Against methodological continuity and metaphysical knowledge

Abstract The main purpose of this paper is to refute the ‘methodological continuity’ argument supporting epistemic realism in metaphysics. This argument aims to show that scientific realists have to accept that metaphysics is as rationally justified as science given that they both employ inference t...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Autor*in:

Allzén, Simon [verfasserIn]

Format:

E-Artikel

Sprache:

Englisch

Erschienen:

2023

Schlagwörter:

Methodological continuity

Scientific Realism

Inference to the best explanation

Metaphysics

Anmerkung:

© The Author(s) 2023

Übergeordnetes Werk:

Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of science - Berlin : Springer, 2011, 13(2023), 1 vom: 11. Jan.

Übergeordnetes Werk:

volume:13 ; year:2023 ; number:1 ; day:11 ; month:01

Links:

Volltext

DOI / URN:

10.1007/s13194-022-00505-6

Katalog-ID:

SPR049762001

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