Research on Ecological Protection Mechanisms in Watersheds Based on Evolutionary Games-Inter-provincial and Intra-provincial Perspectives
Abstract The wholeness of ecological resources in watersheds and the divisiveness of administrative regions make the protection of watersheds exceptional, and their environmental development has always been a hot issue of social concern. To realize the high-quality development of the watershed, this...
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Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Dong, Fugui [verfasserIn] Shi, Mingxia [verfasserIn] Li, Wanying [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2024 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2024. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Water resources management - Springer Netherlands, 1987, 38(2024), 7 vom: 15. Feb., Seite 2377-2397 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:38 ; year:2024 ; number:7 ; day:15 ; month:02 ; pages:2377-2397 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s11269-024-03773-4 |
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SPR055416624 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract The wholeness of ecological resources in watersheds and the divisiveness of administrative regions make the protection of watersheds exceptional, and their environmental development has always been a hot issue of social concern. To realize the high-quality development of the watershed, this paper studies the ecological protection mechanism at the inter-provincial and intra-provincial levels. At the inter-provincial level, we constructed a game model for the evolution of ecological compensation between upstream and downstream governments in the watershed. We explored the changes in the strategy choices of both sides of the game under the condition of an unconstrained mechanism and the constraints of the reward and punishment mechanism of the central government. At the intra-provincial level, the local government, enterprise, and public ecological protection evolution game models are constructed to analyze the strategic choices of the three-party game subjects. The study results show that firstly, the combination of strategies (governance, compensation) cannot be realized by upstream and downstream governments alone, and the central government can intervene by introducing specific incentives and penalties. Secondly, constructing upstream and downstream government ecological compensation mechanisms under the central government constraint has prompted the local government, enterprises, and the public to achieve the ideal stable state of the tripartite game subjects (strict regulation, treatment, supervision). Thirdly, factors such as local government strategy choices and regulatory efforts can impact the rate of evolution of enterprises and the public. | ||
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10.1007/s11269-024-03773-4 doi (DE-627)SPR055416624 (SPR)s11269-024-03773-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 550 630 VZ 43.33 bkl Dong, Fugui verfasserin aut Research on Ecological Protection Mechanisms in Watersheds Based on Evolutionary Games-Inter-provincial and Intra-provincial Perspectives 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2024. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. Abstract The wholeness of ecological resources in watersheds and the divisiveness of administrative regions make the protection of watersheds exceptional, and their environmental development has always been a hot issue of social concern. To realize the high-quality development of the watershed, this paper studies the ecological protection mechanism at the inter-provincial and intra-provincial levels. At the inter-provincial level, we constructed a game model for the evolution of ecological compensation between upstream and downstream governments in the watershed. We explored the changes in the strategy choices of both sides of the game under the condition of an unconstrained mechanism and the constraints of the reward and punishment mechanism of the central government. At the intra-provincial level, the local government, enterprise, and public ecological protection evolution game models are constructed to analyze the strategic choices of the three-party game subjects. The study results show that firstly, the combination of strategies (governance, compensation) cannot be realized by upstream and downstream governments alone, and the central government can intervene by introducing specific incentives and penalties. Secondly, constructing upstream and downstream government ecological compensation mechanisms under the central government constraint has prompted the local government, enterprises, and the public to achieve the ideal stable state of the tripartite game subjects (strict regulation, treatment, supervision). Thirdly, factors such as local government strategy choices and regulatory efforts can impact the rate of evolution of enterprises and the public. Watersheds (dpeaa)DE-He213 Ecological conservation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Evolutionary games (dpeaa)DE-He213 Inter-provincial and Intra-provincial perspectives (dpeaa)DE-He213 Shi, Mingxia verfasserin (orcid)0009-0005-3997-5723 aut Li, Wanying verfasserin aut Enthalten in Water resources management Springer Netherlands, 1987 38(2024), 7 vom: 15. Feb., Seite 2377-2397 (DE-627)315299924 (DE-600)2016360-5 1573-1650 nnns volume:38 year:2024 number:7 day:15 month:02 pages:2377-2397 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11269-024-03773-4 X:VERLAG 0 lizenzpflichtig Volltext SYSFLAG_0 GBV_SPRINGER SSG-OPC-GGO GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 43.33 VZ AR 38 2024 7 15 02 2377-2397 |
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10.1007/s11269-024-03773-4 doi (DE-627)SPR055416624 (SPR)s11269-024-03773-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 550 630 VZ 43.33 bkl Dong, Fugui verfasserin aut Research on Ecological Protection Mechanisms in Watersheds Based on Evolutionary Games-Inter-provincial and Intra-provincial Perspectives 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2024. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. Abstract The wholeness of ecological resources in watersheds and the divisiveness of administrative regions make the protection of watersheds exceptional, and their environmental development has always been a hot issue of social concern. To realize the high-quality development of the watershed, this paper studies the ecological protection mechanism at the inter-provincial and intra-provincial levels. At the inter-provincial level, we constructed a game model for the evolution of ecological compensation between upstream and downstream governments in the watershed. We explored the changes in the strategy choices of both sides of the game under the condition of an unconstrained mechanism and the constraints of the reward and punishment mechanism of the central government. At the intra-provincial level, the local government, enterprise, and public ecological protection evolution game models are constructed to analyze the strategic choices of the three-party game subjects. The study results show that firstly, the combination of strategies (governance, compensation) cannot be realized by upstream and downstream governments alone, and the central government can intervene by introducing specific incentives and penalties. Secondly, constructing upstream and downstream government ecological compensation mechanisms under the central government constraint has prompted the local government, enterprises, and the public to achieve the ideal stable state of the tripartite game subjects (strict regulation, treatment, supervision). Thirdly, factors such as local government strategy choices and regulatory efforts can impact the rate of evolution of enterprises and the public. Watersheds (dpeaa)DE-He213 Ecological conservation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Evolutionary games (dpeaa)DE-He213 Inter-provincial and Intra-provincial perspectives (dpeaa)DE-He213 Shi, Mingxia verfasserin (orcid)0009-0005-3997-5723 aut Li, Wanying verfasserin aut Enthalten in Water resources management Springer Netherlands, 1987 38(2024), 7 vom: 15. Feb., Seite 2377-2397 (DE-627)315299924 (DE-600)2016360-5 1573-1650 nnns volume:38 year:2024 number:7 day:15 month:02 pages:2377-2397 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11269-024-03773-4 X:VERLAG 0 lizenzpflichtig Volltext SYSFLAG_0 GBV_SPRINGER SSG-OPC-GGO GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 43.33 VZ AR 38 2024 7 15 02 2377-2397 |
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10.1007/s11269-024-03773-4 doi (DE-627)SPR055416624 (SPR)s11269-024-03773-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 550 630 VZ 43.33 bkl Dong, Fugui verfasserin aut Research on Ecological Protection Mechanisms in Watersheds Based on Evolutionary Games-Inter-provincial and Intra-provincial Perspectives 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2024. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. Abstract The wholeness of ecological resources in watersheds and the divisiveness of administrative regions make the protection of watersheds exceptional, and their environmental development has always been a hot issue of social concern. To realize the high-quality development of the watershed, this paper studies the ecological protection mechanism at the inter-provincial and intra-provincial levels. At the inter-provincial level, we constructed a game model for the evolution of ecological compensation between upstream and downstream governments in the watershed. We explored the changes in the strategy choices of both sides of the game under the condition of an unconstrained mechanism and the constraints of the reward and punishment mechanism of the central government. At the intra-provincial level, the local government, enterprise, and public ecological protection evolution game models are constructed to analyze the strategic choices of the three-party game subjects. The study results show that firstly, the combination of strategies (governance, compensation) cannot be realized by upstream and downstream governments alone, and the central government can intervene by introducing specific incentives and penalties. Secondly, constructing upstream and downstream government ecological compensation mechanisms under the central government constraint has prompted the local government, enterprises, and the public to achieve the ideal stable state of the tripartite game subjects (strict regulation, treatment, supervision). Thirdly, factors such as local government strategy choices and regulatory efforts can impact the rate of evolution of enterprises and the public. Watersheds (dpeaa)DE-He213 Ecological conservation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Evolutionary games (dpeaa)DE-He213 Inter-provincial and Intra-provincial perspectives (dpeaa)DE-He213 Shi, Mingxia verfasserin (orcid)0009-0005-3997-5723 aut Li, Wanying verfasserin aut Enthalten in Water resources management Springer Netherlands, 1987 38(2024), 7 vom: 15. Feb., Seite 2377-2397 (DE-627)315299924 (DE-600)2016360-5 1573-1650 nnns volume:38 year:2024 number:7 day:15 month:02 pages:2377-2397 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11269-024-03773-4 X:VERLAG 0 lizenzpflichtig Volltext SYSFLAG_0 GBV_SPRINGER SSG-OPC-GGO GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 43.33 VZ AR 38 2024 7 15 02 2377-2397 |
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10.1007/s11269-024-03773-4 doi (DE-627)SPR055416624 (SPR)s11269-024-03773-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 550 630 VZ 43.33 bkl Dong, Fugui verfasserin aut Research on Ecological Protection Mechanisms in Watersheds Based on Evolutionary Games-Inter-provincial and Intra-provincial Perspectives 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2024. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. Abstract The wholeness of ecological resources in watersheds and the divisiveness of administrative regions make the protection of watersheds exceptional, and their environmental development has always been a hot issue of social concern. To realize the high-quality development of the watershed, this paper studies the ecological protection mechanism at the inter-provincial and intra-provincial levels. At the inter-provincial level, we constructed a game model for the evolution of ecological compensation between upstream and downstream governments in the watershed. We explored the changes in the strategy choices of both sides of the game under the condition of an unconstrained mechanism and the constraints of the reward and punishment mechanism of the central government. At the intra-provincial level, the local government, enterprise, and public ecological protection evolution game models are constructed to analyze the strategic choices of the three-party game subjects. The study results show that firstly, the combination of strategies (governance, compensation) cannot be realized by upstream and downstream governments alone, and the central government can intervene by introducing specific incentives and penalties. Secondly, constructing upstream and downstream government ecological compensation mechanisms under the central government constraint has prompted the local government, enterprises, and the public to achieve the ideal stable state of the tripartite game subjects (strict regulation, treatment, supervision). Thirdly, factors such as local government strategy choices and regulatory efforts can impact the rate of evolution of enterprises and the public. Watersheds (dpeaa)DE-He213 Ecological conservation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Evolutionary games (dpeaa)DE-He213 Inter-provincial and Intra-provincial perspectives (dpeaa)DE-He213 Shi, Mingxia verfasserin (orcid)0009-0005-3997-5723 aut Li, Wanying verfasserin aut Enthalten in Water resources management Springer Netherlands, 1987 38(2024), 7 vom: 15. Feb., Seite 2377-2397 (DE-627)315299924 (DE-600)2016360-5 1573-1650 nnns volume:38 year:2024 number:7 day:15 month:02 pages:2377-2397 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11269-024-03773-4 X:VERLAG 0 lizenzpflichtig Volltext SYSFLAG_0 GBV_SPRINGER SSG-OPC-GGO GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 43.33 VZ AR 38 2024 7 15 02 2377-2397 |
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10.1007/s11269-024-03773-4 doi (DE-627)SPR055416624 (SPR)s11269-024-03773-4-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 550 630 VZ 43.33 bkl Dong, Fugui verfasserin aut Research on Ecological Protection Mechanisms in Watersheds Based on Evolutionary Games-Inter-provincial and Intra-provincial Perspectives 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2024. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. Abstract The wholeness of ecological resources in watersheds and the divisiveness of administrative regions make the protection of watersheds exceptional, and their environmental development has always been a hot issue of social concern. To realize the high-quality development of the watershed, this paper studies the ecological protection mechanism at the inter-provincial and intra-provincial levels. At the inter-provincial level, we constructed a game model for the evolution of ecological compensation between upstream and downstream governments in the watershed. We explored the changes in the strategy choices of both sides of the game under the condition of an unconstrained mechanism and the constraints of the reward and punishment mechanism of the central government. At the intra-provincial level, the local government, enterprise, and public ecological protection evolution game models are constructed to analyze the strategic choices of the three-party game subjects. The study results show that firstly, the combination of strategies (governance, compensation) cannot be realized by upstream and downstream governments alone, and the central government can intervene by introducing specific incentives and penalties. Secondly, constructing upstream and downstream government ecological compensation mechanisms under the central government constraint has prompted the local government, enterprises, and the public to achieve the ideal stable state of the tripartite game subjects (strict regulation, treatment, supervision). Thirdly, factors such as local government strategy choices and regulatory efforts can impact the rate of evolution of enterprises and the public. Watersheds (dpeaa)DE-He213 Ecological conservation (dpeaa)DE-He213 Evolutionary games (dpeaa)DE-He213 Inter-provincial and Intra-provincial perspectives (dpeaa)DE-He213 Shi, Mingxia verfasserin (orcid)0009-0005-3997-5723 aut Li, Wanying verfasserin aut Enthalten in Water resources management Springer Netherlands, 1987 38(2024), 7 vom: 15. Feb., Seite 2377-2397 (DE-627)315299924 (DE-600)2016360-5 1573-1650 nnns volume:38 year:2024 number:7 day:15 month:02 pages:2377-2397 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11269-024-03773-4 X:VERLAG 0 lizenzpflichtig Volltext SYSFLAG_0 GBV_SPRINGER SSG-OPC-GGO GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 43.33 VZ AR 38 2024 7 15 02 2377-2397 |
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Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract The wholeness of ecological resources in watersheds and the divisiveness of administrative regions make the protection of watersheds exceptional, and their environmental development has always been a hot issue of social concern. To realize the high-quality development of the watershed, this paper studies the ecological protection mechanism at the inter-provincial and intra-provincial levels. At the inter-provincial level, we constructed a game model for the evolution of ecological compensation between upstream and downstream governments in the watershed. We explored the changes in the strategy choices of both sides of the game under the condition of an unconstrained mechanism and the constraints of the reward and punishment mechanism of the central government. At the intra-provincial level, the local government, enterprise, and public ecological protection evolution game models are constructed to analyze the strategic choices of the three-party game subjects. The study results show that firstly, the combination of strategies (governance, compensation) cannot be realized by upstream and downstream governments alone, and the central government can intervene by introducing specific incentives and penalties. Secondly, constructing upstream and downstream government ecological compensation mechanisms under the central government constraint has prompted the local government, enterprises, and the public to achieve the ideal stable state of the tripartite game subjects (strict regulation, treatment, supervision). 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Dong, Fugui |
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Research on Ecological Protection Mechanisms in Watersheds Based on Evolutionary Games-Inter-provincial and Intra-provincial Perspectives |
| abstract |
Abstract The wholeness of ecological resources in watersheds and the divisiveness of administrative regions make the protection of watersheds exceptional, and their environmental development has always been a hot issue of social concern. To realize the high-quality development of the watershed, this paper studies the ecological protection mechanism at the inter-provincial and intra-provincial levels. At the inter-provincial level, we constructed a game model for the evolution of ecological compensation between upstream and downstream governments in the watershed. We explored the changes in the strategy choices of both sides of the game under the condition of an unconstrained mechanism and the constraints of the reward and punishment mechanism of the central government. At the intra-provincial level, the local government, enterprise, and public ecological protection evolution game models are constructed to analyze the strategic choices of the three-party game subjects. The study results show that firstly, the combination of strategies (governance, compensation) cannot be realized by upstream and downstream governments alone, and the central government can intervene by introducing specific incentives and penalties. Secondly, constructing upstream and downstream government ecological compensation mechanisms under the central government constraint has prompted the local government, enterprises, and the public to achieve the ideal stable state of the tripartite game subjects (strict regulation, treatment, supervision). Thirdly, factors such as local government strategy choices and regulatory efforts can impact the rate of evolution of enterprises and the public. © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2024. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. |
| abstractGer |
Abstract The wholeness of ecological resources in watersheds and the divisiveness of administrative regions make the protection of watersheds exceptional, and their environmental development has always been a hot issue of social concern. To realize the high-quality development of the watershed, this paper studies the ecological protection mechanism at the inter-provincial and intra-provincial levels. At the inter-provincial level, we constructed a game model for the evolution of ecological compensation between upstream and downstream governments in the watershed. We explored the changes in the strategy choices of both sides of the game under the condition of an unconstrained mechanism and the constraints of the reward and punishment mechanism of the central government. At the intra-provincial level, the local government, enterprise, and public ecological protection evolution game models are constructed to analyze the strategic choices of the three-party game subjects. The study results show that firstly, the combination of strategies (governance, compensation) cannot be realized by upstream and downstream governments alone, and the central government can intervene by introducing specific incentives and penalties. Secondly, constructing upstream and downstream government ecological compensation mechanisms under the central government constraint has prompted the local government, enterprises, and the public to achieve the ideal stable state of the tripartite game subjects (strict regulation, treatment, supervision). Thirdly, factors such as local government strategy choices and regulatory efforts can impact the rate of evolution of enterprises and the public. © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2024. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract The wholeness of ecological resources in watersheds and the divisiveness of administrative regions make the protection of watersheds exceptional, and their environmental development has always been a hot issue of social concern. To realize the high-quality development of the watershed, this paper studies the ecological protection mechanism at the inter-provincial and intra-provincial levels. At the inter-provincial level, we constructed a game model for the evolution of ecological compensation between upstream and downstream governments in the watershed. We explored the changes in the strategy choices of both sides of the game under the condition of an unconstrained mechanism and the constraints of the reward and punishment mechanism of the central government. At the intra-provincial level, the local government, enterprise, and public ecological protection evolution game models are constructed to analyze the strategic choices of the three-party game subjects. The study results show that firstly, the combination of strategies (governance, compensation) cannot be realized by upstream and downstream governments alone, and the central government can intervene by introducing specific incentives and penalties. Secondly, constructing upstream and downstream government ecological compensation mechanisms under the central government constraint has prompted the local government, enterprises, and the public to achieve the ideal stable state of the tripartite game subjects (strict regulation, treatment, supervision). Thirdly, factors such as local government strategy choices and regulatory efforts can impact the rate of evolution of enterprises and the public. © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2024. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. |
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| title_short |
Research on Ecological Protection Mechanisms in Watersheds Based on Evolutionary Games-Inter-provincial and Intra-provincial Perspectives |
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https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11269-024-03773-4 |
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Shi, Mingxia Li, Wanying |
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| score |
7.399455 |