benefit has a significant effect on the value of cooperation. In this paper, we investigate, via extensive simulations, the deception behaviour of malicious vehicles looking to park by sending false information in decentralized vehicle cooperation. Furthermore, Deception Detection Mechanisms (DDMs) are introduced and are shown to be valuable in ameliorating the effects of malicious vehicles. The work has broader implications for an open world of autonomous and adaptive systems with decentralized control and ownership which need to cooperate to use shared resources; they are susceptible to malicious behaviour, and hence, need to be built to be robust to such behaviour.
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title_short	Robust cooperative car-parking: implications and solutions for selfish inter-vehicular social behaviour
url	https://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13673-020-00243-9
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