The insignificance of philosophical skepticism

Abstract The Cartesian arguments for external world skepticism are usually considered to be significant for at least two reasons: they seem to present genuine paradoxes and that providing an adequate response to these arguments would reveal something epistemically important about knowledge, justific...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

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Autor*in:	Dixon, Jonathan [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2022

Schlagwörter:	Cartesian skepticism Closure of knowledge Replies to skepticism

Anmerkung:	© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Synthese - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1936, 200(2022), 6 vom: 16. Nov.
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:200 ; year:2022 ; number:6 ; day:16 ; month:11

Links:	Volltext

DOI / URN:	10.1007/s11229-022-03957-8

Katalog-ID:	SPR048644692

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520			\|a Abstract The Cartesian arguments for external world skepticism are usually considered to be significant for at least two reasons: they seem to present genuine paradoxes and that providing an adequate response to these arguments would reveal something epistemically important about knowledge, justification, and/or our epistemic position to the world. Using only premises and reasoning the skeptic accepts, I will show that the most common Cartesian argument for external world skepticism (i.e. the closure-based skeptical argument) leads to a previously unrecognized self-undermining dilemma: it either leads to a reductio ad absurdum, or to avoid this reductio the skeptic must accept that this argument is epistemically idle—it does not provide any support for external world skepticism. Either way, this Cartesian argument cannot legitimately threaten or even call into question our beliefs about the external world. And thus, either way, this Cartesian argument for external world skepticism is not epistemically significant—it is not a genuine paradox and adequately responding to it need not reveal anything epistemically important.
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allfields	10.1007/s11229-022-03957-8 doi (DE-627)SPR048644692 (SPR)s11229-022-03957-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Dixon, Jonathan verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-4040-7289 aut The insignificance of philosophical skepticism 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. Abstract The Cartesian arguments for external world skepticism are usually considered to be significant for at least two reasons: they seem to present genuine paradoxes and that providing an adequate response to these arguments would reveal something epistemically important about knowledge, justification, and/or our epistemic position to the world. Using only premises and reasoning the skeptic accepts, I will show that the most common Cartesian argument for external world skepticism (i.e. the closure-based skeptical argument) leads to a previously unrecognized self-undermining dilemma: it either leads to a reductio ad absurdum, or to avoid this reductio the skeptic must accept that this argument is epistemically idle—it does not provide any support for external world skepticism. Either way, this Cartesian argument cannot legitimately threaten or even call into question our beliefs about the external world. And thus, either way, this Cartesian argument for external world skepticism is not epistemically significant—it is not a genuine paradox and adequately responding to it need not reveal anything epistemically important. Cartesian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Closure of knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 Replies to skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Synthese <Dordrecht> Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1936 200(2022), 6 vom: 16. Nov. (DE-627)315299274 (DE-600)2012638-4 1573-0964 nnns volume:200 year:2022 number:6 day:16 month:11 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03957-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2936 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4392 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 200 2022 6 16 11
spelling	10.1007/s11229-022-03957-8 doi (DE-627)SPR048644692 (SPR)s11229-022-03957-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Dixon, Jonathan verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-4040-7289 aut The insignificance of philosophical skepticism 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. Abstract The Cartesian arguments for external world skepticism are usually considered to be significant for at least two reasons: they seem to present genuine paradoxes and that providing an adequate response to these arguments would reveal something epistemically important about knowledge, justification, and/or our epistemic position to the world. Using only premises and reasoning the skeptic accepts, I will show that the most common Cartesian argument for external world skepticism (i.e. the closure-based skeptical argument) leads to a previously unrecognized self-undermining dilemma: it either leads to a reductio ad absurdum, or to avoid this reductio the skeptic must accept that this argument is epistemically idle—it does not provide any support for external world skepticism. Either way, this Cartesian argument cannot legitimately threaten or even call into question our beliefs about the external world. And thus, either way, this Cartesian argument for external world skepticism is not epistemically significant—it is not a genuine paradox and adequately responding to it need not reveal anything epistemically important. Cartesian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Closure of knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 Replies to skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Synthese <Dordrecht> Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1936 200(2022), 6 vom: 16. Nov. (DE-627)315299274 (DE-600)2012638-4 1573-0964 nnns volume:200 year:2022 number:6 day:16 month:11 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03957-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2936 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4392 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 200 2022 6 16 11
allfields_unstemmed	10.1007/s11229-022-03957-8 doi (DE-627)SPR048644692 (SPR)s11229-022-03957-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Dixon, Jonathan verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-4040-7289 aut The insignificance of philosophical skepticism 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. Abstract The Cartesian arguments for external world skepticism are usually considered to be significant for at least two reasons: they seem to present genuine paradoxes and that providing an adequate response to these arguments would reveal something epistemically important about knowledge, justification, and/or our epistemic position to the world. Using only premises and reasoning the skeptic accepts, I will show that the most common Cartesian argument for external world skepticism (i.e. the closure-based skeptical argument) leads to a previously unrecognized self-undermining dilemma: it either leads to a reductio ad absurdum, or to avoid this reductio the skeptic must accept that this argument is epistemically idle—it does not provide any support for external world skepticism. Either way, this Cartesian argument cannot legitimately threaten or even call into question our beliefs about the external world. And thus, either way, this Cartesian argument for external world skepticism is not epistemically significant—it is not a genuine paradox and adequately responding to it need not reveal anything epistemically important. Cartesian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Closure of knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 Replies to skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Synthese <Dordrecht> Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1936 200(2022), 6 vom: 16. Nov. (DE-627)315299274 (DE-600)2012638-4 1573-0964 nnns volume:200 year:2022 number:6 day:16 month:11 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03957-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2936 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4392 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 200 2022 6 16 11
allfieldsGer	10.1007/s11229-022-03957-8 doi (DE-627)SPR048644692 (SPR)s11229-022-03957-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Dixon, Jonathan verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-4040-7289 aut The insignificance of philosophical skepticism 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. Abstract The Cartesian arguments for external world skepticism are usually considered to be significant for at least two reasons: they seem to present genuine paradoxes and that providing an adequate response to these arguments would reveal something epistemically important about knowledge, justification, and/or our epistemic position to the world. Using only premises and reasoning the skeptic accepts, I will show that the most common Cartesian argument for external world skepticism (i.e. the closure-based skeptical argument) leads to a previously unrecognized self-undermining dilemma: it either leads to a reductio ad absurdum, or to avoid this reductio the skeptic must accept that this argument is epistemically idle—it does not provide any support for external world skepticism. Either way, this Cartesian argument cannot legitimately threaten or even call into question our beliefs about the external world. And thus, either way, this Cartesian argument for external world skepticism is not epistemically significant—it is not a genuine paradox and adequately responding to it need not reveal anything epistemically important. Cartesian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Closure of knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 Replies to skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Synthese <Dordrecht> Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1936 200(2022), 6 vom: 16. Nov. (DE-627)315299274 (DE-600)2012638-4 1573-0964 nnns volume:200 year:2022 number:6 day:16 month:11 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03957-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2936 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4392 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 200 2022 6 16 11
allfieldsSound	10.1007/s11229-022-03957-8 doi (DE-627)SPR048644692 (SPR)s11229-022-03957-8-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Dixon, Jonathan verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-4040-7289 aut The insignificance of philosophical skepticism 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. Abstract The Cartesian arguments for external world skepticism are usually considered to be significant for at least two reasons: they seem to present genuine paradoxes and that providing an adequate response to these arguments would reveal something epistemically important about knowledge, justification, and/or our epistemic position to the world. Using only premises and reasoning the skeptic accepts, I will show that the most common Cartesian argument for external world skepticism (i.e. the closure-based skeptical argument) leads to a previously unrecognized self-undermining dilemma: it either leads to a reductio ad absurdum, or to avoid this reductio the skeptic must accept that this argument is epistemically idle—it does not provide any support for external world skepticism. Either way, this Cartesian argument cannot legitimately threaten or even call into question our beliefs about the external world. And thus, either way, this Cartesian argument for external world skepticism is not epistemically significant—it is not a genuine paradox and adequately responding to it need not reveal anything epistemically important. Cartesian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Closure of knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 Replies to skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in Synthese <Dordrecht> Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1936 200(2022), 6 vom: 16. Nov. (DE-627)315299274 (DE-600)2012638-4 1573-0964 nnns volume:200 year:2022 number:6 day:16 month:11 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03957-8 lizenzpflichtig Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2936 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4392 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 200 2022 6 16 11
language	English
source	Enthalten in Synthese <Dordrecht> 200(2022), 6 vom: 16. Nov. volume:200 year:2022 number:6 day:16 month:11
sourceStr	Enthalten in Synthese <Dordrecht> 200(2022), 6 vom: 16. Nov. volume:200 year:2022 number:6 day:16 month:11
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container_title	Synthese <Dordrecht>
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Dixon, Jonathan @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2022-11-16T00:00:00Z
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author	Dixon, Jonathan
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topic_title	The insignificance of philosophical skepticism Cartesian skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213 Closure of knowledge (dpeaa)DE-He213 Replies to skepticism (dpeaa)DE-He213
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title	The insignificance of philosophical skepticism
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title_sort	insignificance of philosophical skepticism
title_auth	The insignificance of philosophical skepticism
abstract	Abstract The Cartesian arguments for external world skepticism are usually considered to be significant for at least two reasons: they seem to present genuine paradoxes and that providing an adequate response to these arguments would reveal something epistemically important about knowledge, justification, and/or our epistemic position to the world. Using only premises and reasoning the skeptic accepts, I will show that the most common Cartesian argument for external world skepticism (i.e. the closure-based skeptical argument) leads to a previously unrecognized self-undermining dilemma: it either leads to a reductio ad absurdum, or to avoid this reductio the skeptic must accept that this argument is epistemically idle—it does not provide any support for external world skepticism. Either way, this Cartesian argument cannot legitimately threaten or even call into question our beliefs about the external world. And thus, either way, this Cartesian argument for external world skepticism is not epistemically significant—it is not a genuine paradox and adequately responding to it need not reveal anything epistemically important. © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
abstractGer	Abstract The Cartesian arguments for external world skepticism are usually considered to be significant for at least two reasons: they seem to present genuine paradoxes and that providing an adequate response to these arguments would reveal something epistemically important about knowledge, justification, and/or our epistemic position to the world. Using only premises and reasoning the skeptic accepts, I will show that the most common Cartesian argument for external world skepticism (i.e. the closure-based skeptical argument) leads to a previously unrecognized self-undermining dilemma: it either leads to a reductio ad absurdum, or to avoid this reductio the skeptic must accept that this argument is epistemically idle—it does not provide any support for external world skepticism. Either way, this Cartesian argument cannot legitimately threaten or even call into question our beliefs about the external world. And thus, either way, this Cartesian argument for external world skepticism is not epistemically significant—it is not a genuine paradox and adequately responding to it need not reveal anything epistemically important. © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
abstract_unstemmed	Abstract The Cartesian arguments for external world skepticism are usually considered to be significant for at least two reasons: they seem to present genuine paradoxes and that providing an adequate response to these arguments would reveal something epistemically important about knowledge, justification, and/or our epistemic position to the world. Using only premises and reasoning the skeptic accepts, I will show that the most common Cartesian argument for external world skepticism (i.e. the closure-based skeptical argument) leads to a previously unrecognized self-undermining dilemma: it either leads to a reductio ad absurdum, or to avoid this reductio the skeptic must accept that this argument is epistemically idle—it does not provide any support for external world skepticism. Either way, this Cartesian argument cannot legitimately threaten or even call into question our beliefs about the external world. And thus, either way, this Cartesian argument for external world skepticism is not epistemically significant—it is not a genuine paradox and adequately responding to it need not reveal anything epistemically important. © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
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title_short	The insignificance of philosophical skepticism
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Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract The Cartesian arguments for external world skepticism are usually considered to be significant for at least two reasons: they seem to present genuine paradoxes and that providing an adequate response to these arguments would reveal something epistemically important about knowledge, justification, and/or our epistemic position to the world. Using only premises and reasoning the skeptic accepts, I will show that the most common Cartesian argument for external world skepticism (i.e. the closure-based skeptical argument) leads to a previously unrecognized self-undermining dilemma: it either leads to a reductio ad absurdum, or to avoid this reductio the skeptic must accept that this argument is epistemically idle—it does not provide any support for external world skepticism. Either way, this Cartesian argument cannot legitimately threaten or even call into question our beliefs about the external world. 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The insignificance of philosophical skepticism

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