Do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? An illustration from asymmetric Anglo–Dutch auctions
Abstract The Anglo–Dutch auction of Klemperer (European Economic Review 42(3):757–69, 1998) is the unit-demand precursor of the many two-stage hybrid auctions currently used for the allocation of high value goods such as mobile telephony licenses, bus routes, and public procurement. This breadth of...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Marszalec, Daniel [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2022 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
© Japanese Economic Association 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: The Japanese economic review - Springer Nature Singapore, 1995, 75(2022), 2 vom: 09. Dez., Seite 215-242 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:75 ; year:2022 ; number:2 ; day:09 ; month:12 ; pages:215-242 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s42973-022-00124-z |
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SPR055474810 |
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| 520 | |a Abstract The Anglo–Dutch auction of Klemperer (European Economic Review 42(3):757–69, 1998) is the unit-demand precursor of the many two-stage hybrid auctions currently used for the allocation of high value goods such as mobile telephony licenses, bus routes, and public procurement. This breadth of practical applications has been largely matched by an absence of theoretical results regarding the performance of hybrid auctions relative to their simpler component counterparts: the ascending and first-price auctions. To address this imbalance, I analyse an asymmetric discrete private value model that allows a complete revenue ranking between the Anglo–Dutch, ascending and first-price auctions. I find that the Anglo–Dutch auction can revenue-dominate for a small set of parameters, and ranks revenue-last in an even smaller number of cases; for most parameter values it ranks as intermediate. The auction also performs particularly well when bidders face entry costs and the incumbent has small-but-certain value-advantage: a setting where bidder incentives are similar to Klemperer’s notion of “almost common values”. Overall, the Anglo–Dutch auction is rarely best, but even more rarely performs worst—for this reason, it may be a prudent policy choice if the auctioneer is unsure about the magnitude of asymmetries across bidders. While the implications of my basic model do not immediately generalise to more complex settings, they do suggest that the notion that hybrid auctions are naturally “the best of both worlds” need to be evaluated carefully, and cannot be taken for granted. | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Anglo–Dutch auction |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Asymmetric auction |7 (dpeaa)DE-He213 | |
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10.1007/s42973-022-00124-z doi (DE-627)SPR055474810 (SPR)s42973-022-00124-z-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 83.00 bkl Marszalec, Daniel verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-5710-3436 aut Do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? An illustration from asymmetric Anglo–Dutch auctions 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Japanese Economic Association 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. Abstract The Anglo–Dutch auction of Klemperer (European Economic Review 42(3):757–69, 1998) is the unit-demand precursor of the many two-stage hybrid auctions currently used for the allocation of high value goods such as mobile telephony licenses, bus routes, and public procurement. This breadth of practical applications has been largely matched by an absence of theoretical results regarding the performance of hybrid auctions relative to their simpler component counterparts: the ascending and first-price auctions. To address this imbalance, I analyse an asymmetric discrete private value model that allows a complete revenue ranking between the Anglo–Dutch, ascending and first-price auctions. I find that the Anglo–Dutch auction can revenue-dominate for a small set of parameters, and ranks revenue-last in an even smaller number of cases; for most parameter values it ranks as intermediate. The auction also performs particularly well when bidders face entry costs and the incumbent has small-but-certain value-advantage: a setting where bidder incentives are similar to Klemperer’s notion of “almost common values”. Overall, the Anglo–Dutch auction is rarely best, but even more rarely performs worst—for this reason, it may be a prudent policy choice if the auctioneer is unsure about the magnitude of asymmetries across bidders. While the implications of my basic model do not immediately generalise to more complex settings, they do suggest that the notion that hybrid auctions are naturally “the best of both worlds” need to be evaluated carefully, and cannot be taken for granted. Auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Anglo–Dutch auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Ascending auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 First-price auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Hybrid auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Asymmetric auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in The Japanese economic review Springer Nature Singapore, 1995 75(2022), 2 vom: 09. Dez., Seite 215-242 (DE-627)320453871 (DE-600)2006390-8 1468-5876 nnns volume:75 year:2022 number:2 day:09 month:12 pages:215-242 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s42973-022-00124-z X:VERLAG 0 lizenzpflichtig Volltext SYSFLAG_0 GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 83.00 VZ AR 75 2022 2 09 12 215-242 |
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10.1007/s42973-022-00124-z doi (DE-627)SPR055474810 (SPR)s42973-022-00124-z-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 83.00 bkl Marszalec, Daniel verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-5710-3436 aut Do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? An illustration from asymmetric Anglo–Dutch auctions 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Japanese Economic Association 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. Abstract The Anglo–Dutch auction of Klemperer (European Economic Review 42(3):757–69, 1998) is the unit-demand precursor of the many two-stage hybrid auctions currently used for the allocation of high value goods such as mobile telephony licenses, bus routes, and public procurement. This breadth of practical applications has been largely matched by an absence of theoretical results regarding the performance of hybrid auctions relative to their simpler component counterparts: the ascending and first-price auctions. To address this imbalance, I analyse an asymmetric discrete private value model that allows a complete revenue ranking between the Anglo–Dutch, ascending and first-price auctions. I find that the Anglo–Dutch auction can revenue-dominate for a small set of parameters, and ranks revenue-last in an even smaller number of cases; for most parameter values it ranks as intermediate. The auction also performs particularly well when bidders face entry costs and the incumbent has small-but-certain value-advantage: a setting where bidder incentives are similar to Klemperer’s notion of “almost common values”. Overall, the Anglo–Dutch auction is rarely best, but even more rarely performs worst—for this reason, it may be a prudent policy choice if the auctioneer is unsure about the magnitude of asymmetries across bidders. While the implications of my basic model do not immediately generalise to more complex settings, they do suggest that the notion that hybrid auctions are naturally “the best of both worlds” need to be evaluated carefully, and cannot be taken for granted. Auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Anglo–Dutch auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Ascending auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 First-price auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Hybrid auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Asymmetric auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in The Japanese economic review Springer Nature Singapore, 1995 75(2022), 2 vom: 09. Dez., Seite 215-242 (DE-627)320453871 (DE-600)2006390-8 1468-5876 nnns volume:75 year:2022 number:2 day:09 month:12 pages:215-242 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s42973-022-00124-z X:VERLAG 0 lizenzpflichtig Volltext SYSFLAG_0 GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 83.00 VZ AR 75 2022 2 09 12 215-242 |
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10.1007/s42973-022-00124-z doi (DE-627)SPR055474810 (SPR)s42973-022-00124-z-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 83.00 bkl Marszalec, Daniel verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-5710-3436 aut Do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? An illustration from asymmetric Anglo–Dutch auctions 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Japanese Economic Association 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. Abstract The Anglo–Dutch auction of Klemperer (European Economic Review 42(3):757–69, 1998) is the unit-demand precursor of the many two-stage hybrid auctions currently used for the allocation of high value goods such as mobile telephony licenses, bus routes, and public procurement. This breadth of practical applications has been largely matched by an absence of theoretical results regarding the performance of hybrid auctions relative to their simpler component counterparts: the ascending and first-price auctions. To address this imbalance, I analyse an asymmetric discrete private value model that allows a complete revenue ranking between the Anglo–Dutch, ascending and first-price auctions. I find that the Anglo–Dutch auction can revenue-dominate for a small set of parameters, and ranks revenue-last in an even smaller number of cases; for most parameter values it ranks as intermediate. The auction also performs particularly well when bidders face entry costs and the incumbent has small-but-certain value-advantage: a setting where bidder incentives are similar to Klemperer’s notion of “almost common values”. Overall, the Anglo–Dutch auction is rarely best, but even more rarely performs worst—for this reason, it may be a prudent policy choice if the auctioneer is unsure about the magnitude of asymmetries across bidders. While the implications of my basic model do not immediately generalise to more complex settings, they do suggest that the notion that hybrid auctions are naturally “the best of both worlds” need to be evaluated carefully, and cannot be taken for granted. Auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Anglo–Dutch auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Ascending auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 First-price auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Hybrid auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Asymmetric auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in The Japanese economic review Springer Nature Singapore, 1995 75(2022), 2 vom: 09. Dez., Seite 215-242 (DE-627)320453871 (DE-600)2006390-8 1468-5876 nnns volume:75 year:2022 number:2 day:09 month:12 pages:215-242 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s42973-022-00124-z X:VERLAG 0 lizenzpflichtig Volltext SYSFLAG_0 GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 83.00 VZ AR 75 2022 2 09 12 215-242 |
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10.1007/s42973-022-00124-z doi (DE-627)SPR055474810 (SPR)s42973-022-00124-z-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 VZ 83.00 bkl Marszalec, Daniel verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-5710-3436 aut Do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? An illustration from asymmetric Anglo–Dutch auctions 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © Japanese Economic Association 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. Abstract The Anglo–Dutch auction of Klemperer (European Economic Review 42(3):757–69, 1998) is the unit-demand precursor of the many two-stage hybrid auctions currently used for the allocation of high value goods such as mobile telephony licenses, bus routes, and public procurement. This breadth of practical applications has been largely matched by an absence of theoretical results regarding the performance of hybrid auctions relative to their simpler component counterparts: the ascending and first-price auctions. To address this imbalance, I analyse an asymmetric discrete private value model that allows a complete revenue ranking between the Anglo–Dutch, ascending and first-price auctions. I find that the Anglo–Dutch auction can revenue-dominate for a small set of parameters, and ranks revenue-last in an even smaller number of cases; for most parameter values it ranks as intermediate. The auction also performs particularly well when bidders face entry costs and the incumbent has small-but-certain value-advantage: a setting where bidder incentives are similar to Klemperer’s notion of “almost common values”. Overall, the Anglo–Dutch auction is rarely best, but even more rarely performs worst—for this reason, it may be a prudent policy choice if the auctioneer is unsure about the magnitude of asymmetries across bidders. While the implications of my basic model do not immediately generalise to more complex settings, they do suggest that the notion that hybrid auctions are naturally “the best of both worlds” need to be evaluated carefully, and cannot be taken for granted. Auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Anglo–Dutch auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Ascending auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 First-price auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Hybrid auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Asymmetric auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Enthalten in The Japanese economic review Springer Nature Singapore, 1995 75(2022), 2 vom: 09. Dez., Seite 215-242 (DE-627)320453871 (DE-600)2006390-8 1468-5876 nnns volume:75 year:2022 number:2 day:09 month:12 pages:215-242 https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s42973-022-00124-z X:VERLAG 0 lizenzpflichtig Volltext SYSFLAG_0 GBV_SPRINGER GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 83.00 VZ AR 75 2022 2 09 12 215-242 |
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Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abstract The Anglo–Dutch auction of Klemperer (European Economic Review 42(3):757–69, 1998) is the unit-demand precursor of the many two-stage hybrid auctions currently used for the allocation of high value goods such as mobile telephony licenses, bus routes, and public procurement. This breadth of practical applications has been largely matched by an absence of theoretical results regarding the performance of hybrid auctions relative to their simpler component counterparts: the ascending and first-price auctions. To address this imbalance, I analyse an asymmetric discrete private value model that allows a complete revenue ranking between the Anglo–Dutch, ascending and first-price auctions. I find that the Anglo–Dutch auction can revenue-dominate for a small set of parameters, and ranks revenue-last in an even smaller number of cases; for most parameter values it ranks as intermediate. The auction also performs particularly well when bidders face entry costs and the incumbent has small-but-certain value-advantage: a setting where bidder incentives are similar to Klemperer’s notion of “almost common values”. Overall, the Anglo–Dutch auction is rarely best, but even more rarely performs worst—for this reason, it may be a prudent policy choice if the auctioneer is unsure about the magnitude of asymmetries across bidders. While the implications of my basic model do not immediately generalise to more complex settings, they do suggest that the notion that hybrid auctions are naturally “the best of both worlds” need to be evaluated carefully, and cannot be taken for granted.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Auction</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Anglo–Dutch auction</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Ascending auction</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">First-price auction</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Hybrid auction</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Asymmetric auction</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-He213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">The Japanese economic review</subfield><subfield code="d">Springer Nature Singapore, 1995</subfield><subfield code="g">75(2022), 2 vom: 09. 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Marszalec, Daniel ddc 330 bkl 83.00 misc Auction misc Anglo–Dutch auction misc Ascending auction misc First-price auction misc Hybrid auction misc Asymmetric auction Do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? An illustration from asymmetric Anglo–Dutch auctions |
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330 VZ 83.00 bkl Do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? An illustration from asymmetric Anglo–Dutch auctions Auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Anglo–Dutch auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Ascending auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 First-price auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Hybrid auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 Asymmetric auction (dpeaa)DE-He213 |
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do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? an illustration from asymmetric anglo–dutch auctions |
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Do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? An illustration from asymmetric Anglo–Dutch auctions |
| abstract |
Abstract The Anglo–Dutch auction of Klemperer (European Economic Review 42(3):757–69, 1998) is the unit-demand precursor of the many two-stage hybrid auctions currently used for the allocation of high value goods such as mobile telephony licenses, bus routes, and public procurement. This breadth of practical applications has been largely matched by an absence of theoretical results regarding the performance of hybrid auctions relative to their simpler component counterparts: the ascending and first-price auctions. To address this imbalance, I analyse an asymmetric discrete private value model that allows a complete revenue ranking between the Anglo–Dutch, ascending and first-price auctions. I find that the Anglo–Dutch auction can revenue-dominate for a small set of parameters, and ranks revenue-last in an even smaller number of cases; for most parameter values it ranks as intermediate. The auction also performs particularly well when bidders face entry costs and the incumbent has small-but-certain value-advantage: a setting where bidder incentives are similar to Klemperer’s notion of “almost common values”. Overall, the Anglo–Dutch auction is rarely best, but even more rarely performs worst—for this reason, it may be a prudent policy choice if the auctioneer is unsure about the magnitude of asymmetries across bidders. While the implications of my basic model do not immediately generalise to more complex settings, they do suggest that the notion that hybrid auctions are naturally “the best of both worlds” need to be evaluated carefully, and cannot be taken for granted. © Japanese Economic Association 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. |
| abstractGer |
Abstract The Anglo–Dutch auction of Klemperer (European Economic Review 42(3):757–69, 1998) is the unit-demand precursor of the many two-stage hybrid auctions currently used for the allocation of high value goods such as mobile telephony licenses, bus routes, and public procurement. This breadth of practical applications has been largely matched by an absence of theoretical results regarding the performance of hybrid auctions relative to their simpler component counterparts: the ascending and first-price auctions. To address this imbalance, I analyse an asymmetric discrete private value model that allows a complete revenue ranking between the Anglo–Dutch, ascending and first-price auctions. I find that the Anglo–Dutch auction can revenue-dominate for a small set of parameters, and ranks revenue-last in an even smaller number of cases; for most parameter values it ranks as intermediate. The auction also performs particularly well when bidders face entry costs and the incumbent has small-but-certain value-advantage: a setting where bidder incentives are similar to Klemperer’s notion of “almost common values”. Overall, the Anglo–Dutch auction is rarely best, but even more rarely performs worst—for this reason, it may be a prudent policy choice if the auctioneer is unsure about the magnitude of asymmetries across bidders. While the implications of my basic model do not immediately generalise to more complex settings, they do suggest that the notion that hybrid auctions are naturally “the best of both worlds” need to be evaluated carefully, and cannot be taken for granted. © Japanese Economic Association 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract The Anglo–Dutch auction of Klemperer (European Economic Review 42(3):757–69, 1998) is the unit-demand precursor of the many two-stage hybrid auctions currently used for the allocation of high value goods such as mobile telephony licenses, bus routes, and public procurement. This breadth of practical applications has been largely matched by an absence of theoretical results regarding the performance of hybrid auctions relative to their simpler component counterparts: the ascending and first-price auctions. To address this imbalance, I analyse an asymmetric discrete private value model that allows a complete revenue ranking between the Anglo–Dutch, ascending and first-price auctions. I find that the Anglo–Dutch auction can revenue-dominate for a small set of parameters, and ranks revenue-last in an even smaller number of cases; for most parameter values it ranks as intermediate. The auction also performs particularly well when bidders face entry costs and the incumbent has small-but-certain value-advantage: a setting where bidder incentives are similar to Klemperer’s notion of “almost common values”. Overall, the Anglo–Dutch auction is rarely best, but even more rarely performs worst—for this reason, it may be a prudent policy choice if the auctioneer is unsure about the magnitude of asymmetries across bidders. While the implications of my basic model do not immediately generalise to more complex settings, they do suggest that the notion that hybrid auctions are naturally “the best of both worlds” need to be evaluated carefully, and cannot be taken for granted. © Japanese Economic Association 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. |
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| title_short |
Do hybrid auctions always give “the best of both worlds” ? An illustration from asymmetric Anglo–Dutch auctions |
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https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s42973-022-00124-z |
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| score |
7.401101 |